> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:36, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Feb 23, 2020 at 11:36 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 21 Feb 2020, at 11:41, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 9:30 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> But that argument would work for coin tossing too. That eliminate basically >> all probabilistic inference, it seems to me. A dwarf and a giant would not >> accept the Gaussian distribution of height. >> >> >> You still don't get it, do you? The argument applies to all possible bit >> strings of length N. You do not get that from coin tosses in a single world. >> It is only when you claim that all possible results exist in separate >> branching worlds that the problem arises. > > I don’t see the relevance of the numbers of sequences with as much the same W > than M have any relevance with the inference of probabilities. It is low, and > the proportion is the same with or without the annihilation of the copies, > i.e. with self)duplication and coin tossing. I missed your point indeed, but > I don’t see the relevance. May be you elaborate. > > In the coin tossing experiment, with N trials you get just a single binary > string. With WM-dulicatin and N replications, you get all 2^N possible binary > strings. I think this is a significant difference between the two cases.
Sure. The point is that the second explains the first in the quantum coin tossing. > >> So it is a problem for your WM-duplication, and for Everett. > > At least you see that connection (which John Clark seems to miss). > > >> But not for single world theories. Statistical inference is perfectly intact >> as it is used in this world. > > I don’t see why this should not be the case in the WM self-dup, except for a > meagre, and negligible set of histories. It is the same in single world: > winning the big lottery three times in a row is rare. > > That is where you make a fundamental mistake. The sequences with very > unbalanced numbers of W and M are not rare in the WM-duplication case -- they > always occur. Yes, but they have the same relative rarity than in the case where only one history is actualised. All balanced and unbalanced proportion of W and M are given by the Pascal triangle or Gauss, in this particular experience, and assuming the default theoretical hypotheses (‘course). > The argument I have put forward shows that (always taking the first-person > perspective) observers with these unbalanced sequences have every much right > to use their data to infer a probability value as do those observers who get > approximately equal numbers of Ws and Ms. Yes, but the vast majority of histories will be better predicted by “white noise”, or “I don’t know”, etc. If you are OK with the first person indeterminacy, that is enough for the reasoning, as eventually, we will not have classical probabilities, but the quantum one, or similar to the quantum one. > There is no principled way from the 1p perspective in which you can > distinguish these possibilities. Directly no. But by repeating those experiences, and doing some others, you can try a theory, and in this case the mechanist theory, that is the 1p-plural statistic on the computations gives (or points toward) the statistics that we have inferred from the observation. > So all sets of results are equally valid, as are all different probability > estimates. That seems to me to be tautologically true, whatever probabilities that we use. By duplicating the probabilities, to maximise your choice of winning, is the same, independently of the realisation, or not, of the alternate experience. The point is that a mechanist as to accept that he survives (in the usual clinical sense) with a self)duplication, and he can bet in advance that he will see only one city, and understand (using mechanism) that he cannot write which one in advance, as he knows that the other guy, or himself, will disprove it with probability one. > > Hence, there is no single preferred probability in the WM-duplication > scenario. Consider a screen with 16180 * 10000 black and white pixels. And I multiply you by the 2^(16180 * 10000) configuration every 1/24 seconds, and this during 90 minutes, That makes 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 copies at the end of the “movie” projection. You are asked, before the “movie” what do you expect to be the more portable experience between: - White noise, or - 2001, Space Odyssey with Tibetan subtitle (a black and white version). It is easy to show that the white noise will be confirmed by a vast majority of observers, and that is what is counted, to infer the 1p most probable experience. Yes, there is guy who will see the movie "2001, Space Odyssey with Tibetan subtitle”. In fact all black and white movies will be seen, with subtitle in all possible languages (even some non-existing one), and they ahem all the right to kale any bets they want. But even those who bet on a movie after seeing the first halves will be contradicted by the vast majority of their “descendant”, and eventually, it can be shown that the vast majority of movies here are incompressible, and appear as random as possible. The set of even just a little bit compressible movies will have, in the limit (which is the case of interest after the “step seven” of the argument) will be negligible compared to the random one. The bet white noise is far more reasonable than any particular bets, like Space Odyssey, or the binary digits of Pi. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTbHie9F5bwteQFr1PxXH3nHGH4tuqr5QOmWBXrK8dKmw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTbHie9F5bwteQFr1PxXH3nHGH4tuqr5QOmWBXrK8dKmw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A6D0A3D4-DC33-4BF6-BAFE-2AF0BB204CA1%40ulb.ac.be.
