On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 14:49, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 1:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Thu, 12 Sep 2019 at 09:38, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 2:55 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Tuesday, September 10, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:18 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>> > Another argument that has been given here before is that if quantum >>>>>> > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of >>>>>> people >>>>>> > who are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and >>>>>> we >>>>>> > do not see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if >>>>>> the >>>>>> > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people >>>>>> > born within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on >>>>>> our >>>>>> > branch if this scenario is true. >>>>>> >>>>>> My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much >>>>>> older >>>>>> than even the oldest people we know. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is probably the best single argument against quantum immortality: >>>>> if QI is true, then the measure of our lifetime after one reaches a normal >>>>> lifetime is infinitely greater than the measure before age , say, 120 yr. >>>>> So if one finds oneself younger than 120 years, QI is false, and if MWI is >>>>> still considered to be true, there must be another argument why MWI does >>>>> not imply QI. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Why do you think that measure only increases with age? On an objective >>>> level it only decreases. >>>> >>> >>> As Bruno would say, "you confuse the 1p with the 1pp." I am talking >>> about my personal measure of the number of years I have lived. As I get >>> older, the number of years I have lived increases. If I live to 1000, I >>> have lived more years between 100 and 1000 than between 1 and 100. This is >>> arithmetic, after all. >>> >>> But this discussion has gone off the rails. It started as a discussion >>> of quantum immortality, and the arguments against this notion, even in MWI. >>> The arguments against QI that have been advanced are that life-threatening >>> events tend not to be binary or quantum, but rather we enter a period of >>> slow decline, due to illness or other factors. Consequently, there is no >>> reason for us to expect to be immortal, even in MWI. The other argument is >>> that if QI is true, then you would expect to be very old. This argument was >>> advanced by Mallah (arXiv: 0905.0187) and has not been satisfactorily >>> rebutted. >>> >> >> It is not simple arithmetic if you live to be very old that most of your >> measure is in your older years if you take into account all the copies. >> Suppose there are 10^100 copies of you under 100 years old and then all but >> one copy dies, but that one copy goes on to live to 1000. If you did not >> know how old you were and you had to guess given this information, then you >> would guess with near certainty that you were under 100 years old. However, >> you would also know with certainty that you would live to 1000, and you >> would not notice anything weird happening as you approached your 100th >> birthday. >> > > The trouble with this argument is that you know that at least one copy of > you will survive past 100 years (or past any age, for that matter). Given > that you survive, the probability of survival is one. Taking account of all > the other copies who die does not alter this fact. If you are all your > copies, then your probability of survival under the assumption of QI is > always one. > > Your RSSA assumption is effectively a dualist model -- there is only one > soul that makes you really you, and that soul goes at random into one and > only one copy at any time. Then the chances that this soul-containing copy > is the one that survives, does indeed decrease rapidly with age. But that > is the wrong way to look at it -- there is no 'soul' that makes a copy you. > On the MWI assumptions, every copy is 'you', so since at least one copy > always survives, 'you' will always survive. The number of years you survive > past age 100 is indefinitely large, so you spend more time in those years, > and you have probability one of getting there. > I would not call it dualism. There are many copies, but I am one and only one copy. I do not assume there is a “soul”, just a process that can reflect and say “hey, it’s me”. I don’t know which copy I am and it doesn’t matter. What matters, because it defines survival, is that there be an entity in the future that identifies as being me and remembers being me. Effectively, since I am a process rather than a persisting physical object, I die with every passing moment, and it is only the existence of such entities that identify as being me and remember being me that creates the illusion of survival. I die if no such entities exist anywhere or any time. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWOkjGVUP_S4Jj%3D7aHY4ZmEZcAuZgjRGGZtfXh%2Bqoa7vA%40mail.gmail.com.
