On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell >> wrote: >>> >>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/ >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of >>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of >>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities. >>>> >>>> @philipthrift >>>> >>> >>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper on >>> how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI I have yet to read >>> their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One >>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of >>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be >>> useful for working with quantum gravity, >>> >>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete unfortunately, >>> where the two sets of quantum interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and >>> those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no decision >>> procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The proof is set with >>> nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the state space. In >>> effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden variables localize >>> extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is >>> the generation of information in a local context from quantum nonlocality >>> that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. Quantum >>> interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or postulates. MWI and >>> within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this is a >>> ψ-ontology, >>> and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic >>> nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of >>> the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum >>> interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule >>> within QuBism, which is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI? >>> >>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system >>> to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it >>> is a part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If >>> MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are >>> connected to the Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think >>> about. >>> >>> LC >>> >> >> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the many >> worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG >> > > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly > argued. > > > The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more > than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of homogeneity. >
Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had a discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG > > Of course, (for those who are aware of Gödel 1931 and Turing 1936), > arithmetic contains all computations, which entails, when assuming > mechanism, an infinity of each os us. > I really don't see how you make that jump. And what exactly does "assuming mechanism" mean? AG > That explains both where the appearance of universe come from, and the > quantum mechanical type of formalism. In “many-world”, the “many” makes > sense, but the term “world” is not well defined and should not been taken > literally. It is more histories than worlds per se. > > Bruno > > > > What's the argument for such a claim? Morevover, I don't believe a > universe of finite age, such as ours which everyone more or less agrees > began some 13.8 BYA, can be spatially infinite. Here I'm referring to our > bubble, not some infinite substratum from which it might have arose. AG > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f85775c7-7914-47e4-83eb-1142b1b58249%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f85775c7-7914-47e4-83eb-1142b1b58249%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/46e1d02d-2609-4316-8818-781a6db0814a%40googlegroups.com.
