On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 2:23:14 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 14:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/12/2019 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 12:26, Alan Grayson <[email protected] 
>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>>> wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift 
>>>>> wrote: 
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>> wrote: 
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>>>>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of 
>>>>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper 
>>>>> on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have yet to 
>>>>> read 
>>>>> their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One 
>>>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of 
>>>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be 
>>>>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>>>>
>>>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>>>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
>>>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There 
>>>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The proof 
>>>>> is 
>>>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the state 
>>>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden variables 
>>>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
>>>>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from 
>>>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. 
>>>>> Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
>>>>> postulates. 
>>>>> MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this is a 
>>>>> ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the degree 
>>>>> of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can 
>>>>> address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary 
>>>>> postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be 
>>>>> made 
>>>>> for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the 
>>>>> dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>>>>
>>>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system 
>>>>> to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it 
>>>>> is a part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If 
>>>>> MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are 
>>>>> connected to the Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think 
>>>>> about.
>>>>>
>>>>> LC
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the 
>>>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>>>>
>>>
>>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>>> exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed 
>>> by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly 
>>> argued.  What's the argument for such a claim? 
>>>
>>
>> Given a sufficient number of trials, the probability that an event that 
>> can occur will occur approaches one. 
>>
>>
>> That assumes identical trials.  A countably infinite set of universes 
>> could all be different.  
>>
>
> Yes, but consider an infinite universe where the cosmological principle 
> applies, which does not seem an unreasonable assumption.
>

It is unreasonable if the universe has been expanding for finite time, 
which is generally accepted. AG 

>
>> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

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