> On 19 Sep 2019, at 12:22, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 5:02 AM John Clark <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 5:54 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > This is exactly the break that occurred going from mind-brain identity > > theory to multiple-realizability theories > > (functionalism/computationalism/mechanism). It's the conventional meaning > > implied by mechanism that there's no identity (one to one relationship) > > between a mind and any particular one if it's instantiations. > > I've read that 3 times and I still can't figure out what it means. > > Sorry I should have included references. This article explains it further: > > https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_realizability > <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_realizability> >
OK. But note that some people (like Jones on this list, sometimes ago) who accept the multiple-realisability, but still insist that they have each to be implement physically. But that does not make sense once we say yes to the doctor, as a machine cannot feel any difference between being emulated by a physical reality or by the arithmetical reality. Yet, importantly, the machine can measure the palsuiblity of mechanism by doing experiments in the physical reality, and thanks to QM, Mechanism, and thus its immaterialism, is vindicated empirically. Bruno > Jason > > > > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3oTnjg%3DF-6GzfPpBcByj2uMikVmCqkOXE4Qd0BOgK0mw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3oTnjg%3DF-6GzfPpBcByj2uMikVmCqkOXE4Qd0BOgK0mw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgy1R-%2BuhCwCkeBFRxGqhScwg2LhxVBWqi5OzfwH5FbVw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgy1R-%2BuhCwCkeBFRxGqhScwg2LhxVBWqi5OzfwH5FbVw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6A09DDB9-19DC-419A-9D92-98A2FFD6CE7E%40ulb.ac.be.
