On 2/7/2020 9:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 4:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 2/7/2020 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
    On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 1:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
    <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

        On 2/7/2020 5:57 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

        There is nothing that picks out one particular set of paths
        as preferred in the many-worlds situation.

        Sure you can.  For example you can pick out the set of paths
        whose statistics are within some bounds of the mean.


    Assuming you know what the 'mean' is absent any experiment.

    The mean is estimated by the average of the experimental values.



In other words, you use the data to infer probabilities. But the same data occur whatever the probabilities, so your backward inference to the probabilities is meaningless.

    Otherwise you are just cherry picking data to support your
    arbitrary theory.

        One can only get that in a stochastic one-world model.

        All paths occur in a stochastic one-world model too.


    No they don't. They are possible, perhaps, but they do not
    necessarily occur.

    They don't /necessarily/ occur.  But they probabilistic occur.


It means they occur with high probability given enough instances of the experiment.  So I don't see why you attach great significance to all possibilities occurring in MWI.


What on earth does that mean?

If the probability is very low, then the improbable sequences of results need not occur even if you repeat the experiment 'till the heat death of the universe. In MWI the low weight sequences necessarily occur in every run of the experiments. Do you not see the difference?

But the improbable sequences will occur in the same proportion in both scenarios.


      Otherwise it wouldn't be a stochastic model.  So it seems that
    all you objections to MWI apply equally.



Get a grip, Brent.


          The only difference is that some probability measure is
        assumed as part of the model.


    And this gives one a principled reason for ignoring the paths
    that are not observed.

    Why not ignore them because they are not observed?  That's a
    principled reason.


That is a one-world theory. And I agree that that is the way to go.

    Low probability has an independent meaning in the one-world case,
    so one is unlikely to observe a low probability set of results.

    One is unlikely to observe a result that is realized in only a
    small fraction of the MW branches.


Why? One does not choose one's results at random from the set of all possible results.

The theory is that which experience "you" have is determined by making a copy of you for each result and one of them, at random, is the "you" who has the experience.  So it is effectively a random sample from the possible results.

In MWI there is always an observer who gets every possible set of results. Why ignore those unfortunates who get rest inconsistent with your pet theory?

Because they are relatively few in number and hence unlikely to be the "you" who gets the result.


      I agree that MWI fails to derive the Born rule.  But I don't
    agree that it is inconsistent with it, given the version of MWI
    that postulates many branches...not just one per possible outcome.


The point is that MWI is inconsistent with experience. There will always be observers who get results inconsistent with the Born rule.

Why do you think you can't get a result inconsistent with the Born rule in one world.  What do you mean by "inconsistent".  The results are probabilistic so they will have degrees of consistency and inconsistency with the Born rule...just as there is a spread of results in MWI.

And we cannot ensure that we are not such observers. So how can we claim that our theory is confirmed by the data? The data are consistent with all possible theories -- or none at all.

But it's not all or nothing.  It's statistics.

Brent


Bruce
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