> On 16 Sep 2019, at 14:17, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 8:34 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > With mechanism [...] > > Bruno, I really wish you wouldn't start long paragraphs with those two words > because when you do I don't know if I agree with you or not.
You agree with the THEORY (hypothesis/postulate), which is simply the "yes doctor”, the idea that the brain is digitally emulable, etc. That is explained in all my paper and in all my post. Where you disagree is in the THEOREM. Your argument is that step 3 is flawed. You disagree also with the step 7, as it used the well know fact that the notion of computation is purely arithmetical, which is known (at least by logicians and theoretical computer scientists) since the 1930s. > Please be more specific and spell out exactly what assumptions you're > starting from, The assumption is that we can survive with an artficial physical brain. The theorem is that in that case physics has to be reduced to a statistic on all computations, which exists and are well structured (differently for each points of view) in the arithmetical reality. > your all purpose word "mechanism" just isn't good enough. I thought I knew > what "mechanism" mente today but quickly realized I was entirely wrong > because immediately after those two words you added "you are not identical > with your atoms configurations”. Indeed, once you accept the digital brain transplant, you understand that you can in principle change of body everyday, which illustrate that your identity is not in the atoms, but in the program implemented by your atom today, but by other atoms tomorrow. You can even survive with Babbage machine, which ahas no carbon atom. All this sis well known. What is less well known is that eventually the atoms are no more made of matter, but are mathematical invariant in some number theoretical relations, which is my contribution. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1xdGTxjAnooW9KR-dLzVJ02OC%3DCg3-y___L3pRSPd8xA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1xdGTxjAnooW9KR-dLzVJ02OC%3DCg3-y___L3pRSPd8xA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2494383E-5A32-42AA-A605-045028B898DB%40ulb.ac.be.
