> On 14 Aug 2019, at 12:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 5:06:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 12 Aug 2019, at 11:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, August 12, 2019 at 4:17:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 00:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 1:07:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 9 Aug 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The Right Stuff >>>> Ned Markosian >>>> https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf >>>> <https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf> >>>> from https://markosian.net/online-papers/ >>>> <https://markosian.net/online-papers/> >>>> >>>> Things are also known as “objects” and “entities,” and stuff is also known >>>> as >>>> “matter” and “material.” >>>> >>>> This paper argues for including stuff in one’s ontology. The distinction >>>> between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different >>>> ontologies >>>> of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure >>>> stuff >>>> ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper defends >>>> the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition to >>>> things) >>>> in one’s ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and four of >>>> which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain metaphysical >>>> positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five objections to >>>> positing stuff are considered and rejected. >>> >>> Honest and clear defence of stuff!. I appreciate his distinction between >>> things and stuff. >>> >>> So with mechanism, we can say: many things no stuff! >>> (Many things like numbers, machines, persons, physical objects, physical >>> experiences, etc.), >>> >>> >>> Feel free to defend any of the eleven reason he gave. Up to now (I read >>> slowly) I am not convinced. >>> >>> I am more sure that 2+2=4 than of the existence of plumb, .. not mentioning >>> the existence of a plumber ! >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> I don't know about a plumb, but of a plum, I am more sure of any of my >>> experiences of eating a plum than 2+2=4. >> >> But the experience of eating a plum is not a proof that the plum is made of >> matter. I dreamed a lot eating things, for example. A first person >> experience never proves anything, except the existence of that experience >> for the one who remember it. >> >> >> >>> >>> 2+2=4 is a heuristic of mathematical language. Useful for us, but not >>> "real" like a plum-eating experience. >> >> With mechanism, we do have an explanation of where such experience come from. >> >> >> >>> >>> Language bewilders us, and thus we talk and write and think of things, but >>> it's the plum stuff that matters. >> >> >> Then mechanism is false. Maybe, but the evidences side with mechanism, not >> with materialism. Yes, language bewllders us in making us believe in stuff, >> but if digital mechanism is correct, all the argument you might find for >> better are find by your counterpart in arithmetic, and here we know that >> they are invalid, but that shows that your intuition is not well sustained, >> or that mechanism is false (and the “you” in arithmetic becomes p-zombies. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> This is the whole panpsychism (here the Galen Stawson, Philip Goff, Hedda >> Hassel Mørch, ... materialist panpsychist kind, not the idealist version of >> maybe a few) enterprise. >> >> Either: >> >> Mechanism is true. >> >> or >> >> Panpsychism is true. > > > Why? > > It seems to me that if Mechanism is false, *many* different sorts of > non-mechanist theory can be true, including pure arithmetical one, or set > theoretical one. > > With Non-Mechanism, weak materialism *might* become consistent, but that does > not (yet) make it necessarily true. > > Bruno > > > > Basically, you replace mechanism with an experiential mechanism > (e-mechanism), where > > Φ+Ψ: both numbers (information) and [real!] qualia (experience) are > processed. > > Now matter (in the panpsychist view) supplies Φ+Ψ but maybe there's an > alternative. > > It comes down to what real Ψ is. > > > A recent paper from Hedda Hassel Mørch here: > > https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf > <https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf> > > A real Ψ vs an illusory or simulated Ψ is the key issue.
Hmm…. With digital mechanism, the simulation concerns the machine ([]p, [] is Gödel’s universal Löbian predicate: it is a Universal machine capable of proving its own universality). In the case, as I say, it is “[]p” which is simulated. We cannot really simulated “p” (that would not even have a meaning), but the machine which says []p, is confronted with the truth of p (or its falsity, but let us assume that the machine is sound), and in this case, we get a being described by ([]p & p), associated logically to the machine, and which is not Turing emulable. It plays the role of the machine knowledge. Is non emulability comes from the fact that we cannot define a knowledge, or a truth predicate. If Tarski theorem was wrong, we would be able to build a truth predicate, like True(‘p’) and simulate []p & p by computing beweisbar(‘p’) & True(‘p’), but a predicate like true cannot exist (Tarski theorem). The truth predicate plays the role of Plato’s Truth, or Ploitinus’ One: we just cannot define it in the language of any machine. But that does not mean that the machine cannot guess it, and develop theories pointing on it. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b0b23224-8f9c-49a3-8afd-fd0c96c9366f%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b0b23224-8f9c-49a3-8afd-fd0c96c9366f%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/44DA3133-82F1-48FD-998D-12B91BBE0EF2%40ulb.ac.be.
