On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 4:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
[email protected]> wrote:

> On 2/7/2020 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 1:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On 2/7/2020 5:57 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> There is nothing that picks out one particular set of paths as preferred
>> in the many-worlds situation.
>>
>>
>> Sure you can.  For example you can pick out the set of paths whose
>> statistics are within some bounds of the mean.
>>
>
> Assuming you know what the 'mean' is absent any experiment.
>
>
> The mean is estimated by the average of the experimental values.
>


In other words, you use the data to infer probabilities. But the same data
occur whatever the probabilities, so your backward inference to the
probabilities is meaningless.

> Otherwise you are just cherry picking data to support your arbitrary
> theory.
>
>> One can only get that in a stochastic one-world model.
>>
>>
>> All paths occur in a stochastic one-world model too.
>>
>
> No they don't. They are possible, perhaps, but they do not necessarily
> occur.
>
>
> They don't *necessarily* occur.  But they probabilistic occur.
>

What on earth does that mean?

If the probability is very low, then the improbable sequences of results
need not occur even if you repeat the experiment 'till the heat death of
the universe. In MWI the low weight sequences necessarily occur in every
run of the experiments. Do you not see the difference?

  Otherwise it wouldn't be a stochastic model.  So it seems that all you
> objections to MWI apply equally.
>


Get a grip, Brent.

>
>   The only difference is that some probability measure is assumed as part
>> of the model.
>>
>
> And this gives one a principled reason for ignoring the paths that are not
> observed.
>
>
> Why not ignore them because they are not observed?  That's a principled
> reason.
>

That is a one-world theory. And I agree that that is the way to go.

Low probability has an independent meaning in the one-world case, so one is
> unlikely to observe a low probability set of results.
>
>
> One is unlikely to observe a result that is realized in only a small
> fraction of the MW branches.
>

Why? One does not choose one's results at random from the set of all
possible results. In MWI there is always an observer who gets every
possible set of results. Why ignore those unfortunates who get rest
inconsistent with your pet theory?

  I agree that MWI fails to derive the Born rule.  But I don't agree that
> it is inconsistent with it, given the version of MWI that postulates many
> branches...not just one per possible outcome.
>

The point is that MWI is inconsistent with experience. There will always be
observers who get results inconsistent with the Born rule. And we cannot
ensure that we are not such observers. So how can we claim that our theory
is confirmed by the data? The data are consistent with all possible
theories -- or none at all.

Bruce

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