> On 17 Feb 2020, at 22:50, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 1:15 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 16 Feb 2020, at 23:17, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> They clearly can't all be right, so either there is no actual probability >> underlying the events and their calculations are misguided, or the theory >> itself is incoherent. > > The prediction must be valid for all the copies. Are you OK that the H-guy > predicts “W or M”, instead of “W”, > “M” and “W and M”, for one trial? > > > No, the only thing he can say, given the protocol, is that there will be a > copy of me in W and a copy in M. Probabilities do not come into it.
But there were no probabilities involved in my question. An indeterminacy was involved, perhaps you are saying that no “non determinacy” are involved, but this would imply the rejection of Mechanism, and you are telling me that in a self-duplication you just die? If Mechanism is assumed, (i.e. the idea that we can survive with a digital body/brain, or classical teleportation, duplication, etc.) it is easy to see that if the H-guy predicts, for his person first person experience (which does not disappear by mechanism) “W or M”, the two copies will say that the prediction was correct (and if the protocol is respected, they are both correct indeed). But f the H-guy predicts “W”, or “M” or “W and M”, one guy at least will have an experience refuting that prediction, making it incorrect. > > Are you OK that the H-guy says (assuming mechanism of course) that he is sure > to get some coffee, but that he cannot be sure if it will taste like American > or Russian coffee? > > The M coffee will taste Russian, and the W coffee will be undrinkable, like > most American coffee. OK. Lol. But the question is do you agree that in H you are unable to be sure about the taste of the coffee which he will experience after pushing the button. He will never say I will feel both, as no copies at all will ever experience them both, in the fist person way of experiencing something. > > > Some will be wrong, but the majority will be correct. As the number of > iteration increase, we get near one. And in the “real scenario”, that is > confronted to the arithmetical reality which emulates all 2^aleph_0 > consistent continuations, those having the wrong probability constitue a set > of real of measure 0. > > There is no "wrong" probability! All 1p probabilities are equally valid -- > and equally wrong. That begins to look like postmodern relativism to me, to be honest. All 1p experience are equally valid, but not all distribution of probabilities are confirmed in the personal diary (the one in which the prediction is made, and that the candidat take with him in the duplication-annihilation machine). > >Those disagreeing with any 1p probability form sets of zero measure in the > >limit of large N. > > Again, you use the 3p view to refute a 1p perception. And that is invalid. I do not refute the 1p perception, only the theory some person can build, and which is wrong for almost all copies. Keep in mind that the question is about a future first person experience, not on anything communicable in a 3p manner. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQR6af0-Q0K9uDgr8RjOu97Hz4-YKkg0P4sdbDNzFDm%2BA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQR6af0-Q0K9uDgr8RjOu97Hz4-YKkg0P4sdbDNzFDm%2BA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/DD7650F6-F6C5-4289-A689-4811B5610DE1%40ulb.ac.be.
