> On 24 Feb 2020, at 11:56, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 7:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 22 Feb 2020, at 18:40, PGC <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of linguistic pragmatism >>>> >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism> >>>> >>>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>> >>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >> >> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis understand >> that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond “my >> consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren Suydam’ >> remark). >> >> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments over >> anybody proposing science based ontological packages metaphysically: >> language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to confuse personal mysticism >> with reality, to engage in false equivalencies between terms used in formal >> contexts and everyday use of language, scientism etc. Slowly, yours truly is >> coming around to the idea that folks agreeing on ontology/reality/religion, >> which would guide research in some allegedly correct direction; spilling >> over positive effects into the world... that Wittgenstein may prove correct >> in that this is a confused product of muddled armchair thinking, not because >> of his generally negative stance, but because there seem to be positive >> developments out there that he couldn't have informed those arguments with. >> >> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound >> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says thousands >> of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value and benefit >> questions instead, through say orchestration of highly sophisticated forms >> of organization applied to education, governing, finance, technology, >> problem solving, applied or theoretical etc. that are permissionless, >> universally accessible, require no hierarchy of politics, charlatan experts, >> control freaks, their sycophants, and bibles of some Messiah achieving >> miracles such as eternal life, self-duplication etc. >> >> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves be >> highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and long >> terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks will be >> opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what reality may >> be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space in the long term, >> nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, expensive wars, >> standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more appropriate politics >> and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, shifting our old-school >> conceptions of what first principles are, and you'd refute Wittgenstein >> instead of running from him. Engineering incentive and not what the game is >> but how the game of life on this planet could be. >> >> >> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes use the >> “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo cogito, cogito >> ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of Descartes, bit of his own >> consciousness, hoping others can do the same reasoning for themselves. >> Consciousness always refer to a first person experience implicitly: like God >> (truth) it is not a thing. >> >> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >> contexts” > > Yes, that is well illustrated in the different type of knowledge, (like p, > []p, []p & p, …), but also in the infinity of “[]”, different for each > machine/number. > > > >> but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with your use of >> "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is incompatible >> with physicalism" and all the rest of it. > > I just assume the Mechanist hypothesis, and derive from it that we cannot > assume more than elementary arithmetic for the ontology, and then the > phenomenology (mathematically obtained, but intuitively explainable with > variate thought experiences) shows the appearance of those variate notion of > truth. > I don’t claim mechanism is true, of course, but I derive its consequences, > and I show that some are testable. > > Bruno > > > Wittgenstein did appeal to a language form that is close to or might be > compared to first order logic.
He got the 0-order logic, somehow. Proved sound and complete by Emil Post (before or after, I am not sure). > Generally language used and how we reference language to objects is beyond > this, and it has some element of semantics. This does take one potentially > into the Loeb theorem, such as in Boolos and Jeffery's book and the > connection to semantic soundness. No doubt on this. This is what I have exploited to derive the theology and physics of the universal number. Löb’s theorem plays a key role, and Solovay “final” theorems do the trick, at the propositional modal level, so we get already the propositional full logic of the subject (and we got Intuitionist knowledge logic) and of the material object (we get quantum logic, classical and intuitionist). The point is that with Mechanism, physics is derivable from the psychology or theology of machines or numbers. That makes theology into a popperian science, that is, refutable experimentally. Bruno > > LC > > >> I used to wonder why you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a >> wider audience, and philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. PGC >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/554e5aa3-9488-4e0b-8740-d874bd485aef%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/554e5aa3-9488-4e0b-8740-d874bd485aef%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/088914f2-f881-4a6c-8152-b2748618d61c%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/088914f2-f881-4a6c-8152-b2748618d61c%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/57D43C72-701B-46D0-900F-0EB992F47310%40ulb.ac.be.
