On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 19:48, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 2:23:14 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 14:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 9/12/2019 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 12:26, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of >>>>>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of >>>>>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper >>>>>> on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI I have yet to >>>>>> read >>>>>> their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One >>>>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of >>>>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be >>>>>> useful for working with quantum gravity, >>>>>> >>>>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete >>>>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that >>>>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There >>>>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The proof >>>>>> is >>>>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the state >>>>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden variables >>>>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this >>>>>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from >>>>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. >>>>>> Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or >>>>>> postulates. >>>>>> MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this is a >>>>>> ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the degree >>>>>> of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can >>>>>> address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary >>>>>> postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be >>>>>> made >>>>>> for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the >>>>>> dialectic opposite of MWI? >>>>>> >>>>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working >>>>>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. >>>>>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals >>>>>> of >>>>>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum >>>>>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some >>>>>> interesting things to think about. >>>>>> >>>>>> LC >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the >>>>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must >>>> exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed >>>> by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly >>>> argued. What's the argument for such a claim? >>>> >>> >>> Given a sufficient number of trials, the probability that an event that >>> can occur will occur approaches one. >>> >>> >>> That assumes identical trials. A countably infinite set of universes >>> could all be different. >>> >> >> Yes, but consider an infinite universe where the cosmological principle >> applies, which does not seem an unreasonable assumption. >> > > It is unreasonable if the universe has been expanding for finite time, > which is generally accepted. > Is it certain that it had to be of finite volume initially, or that the expansion must always have been at a finite rate? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXaEVy1snVCObOqhfUJdgm-WJJU0FyfyuNTCfy9_9toSw%40mail.gmail.com.
