> On 18 Feb 2020, at 23:07, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 11:41 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 17 Feb 2020, at 22:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 1:15 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On 16 Feb 2020, at 23:17, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >>> They clearly can't all be right, so either there is no actual probability >>> underlying the events and their calculations are misguided, or the theory >>> itself is incoherent. >> >> The prediction must be valid for all the copies. Are you OK that the H-guy >> predicts “W or M”, instead of “W”, >> “M” and “W and M”, for one trial? >> >> >> No, the only thing he can say, given the protocol, is that there will be a >> copy of me in W and a copy in M. Probabilities do not come into it. > > But there were no probabilities involved in my question. An indeterminacy was > involved, perhaps you are saying that no “non determinacy” are involved, but > this would imply the rejection of Mechanism, and you are telling me that in a > self-duplication you just die? > > On the protocol, the H-guy is deleted after the copying. So it is quite > plausible to argue that he does indeed die, and two new persons are created. > Some theories of personal identity would support this argument. > > If Mechanism is assumed, (i.e. the idea that we can survive with a digital > body/brain, or classical teleportation, duplication, etc.) it is easy to see > that if the H-guy predicts, for his person first person experience (which > does not disappear by mechanism) “W or M”, the two copies will say that the > prediction was correct (and if the protocol is respected, they are both > correct indeed). But f the H-guy predicts “W”, or “M” or “W and M”, one guy > at least will have an experience refuting that prediction, making it > incorrect. > >> >> Are you OK that the H-guy says (assuming mechanism of course) that he is >> sure to get some coffee, but that he cannot be sure if it will taste like >> American or Russian coffee? >> >> The M coffee will taste Russian, and the W coffee will be undrinkable, like >> most American coffee. > > OK. Lol. > > But the question is do you agree that in H you are unable to be sure about > the taste of the coffee which he will experience after pushing the button. He > will never say I will feel both, as no copies at all will ever experience > them both, in the fist person way of experiencing something. > > As above -- the H-guy never tastes any coffee. It is only the M-guy and the > W-guy who get coffee. The H-guy can predict that the M-guy will taste Russian > coffee, and that the W-guy will spit it out, but 'he' (the H-guy) no longer > exists and does not taste anything. > >> >> Some will be wrong, but the majority will be correct. As the number of >> iteration increase, we get near one. And in the “real scenario”, that is >> confronted to the arithmetical reality which emulates all 2^aleph_0 >> consistent continuations, those having the wrong probability constitue a set >> of real of measure 0. >> >> There is no "wrong" probability! All 1p probabilities are equally valid -- >> and equally wrong. > > That begins to look like postmodern relativism to me, to be honest. All 1p > experience are equally valid, but not all distribution of probabilities are > confirmed in the personal diary (the one in which the prediction is made, and > that the candidat take with him in the duplication-annihilation machine). > > "All 1p experiences are equally valid" means that all calculations of > probability based on individually acquired data are valid -- so all > probabilities are valid. All calculate probabilities based on the data in > their diaries -- no-one in MWI has simultaneous access to all diaries for > comparative purposes. > >> >Those disagreeing with any 1p probability form sets of zero measure in the >> >limit of large N. >> >> Again, you use the 3p view to refute a 1p perception. And that is invalid. > > I do not refute the 1p perception, only the theory some person can build, and > which is wrong for almost all copies. Keep in mind that the question is about > a future first person experience, not on anything communicable in a 3p manner. > > I agree. So there is no-one with access to all personal diaries for > comparative purposes -- there is no correct probability, and no-one is wrong > (from the 1p view).
OK. But as you say above this required assuming that the brain, or something in the brain is not Tutrin emulable, and so you need to reject Mechanism, but then you have to reject Darwinism, and many theories which impliy Mechanism. Non Mechanism is sometimes sum up by “belief in magic”. Diderot defined Rationalism by Descarte’s Mechanism. So my question was really: Assuming Mechanism, do you see that it leads to a first person indeterminacy, and a first person plural indeterminacy, inside population of machines, in the case where we duplicate those (entire) population? Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSJSpNRgKdPyTv0NBHtUE7msBpZNmgxwWXuX9V3vdQb1A%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSJSpNRgKdPyTv0NBHtUE7msBpZNmgxwWXuX9V3vdQb1A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/825F688F-72E6-4D92-B5DF-59FC6DA94FF2%40ulb.ac.be.
