Le ven. 13 sept. 2019 à 08:03, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> a écrit :
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 3:07 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> On 9/12/2019 9:49 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 1:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, 12 Sep 2019 at 09:38, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 2:55 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, September 10, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:18 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>> > Another argument that has been given here before is that if >>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>> > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of >>>>>>> people >>>>>>> > who are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and >>>>>>> we >>>>>>> > do not see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people >>>>>>> > born within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on >>>>>>> our >>>>>>> > branch if this scenario is true. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much >>>>>>> older >>>>>>> than even the oldest people we know. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is probably the best single argument against quantum >>>>>> immortality: if QI is true, then the measure of our lifetime after one >>>>>> reaches a normal lifetime is infinitely greater than the measure before >>>>>> age >>>>>> , say, 120 yr. So if one finds oneself younger than 120 years, QI is >>>>>> false, >>>>>> and if MWI is still considered to be true, there must be another argument >>>>>> why MWI does not imply QI. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Why do you think that measure only increases with age? On an objective >>>>> level it only decreases. >>>>> >>>> >>>> As Bruno would say, "you confuse the 1p with the 1pp." I am talking >>>> about my personal measure of the number of years I have lived. As I get >>>> older, the number of years I have lived increases. If I live to 1000, I >>>> have lived more years between 100 and 1000 than between 1 and 100. This is >>>> arithmetic, after all. >>>> >>>> But this discussion has gone off the rails. It started as a discussion >>>> of quantum immortality, and the arguments against this notion, even in MWI. >>>> The arguments against QI that have been advanced are that life-threatening >>>> events tend not to be binary or quantum, but rather we enter a period of >>>> slow decline, due to illness or other factors. Consequently, there is no >>>> reason for us to expect to be immortal, even in MWI. The other argument is >>>> that if QI is true, then you would expect to be very old. This argument was >>>> advanced by Mallah (arXiv: 0905.0187) and has not been satisfactorily >>>> rebutted. >>>> >>> >>> It is not simple arithmetic if you live to be very old that most of your >>> measure is in your older years if you take into account all the copies. >>> Suppose there are 10^100 copies of you under 100 years old and then all but >>> one copy dies, but that one copy goes on to live to 1000. If you did not >>> know how old you were and you had to guess given this information, then you >>> would guess with near certainty that you were under 100 years old. However, >>> you would also know with certainty that you would live to 1000, and you >>> would not notice anything weird happening as you approached your 100th >>> birthday. >>> >> >> The trouble with this argument is that you know that at least one copy of >> you will survive past 100 years (or past any age, for that matter). Given >> that you survive, the probability of survival is one. Taking account of all >> the other copies who die does not alter this fact. If you are all your >> copies, then your probability of survival under the assumption of QI is >> always one. >> >> Your RSSA assumption is effectively a dualist model -- there is only one >> soul that makes you really you, and that soul goes at random into one and >> only one copy at any time. Then the chances that this soul-containing copy >> is the one that survives, does indeed decrease rapidly with age. But that >> is the wrong way to look at it -- there is no 'soul' that makes a copy you. >> On the MWI assumptions, every copy is 'you', so since at least one copy >> always survives, 'you' will always survive. The number of years you survive >> past age 100 is indefinitely large, so you spend more time in those years, >> and you have probability one of getting there. >> >> >> As I understand it the theory is that all these 'you's' on all the >> branches are potentially the you-of-here-and-now. So the probability that >> you-of-here-and-now sees your self as much older than others depends on the >> measure of intervals along all the branches. So the question then turns, >> as Telmo said, whether this branching structure wide or deep. QI is the >> theory that it is infinitely deep. Could it also be infinitely wide? I >> don't think so, but in Bruno's theory it could be both. The question seems >> to come down to whether one is "copied" by quantum level events that are >> amplified to the level of consciousness (which is quasi-classical) very >> frequently (continuously?) or rarely. >> > > Yes. QI is possible only in a many-worlds scenario, but that does not > necessarily mean that any many-worlds scenario implies QI. As you say, most > of life's significant events are quasi-classical in origin, not decoherence > amplified quantum events. One could be "copied" by quantum events that are > irrelevant to your survival. For example, by the splitting of worlds > occasioned by someone shining a laser on a half-silvered mirror. That just > increases the number of copies, all of which probably survive that > splitting process. > > As another aside, it seems to me that Stathis's RSSA, with measure along > the lifeline decreasing in accordance with Born's rule (as Russell Standish > puts it in his book "Theory of Nothing"), is equivalent to a collapse model > (or the existence of a dualist "soul" as I put it before). > Wel if by "dualist soul" you mean something immaterial about our consciousness (like I don't know information) can be duplicated then yes it is dualist and any computational theory of mind is dualist in this sense then. I suppose you would say that if someone believe "he" can be copied and uploaded in a virtual environment then he is a dualist ? Quentin > QI requires many worlds. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRUGzHK%3D7u7FizR%3DcgVR68QbJa7wJ9oD14cFh5cwVMfoA%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRUGzHK%3D7u7FizR%3DcgVR68QbJa7wJ9oD14cFh5cwVMfoA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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