On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 8:59:59 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 19:48, Alan Grayson <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 2:23:14 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 14:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 9/12/2019 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 12:26, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of >>>>>>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of >>>>>>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a >>>>>>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI I have >>>>>>> yet >>>>>>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. >>>>>>> One >>>>>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of >>>>>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> useful for working with quantum gravity, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete >>>>>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that >>>>>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. >>>>>>> There >>>>>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The proof >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the >>>>>>> state >>>>>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden >>>>>>> variables >>>>>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this >>>>>>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from >>>>>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. >>>>>>> Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or >>>>>>> postulates. >>>>>>> MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this is >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the >>>>>>> degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing >>>>>>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar >>>>>>> demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what >>>>>>> might >>>>>>> be called the dialectic opposite of MWI? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working >>>>>>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. >>>>>>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the >>>>>>> fundamentals of >>>>>>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum >>>>>>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some >>>>>>> interesting things to think about. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> LC >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the >>>>>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there >>>>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently >>>>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even >>>>> plausibly argued. What's the argument for such a claim? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Given a sufficient number of trials, the probability that an event that >>>> can occur will occur approaches one. >>>> >>>> >>>> That assumes identical trials. A countably infinite set of universes >>>> could all be different. >>>> >>> >>> Yes, but consider an infinite universe where the cosmological principle >>> applies, which does not seem an unreasonable assumption. >>> >> >> It is unreasonable if the universe has been expanding for finite time, >> which is generally accepted. >> > > Is it certain that it had to be of finite volume initially, or that the > expansion must always have been at a finite rate? > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou >
The rate of expansion can vary, can be huge, much faster than the SoL, but it can't be infinitely fast, based on the view that singularities are not physically possible. Initially, I suppose it could have been infinitely large, but the data seems to indicate otherwise, such as the CMBR at 380,000 years after the BB. If it was infintely large at that time, it should have already cooled to near absolute zero. AG -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fdf7768d-d756-4290-b691-ba8efbce8fb3%40googlegroups.com.
