On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 5:06:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Aug 2019, at 11:49, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, August 12, 2019 at 4:17:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 00:16, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 1:07:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9 Aug 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *The Right Stuff*
>>> Ned Markosian
>>> https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf
>>> from https://markosian.net/online-papers/
>>>
>>> *Things are also known as “objects” and “entities,” and stuff is also
>>> known as*
>>> *“matter” and “material.”*
>>>
>>> *This paper argues for including stuff in one’s ontology. The
>>> distinction*
>>> *between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different
>>> ontologies*
>>> *of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure
>>> stuff*
>>> *ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper
>>> defends*
>>> *the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition
>>> to things)*
>>> *in one’s ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and
>>> four of*
>>> *which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain
>>> metaphysical*
>>> *positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five
>>> objections to*
>>> *positing stuff are considered and rejected.*
>>>
>>>
>>> Honest and clear defence of stuff!. I appreciate his distinction between
>>> things and stuff.
>>>
>>> So with mechanism, we can say: many things no stuff!
>>> (Many things like numbers, machines, persons, physical objects,
>>> physical experiences, etc.),
>>>
>>>
>>> Feel free to defend any of the eleven reason he gave. Up to now (I read
>>> slowly) I am not convinced.
>>>
>>> I am more sure that 2+2=4 than of the existence of plumb, .. not
>>> mentioning the existence of a plumber !
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> I don't know about a plumb, but of a plum, I am more sure of any of my
>> experiences of eating a plum than 2+2=4.
>>
>>
>> But the experience of eating a plum is not a proof that the plum is made
>> of matter. I dreamed a lot eating things, for example. A first person
>> experience never proves anything, except the existence of that experience
>> for the one who remember it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2+2=4 is a heuristic of mathematical language. Useful for us, but not
>> "real" like a plum-eating experience.
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, we do have an explanation of where such experience come
>> from.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Language bewilders us, and thus we talk and write and think of things,
>> but it's the plum stuff that matters.
>>
>>
>>
>> Then mechanism is false. Maybe, but the evidences side with mechanism,
>> not with materialism. Yes, language bewllders us in making us believe in
>> stuff, but if digital mechanism is correct, all the argument you might find
>> for better are find by your counterpart in arithmetic, and here we know
>> that they are invalid, but that shows that your intuition is not well
>> sustained, or that mechanism is false (and the “you” in arithmetic becomes
>> p-zombies.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> This is the whole panpsychism (here the Galen Stawson, Philip Goff, Hedda
> Hassel Mørch, ... materialist panpsychist kind, not the idealist version
> of maybe a few) enterprise.
>
> Either:
>
> Mechanism is true.
>
> or
>
> Panpsychism is true.
>
>
>
> Why?
>
> It seems to me that if Mechanism is false, *many* different sorts of
> non-mechanist theory can be true, including pure arithmetical one, or set
> theoretical one.
>
> With Non-Mechanism, weak materialism *might* become consistent, but that
> does not (yet) make it necessarily true.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Basically, you replace mechanism with an experiential mechanism (
*e-mechanism*), where
*Φ+Ψ:* *both numbers (information) and [real!] qualia (experience)
are processed*.
Now matter (in the panpsychist view) supplies *Φ+Ψ* but maybe there's an
alternative.
It comes down to what real *Ψ *is.
A recent paper from Hedda Hassel Mørch here:
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf
A real *Ψ* vs an illusory or simulated *Ψ *is the key issue.
@philipthrift
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b0b23224-8f9c-49a3-8afd-fd0c96c9366f%40googlegroups.com.
