On 2/19/2020 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Feb 2020, at 23:14, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 12:05 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 18 Feb 2020, at 02:37, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
And if the probabilities are to be objective
They have to be at least first person plural.
'Objective', as I use the word here, means 'interpersonally agreed'.
In your terminology, that would be 1pp since there is no 3p in
many-worlds.
We should be able to make bet. But that is the case if instead of
duplicating the H-guy, you duplicate the H-Guy + the person (the
witness) with whom he make a bet. In that case, if you bet “W”,
and the witness bet “M" then in W you win the bet, and in M you
lost the bet. In the irate case, you recover the idea that by
using the Pascal Triangle, you can maximise your benefits, and
this shows that we can use the Dutch Argument to define some
probabilities in simple duplication scenario (to be sure, the
real case will be in arithmetic where such simple case scenario
can be shown to never occur, and that is why the math is a bit
more sophisticated there).
If I understand you here, I think this is wrong. In the iterated
case, the 1pp probabilities are those calculated on each branch, and
they are all valid —
I don’t think so. On most branches the probability (or the
indeterminacy) comes from the fact that most of the 1p(p) histories
will be algorithmically incompressible, and thus highly non predictable,
Can a finite sequence be algorithmically incompressible? Can't I just
give it a name, say "Albert" and write 'print albert'.
and behave, for n great, as random sequence. “W or M” will be the only
always correct prediction, and P = 1/2 will match well the ignorance
in a set with a measure converging to the Gaussian. Most 1p or 1pp
will just predict white noise, like we predict that a sheaf of light
get divided by two when going through an half silvered mirror. The
worlds/histories departing from the normal distribution get
infinitesimally rare in the limit (and Dital Mechanism explains why we
have to consider that limit, mainly the invariance of the first person
experience for the delays of reconstitution in the arithmetical
Universal Dovetailer.
there is no 3p view (God's-eye-view) to contradict them.
They are aware of the protocol, and by definition, the protocol is
respected, so they do have some 3p idea of what is going on.
But in reality experimenters are only aware of the result they measure.
They're trying to infer a protocol.
Brent
In the WM duplication, then the copies are able to meet and compare
diaries, so things are different,
That is what I am talking about. Eventually this will justify both the
quantum MW and its formalisme.
but I am interest in the Many-worlds case, not classical
single-world duplication.
With mechanism, the quantum Many-Worlds (or any physics) has to be
explained by the single-body (or single population of bodies)
duplication/multiplication occurring (virtually, arithmetically) in
arithmetic.
If interested I can explain more. A lot of people miss that the notion
of computation (i.e. the notion of universal machine and their
executions) is a purely arithmetical notion. Gödel is the first to
have shown this, but he did not realise what he as doing because he
missed, in 1931, the Church Turing thesis, as he explained himself.
Gödel will accept it later when reading Turing.
Bruno
Bruce
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