On 9/13/2019 1:23 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 14:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



    On 9/12/2019 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


    On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 12:26, Alan Grayson
    <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



        On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan
        Grayson wrote:



            On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6,
            Lawrence Crowell wrote:

                On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5,
                Philip Thrift wrote:



                    On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM
                    UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

                        
https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/




                    Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one
                    world of quantum-stochastic processes. They are
                    like vampires, but instead of running away from
                    sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.

                    @philipthrift


                This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and
                Sebens have a paper on how supposedly the Born rule
                can be derived from MWI  I have yet to read their
                paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to
                it. One advantage that MWI does have is that it
                splits the world as a sort of quantum frame dragging
                that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be
                useful for working with quantum gravity,

                I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be
                complete unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum
                interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and those that
                are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no
                decision procedure which can prove QM holds either
                way. The proof is set with nonlocal hidden variables
                over the projective rays of the state space. In
                effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden
                variables localize extant quantities, say with
                ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is the
                generation of information in a local context from
                quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with
                ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then
                auxiliary physical axioms or postulates. MWI and
                within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has
                done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born
                rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic
                nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can
                address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie
                into the auxiliary postulates of quantum
                interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made
                for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might
                be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?

                To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe
                a working system to understand QM foundations, is
                maybe taking things too far. However, it is a part of
                some open questions concerning the fundamentals of
                QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
                interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it
                makes for some interesting things to think about.

                LC


            If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll
            believes the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG


        Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then
        there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves.
        This is frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but
        never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly argued.  What's the
        argument for such a claim?


    Given a sufficient number of trials, the probability that an
    event that can occur will occur approaches one.

    That assumes identical trials.  A countably infinite set of
    universes could all be different.


Yes, but consider an infinite universe where the cosmological principle applies, which does not seem an unreasonable assumption.

The cosmological principle is only a heuristic referring to classical uniformity at a level of (very) coarse graining.

Brent

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