On Sunday, October 6, 2019 at 1:19:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 5 Oct 2019, at 13:08, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, October 5, 2019 at 2:21:34 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 4 Oct 2019, at 20:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, October 4, 2019 at 8:28:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 4 Oct 2019, at 00:53, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> The question is about quantum many worlds. Not cosmology. >>> >>> >>> Cosmology assumes the quantum at a cosmological scale, and it is where a >>> collapse makes the less sense. Who would observe and be responsible for the >>> collapse of the universal wave? Belinfante estimates that the >>> Copenhagen-von Neuman formulation of QM requires an external god looking at >>> the universe, like materialism requires a god selecting a unique >>> computation, but that’s no more doing science. >>> >>> François Englert, who worked in quantum cosmology, was very annoyed by >>> the collapse problem, and was relieved that it makes sense to just abandon >>> the collapse idea. The collapse is usually not even defined in any >>> intelligible sense, and it introduces a duality incompatible with >>> Mechanism, but also with the scientific attitude, I would say. >>> >>> With mechanism, there is only one consciousness which differentiates >>> into many 1p histories, and they interfere statistically, notably by >>> allowing a 1p plural observable and sharable reality. >>> >>> Why to believe in any “world"? >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> Applied sciences >> >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_applied_science#Branches_of_applied_science >> >> do not need Many Worlds Interpretation (as far as I can see). >> >> If there is no reason to use MWI in applied science, there is no reason >> to consider MWI in science at all. >> >> >> That leads back to instrumentalist metaphysics, which is the same as >> “shut up and calculate”. You don’t need any world, not even one, in that >> case. >> >> Bruno >> > > > > It could appear so, but I say it leads to codicalism (between > instrumentalism [strict antirealism] and realism). > > > “Codicalism” or even “formalism” necessitates sigma_1 arithmetical > realism, which is the only ontology possible when we assume mechanism, but > consciousness and matter become phenomenological, and necessitate in > principle the whole of the mathematical reality, which is multiple and > undefinable (by machines, provably by machine’s too). > > Bruno > > > >
JD Hamkins - https://twitter.com/jdhamkins <https://twitter.com/jdhamkins?lang=en> - has expanded the definition of "definable" in mathematics. Nothing is settled and written on stone tablets, like The Ten Commandments. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/df9674d6-9a21-4651-9be7-b340b7d79273%40googlegroups.com.
