> On 14 Aug 2019, at 15:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 7:42:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 14 Aug 2019, at 12:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 5:06:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 11:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, August 12, 2019 at 4:17:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 00:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 1:07:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 9 Aug 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The Right Stuff >>>>> Ned Markosian >>>>> https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf >>>>> <https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf> >>>>> from https://markosian.net/online-papers/ >>>>> <https://markosian.net/online-papers/> >>>>> >>>>> Things are also known as “objects” and “entities,” and stuff is also >>>>> known as >>>>> “matter” and “material.” >>>>> >>>>> This paper argues for including stuff in one’s ontology. The distinction >>>>> between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different >>>>> ontologies >>>>> of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure >>>>> stuff >>>>> ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper >>>>> defends >>>>> the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition to >>>>> things) >>>>> in one’s ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and four >>>>> of >>>>> which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain metaphysical >>>>> positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five objections >>>>> to >>>>> positing stuff are considered and rejected. >>>> >>>> Honest and clear defence of stuff!. I appreciate his distinction between >>>> things and stuff. >>>> >>>> So with mechanism, we can say: many things no stuff! >>>> (Many things like numbers, machines, persons, physical objects, physical >>>> experiences, etc.), >>>> >>>> >>>> Feel free to defend any of the eleven reason he gave. Up to now (I read >>>> slowly) I am not convinced. >>>> >>>> I am more sure that 2+2=4 than of the existence of plumb, .. not >>>> mentioning the existence of a plumber ! >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know about a plumb, but of a plum, I am more sure of any of my >>>> experiences of eating a plum than 2+2=4. >>> >>> But the experience of eating a plum is not a proof that the plum is made of >>> matter. I dreamed a lot eating things, for example. A first person >>> experience never proves anything, except the existence of that experience >>> for the one who remember it. >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> 2+2=4 is a heuristic of mathematical language. Useful for us, but not >>>> "real" like a plum-eating experience. >>> >>> With mechanism, we do have an explanation of where such experience come >>> from. >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Language bewilders us, and thus we talk and write and think of things, but >>>> it's the plum stuff that matters. >>> >>> >>> Then mechanism is false. Maybe, but the evidences side with mechanism, not >>> with materialism. Yes, language bewllders us in making us believe in stuff, >>> but if digital mechanism is correct, all the argument you might find for >>> better are find by your counterpart in arithmetic, and here we know that >>> they are invalid, but that shows that your intuition is not well sustained, >>> or that mechanism is false (and the “you” in arithmetic becomes p-zombies. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> This is the whole panpsychism (here the Galen Stawson, Philip Goff, Hedda >>> Hassel Mørch, ... materialist panpsychist kind, not the idealist version >>> of maybe a few) enterprise. >>> >>> Either: >>> >>> Mechanism is true. >>> >>> or >>> >>> Panpsychism is true. >> >> >> Why? >> >> It seems to me that if Mechanism is false, *many* different sorts of >> non-mechanist theory can be true, including pure arithmetical one, or set >> theoretical one. >> >> With Non-Mechanism, weak materialism *might* become consistent, but that >> does not (yet) make it necessarily true. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Basically, you replace mechanism with an experiential mechanism >> (e-mechanism), where >> >> Φ+Ψ: both numbers (information) and [real!] qualia (experience) are >> processed. >> >> Now matter (in the panpsychist view) supplies Φ+Ψ but maybe there's an >> alternative. >> >> It comes down to what real Ψ is. >> >> >> A recent paper from Hedda Hassel Mørch here: >> >> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf >> <https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf> >> >> A real Ψ vs an illusory or simulated Ψ is the key issue. > > > Hmm…. With digital mechanism, the simulation concerns the machine ([]p, [] is > Gödel’s universal Löbian predicate: it is a Universal machine capable of > proving its own universality). > > In the case, as I say, it is “[]p” which is simulated. We cannot really > simulated “p” (that would not even have a meaning), but the machine which > says []p, is confronted with the truth of p (or its falsity, but let us > assume that the machine is sound), and in this case, we get a being described > by ([]p & p), associated logically to the machine, and which is not Turing > emulable. It plays the role of the machine knowledge. Is non emulability > comes from the fact that we cannot define a knowledge, or a truth predicate. > If Tarski theorem was wrong, we would be able to build a truth predicate, > like True(‘p’) and simulate []p & p by computing beweisbar(‘p’) & True(‘p’), > but a predicate like true cannot exist (Tarski theorem). > > The truth predicate plays the role of Plato’s Truth, or Ploitinus’ One: we > just cannot define it in the language of any machine. But that does not mean > that the machine cannot guess it, and develop theories pointing on it. > > Bruno > > > In the common view, machines do more than process information (numbers). > > Car engines process gasoline to make motion. > > Star Trek food machines process atoms to make dinner.
You are right on this. But I was using “machine” to mean “digital machine”. They are the one which do nothing more than processing numbers or Turing equivalent. Then the non digital machine, like a soap film, or a car engine, are constuct in the mind of the universal numbers relatively to each others. Bruno > > etc. > > @philipthfift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71589961-d7f0-4947-ae6c-aac83e8ae3c1%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71589961-d7f0-4947-ae6c-aac83e8ae3c1%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/929FE19F-C28A-4533-9B9B-0BDBA54965EF%40ulb.ac.be.
