On 2/7/2020 2:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 6:45 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

    On 2/7/2020 3:07 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
    On Fri, Feb 7, 2020 at 9:54 PM Lawrence Crowell
    <goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com
    <mailto:goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>> wrote:

        On Thursday, February 6, 2020 at 10:59:27 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:


            This argument from Kent completely destroys Everett's
            attempt to derive the Born rule from his many-worlds
            approach to quantum mechanics. In fact, it totally
            undermines most attempts to derive the Born rule from any
            branching theory, and undermines attempts to justify
            ignoring branches on which the Born rule weights are
            disconfirmed. In the many-worlds case, recall, all
            observers are aware that other observers with other data
            must exist, but each is led to construct a spurious
            measure of importance that favours their own observations
            against the others', and this leads to an obvious
            absurdity. In the one-world case, observers treat what
            actually happened as important, and ignore what didn't
            happen: this doesn't lead to the same difficulty.

            Bruce


        This appears to argue that observers in a branch are limited
        in their ability to take the results of their branch as a
        Bayesian prior. This limitation occurs for the coin flip case
        where some combinations have a high degree of structure. Say
        all heads or a repeated sequence of heads and tails with some
        structure, or apparent structure. For large N though these
        are a diminishing measure.


    I don't think you have fully come to terms with Kent's argument.
    How do you determine the measure on the observed outcomes? The
    argument that such 'outlier' sequences are of small measure fails
    at the first hurdle, because all sequences have equal measure --
    all are equally likely. In fact, all occur with unit probability
    in MWI.

    In practice one doesn't look for a measure on specific outcomes
    sequences because you're testing a theory that only predicts one
    probability.  You flip coins to test whether P(heads)=0.5 which
    you can confirm or refute without even knowing the sequences.


The point of Kent's argument is that in MWI where all outcomes occur, you will get the same set of sequences of results whatever the intrinsic probabilities might be. So you cannot use data from any one sequence to test a hypothesis about the probabilities: the sequences obtained are independent of any underlying probability measure.

Why not?  Most copies of me will see sequences with approximately equal numbers of H and T.  In fact we do use data from one sequence, which ever one our accelerator produces, even though the theory we're testing predicts that all sequences are possible.  But we don't compare sequences; we compare statistics on the sequences and compare those to predicted probabilities.

Whether sequences are independent of "underlying probabilities" is a different problem.  First, one can't legitimately assume underlying probabilities when trying to justify the existence of a probability measure.  Second, the simple way to postulate a measure is just counting branches, which means that there must be many repetitions of the same sequence on different branches in order to realize probability values that aren't integer ratios

Brent


    It might be that every sequence you get by flipping is in the form
    HTHTHTHTHTHTHT... which would support P(H)=0.5.  It would be a
    different world than ours, possibly with different physics; but
    that would be a matter of  testing a different theory.

    One of the problems with MWI is that can't seem to explain
    probability without sneaking in some equivalent concept. The
    obvious version of MWI would be branch counting in which every
    measurement-like event produces an enormous number of branches and
    the number of branches with spin UP relative to the number with
    spin DOWN gives the odds of spin UP.  A meta-physical difficulty
    is the all the spin UP branches are identical and so by Leibniz's
    identity of indiscernibles are really only one; but maybe this
    inapplicable since the measure involves lots of environment that
    would make it discernible.


That seems to be rather beside the point.

Bruce
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