> On 26 Feb 2020, at 21:41, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 2/26/2020 3:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Feb 2020, at 22:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/25/2020 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 24 Feb 2020, at 03:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>>>>> <everyth...@googlegroups.com <>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of linguistic pragmatism >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>>>>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis >>>>>>>> understand that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond >>>>>>>> “my consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren >>>>>>>> Suydam’ remark). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old >>>>>>>> arguments over anybody proposing science based ontological packages >>>>>>>> metaphysically: language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to >>>>>>>> confuse personal mysticism with reality, to engage in false >>>>>>>> equivalencies between terms used in formal contexts and everyday use >>>>>>>> of language, scientism etc. Slowly, yours truly is coming around to >>>>>>>> the idea that folks agreeing on ontology/reality/religion, which would >>>>>>>> guide research in some allegedly correct direction; spilling over >>>>>>>> positive effects into the world... that Wittgenstein may prove correct >>>>>>>> in that this is a confused product of muddled armchair thinking, not >>>>>>>> because of his generally negative stance, but because there seem to be >>>>>>>> positive developments out there that he couldn't have informed those >>>>>>>> arguments with. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >>>>>>>> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with >>>>>>>> profound erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein >>>>>>>> says thousands of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of >>>>>>>> value and benefit questions instead, through say orchestration of >>>>>>>> highly sophisticated forms of organization applied to education, >>>>>>>> governing, finance, technology, problem solving, applied or >>>>>>>> theoretical etc. that are permissionless, universally accessible, >>>>>>>> require no hierarchy of politics, charlatan experts, control freaks, >>>>>>>> their sycophants, and bibles of some Messiah achieving miracles such >>>>>>>> as eternal life, self-duplication etc. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >>>>>>>> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves >>>>>>>> be highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and >>>>>>>> long terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks >>>>>>>> will be opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what >>>>>>>> reality may be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space >>>>>>>> in the long term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, >>>>>>>> expensive wars, standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more >>>>>>>> appropriate politics and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, >>>>>>>> shifting our old-school conceptions of what first principles are, and >>>>>>>> you'd refute Wittgenstein instead of running from him. Engineering >>>>>>>> incentive and not what the game is but how the game of life on this >>>>>>>> planet could be. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes >>>>>>>> use the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo >>>>>>>> cogito, cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of >>>>>>>> Descartes, bit of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same >>>>>>>> reasoning for themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person >>>>>>>> experience implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >>>>>>>> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with >>>>>>>> your use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism >>>>>>>> is incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to >>>>>>>> wonder why you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a >>>>>>>> wider audience, and philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. >>>>>>>> PNGC >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- namely, >>>>>>>> that a human being can be perfectly simulated by a computer. But if >>>>>>>> that's what he means, how does it follow that mechanism is >>>>>>>> incompatible with physicalism? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Because all possible computations (in the Turing sense) are implicit in >>>>>>> arithmetic. And Bruno thinks arithmetic exists, and hence all threads >>>>>>> of human (and non-human) consciousness exist in arithmetic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What exactly does Bruno mean by physicalism? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That physics is the basic science; i.e. the ontology of physics, >>>>>>> whatever it is, must give rise to everything else, including conscious >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Why the incompatibility? Bruno? TIA, AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno's a fundamentalist. You can only have one, really real, true >>>>>>> fundamental ontology. >>>>>> >>>>>> Given the sense of “fundamentalism” in the religious (pseudo-religious) >>>>>> domain, it might be useful to make precise that I do not defend any >>>>>> theory or religion. I just say that IF we can survive with an artificial >>>>>> brain, then physics becomes the science of available predictions by >>>>>> universal machine implemented in arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> If arithmetic exists independent of physics. >>>> >>>> Then you should be able to give a definition of natural numbers, based on >>>> physical laws, and express those physical laws without using the notion of >>>> numbers. I don’t see how this is possible, at least with Mechanism. You >>>> have to assume something Turing universal, to get something Turing >>>> universal. We cannot prove the existence of something Turing universal >>>> withou >>> >>> Definitions are in words. How do you define the words. As JKC correctly >>> points out, examples are more important than definitions. I don't use >>> physical laws to define natural numbers, I use ostensive definition by >>> examples...which is exactly how you learned numbers at your mother's knee. >> >> Practically? I am OK with this. But when we do fundamental science, we must >> be clear on what we assume, and what we derive, and the point is that with >> mechanism, we can no more assume a physical universe. > > And we should be clear that what we are doing are assuming and hypothesizing > and reasoning about our assumptions and we are not bringing anything into > existence thereby.
Exactly. When doing metaphysics seriously, we make the ontological commitment(s) into hypotheses themselves. That is exactly what the materialists have forgotten to do since the “political” (tyrannical) institutionalisation of religion, but this comes from the abandon of the scientific attitude in theology/metaphysics since about 1500 years. Bruno > > Brent > >> If we assume a physical universe to explain a first peson prediction, that >> would work if that physical universe is not Turing emulable, and, >> importantly, that it is able to make my consciousness, or my first person >> prediction, related to that physical universe. But with mechanism, that >> consciousness is brought by the corresponding computation in arithmetic. If >> not, you need a non computationalist theory of mind. If the >> mechanism by which the physical universe makes me conscious is Turing >> emulable, it is automatically already emulated in arithmetic, through >> infinitely many occurrences, and the first person prediction (physics) has >> to be a statistics on all (relative) computations. >> >> Mechanism just make precise and rigorous the old and antic “dream argument”. >> The LARC experience is a stunning evidence for the existence of the Higgs >> Boson, but not a proof, as I can conceive that I will wake up and realised >> that this LARC stuff was just a dream. We cannot prove any ontological >> evidence from any experience, but of course we can judge some evidences and >> accumulation of evidences making some belief more plausible than other. >> >> >> >> >>> The concern for definitions and axioms only arose when you wanted to reason >>> about numbers too big to comprehend or write down. >> >> >> It happens when we search a (fundamental) theory. With Mechanism, we have to >> derive physics from machine biology-psychology-theology, that is from the >> mathematics of arithmetical self-reference (from qG1*) (G1= G + (p->[]p). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>>> t postulating the existence of something Turing universal. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e2073f78-fb67-66b6-7226-28b887881e87%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e2073f78-fb67-66b6-7226-28b887881e87%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1E52FB50-992D-461F-8501-E5E01CBADC23%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1E52FB50-992D-461F-8501-E5E01CBADC23%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/009c7520-cab9-7748-7bf8-fff7c2d14db2%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/009c7520-cab9-7748-7bf8-fff7c2d14db2%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/DC141BDF-477F-4498-8D20-25AB78DB66DE%40ulb.ac.be.
