On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 7:42:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 Aug 2019, at 12:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 5:06:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 12 Aug 2019, at 11:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, August 12, 2019 at 4:17:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 00:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 1:07:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 9 Aug 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *The Right Stuff* >>>> Ned Markosian >>>> https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf >>>> from https://markosian.net/online-papers/ >>>> >>>> *Things are also known as “objects” and “entities,” and stuff is also >>>> known as* >>>> *“matter” and “material.”* >>>> >>>> *This paper argues for including stuff in one’s ontology. The >>>> distinction* >>>> *between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different >>>> ontologies* >>>> *of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a >>>> pure stuff* >>>> *ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper >>>> defends* >>>> *the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition >>>> to things)* >>>> *in one’s ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and >>>> four of* >>>> *which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain >>>> metaphysical* >>>> *positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five >>>> objections to* >>>> *positing stuff are considered and rejected.* >>>> >>>> >>>> Honest and clear defence of stuff!. I appreciate his distinction >>>> between things and stuff. >>>> >>>> So with mechanism, we can say: many things no stuff! >>>> (Many things like numbers, machines, persons, physical objects, >>>> physical experiences, etc.), >>>> >>>> >>>> Feel free to defend any of the eleven reason he gave. Up to now (I read >>>> slowly) I am not convinced. >>>> >>>> I am more sure that 2+2=4 than of the existence of plumb, .. not >>>> mentioning the existence of a plumber ! >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>> I don't know about a plumb, but of a plum, I am more sure of any of my >>> experiences of eating a plum than 2+2=4. >>> >>> >>> But the experience of eating a plum is not a proof that the plum is made >>> of matter. I dreamed a lot eating things, for example. A first person >>> experience never proves anything, except the existence of that experience >>> for the one who remember it. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2+2=4 is a heuristic of mathematical language. Useful for us, but not >>> "real" like a plum-eating experience. >>> >>> >>> With mechanism, we do have an explanation of where such experience come >>> from. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Language bewilders us, and thus we talk and write and think of things, >>> but it's the plum stuff that matters. >>> >>> >>> >>> Then mechanism is false. Maybe, but the evidences side with mechanism, >>> not with materialism. Yes, language bewllders us in making us believe in >>> stuff, but if digital mechanism is correct, all the argument you might find >>> for better are find by your counterpart in arithmetic, and here we know >>> that they are invalid, but that shows that your intuition is not well >>> sustained, or that mechanism is false (and the “you” in arithmetic becomes >>> p-zombies. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> This is the whole panpsychism (here the Galen Stawson, Philip Goff, Hedda >> Hassel Mørch, ... materialist panpsychist kind, not the idealist version >> of maybe a few) enterprise. >> >> Either: >> >> Mechanism is true. >> >> or >> >> Panpsychism is true. >> >> >> >> Why? >> >> It seems to me that if Mechanism is false, *many* different sorts of >> non-mechanist theory can be true, including pure arithmetical one, or set >> theoretical one. >> >> With Non-Mechanism, weak materialism *might* become consistent, but that >> does not (yet) make it necessarily true. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > Basically, you replace mechanism with an experiential mechanism ( > *e-mechanism*), where > > *Φ+Ψ:* *both numbers (information) and [real!] qualia (experience) > are processed*. > > Now matter (in the panpsychist view) supplies *Φ+Ψ* but maybe there's an > alternative. > > It comes down to what real *Ψ *is. > > > A recent paper from Hedda Hassel Mørch here: > > https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf > > A real *Ψ* vs an illusory or simulated *Ψ *is the key issue. > > > > Hmm…. With digital mechanism, the simulation concerns the machine ([]p, [] > is Gödel’s universal Löbian predicate: it is a Universal machine capable of > proving its own universality). > > In the case, as I say, it is “[]p” which is simulated. We cannot really > simulated “p” (that would not even have a meaning), but the machine which > says []p, is confronted with the truth of p (or its falsity, but let us > assume that the machine is sound), and in this case, we get a being > described by ([]p & p), associated logically to the machine, and which is > not Turing emulable. It plays the role of the machine knowledge. Is non > emulability comes from the fact that we cannot define a knowledge, or a > truth predicate. If Tarski theorem was wrong, we would be able to build a > truth predicate, like True(‘p’) and simulate []p & p by computing > beweisbar(‘p’) & True(‘p’), but a predicate like true cannot exist (Tarski > theorem). > > The truth predicate plays the role of Plato’s Truth, or Ploitinus’ One: we > just cannot define it in the language of any machine. But that does not > mean that the machine cannot guess it, and develop theories pointing on it. > > Bruno > > In the common view, machines do more than process information (numbers).
Car engines process gasoline to make motion. Star Trek food machines process atoms to make dinner. etc. @philipthfift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71589961-d7f0-4947-ae6c-aac83e8ae3c1%40googlegroups.com.
