> On 16 May 2020, at 17:19, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote: > > > > Am Do, 7. Mai 2020, um 16:30, schrieb Bruno Marchal: >> >>> On 6 May 2020, at 12:58, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Am Mi, 6. Mai 2020, um 10:41, schrieb Bruno Marchal: >>>> >>>>> On 5 May 2020, at 21:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5/5/2020 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> Physics works very well, to make prediction but as metaphysics, as the >>>>>> Platonist greeks understood, it simply does not work at all. It uses an >>>>>> identity thesis between mind and brain which is easy in one direction, >>>>>> but non-sensical in the other direction. It is not a matter of choice: >>>>>> if mechanism is true, the many physical histories must emerges from the >>>>>> many computations in all models of arithmetic, or in the standard model >>>>>> (as you prefer). >>>>> And you use the identity theory of all possible computation and >>>>> reality...which has no evidence in support of it and I see no reason to >>>>> believe. >>>> >>>> The existence of all computations is a theorem of arithmetic. If you >>>> understand 2+2=4 and similar, you can understand that all computations >>>> are emulated in (all) model(s) of arithmetic. That arithmetic is >>>> assumed in all theories made by physicists. But when you add an >>>> ontological physical universe, we have no mean to restrict the >>>> statistics on all computations on the “physical” computations without >>>> adding some magic in the theory. >>>> >>>> So, it seems you are the one adding an ontological commitment, to make >>>> magically disappear the consciousness of the relative number in >>>> arithmetic. >>>> >>>> The reason to believe this is just Mechanism. I have not find a reason >>>> to believe in a physical universe having an ontological primitive >>>> status, which would be a reason to believe in non-mechanism (and to >>>> reject Darwinism, molecular biology, even most physical equations, >>>> whose solutions when exploitable in nature are up to now always >>>> computable. >>>> >>>> We just can’t invoke an ontological commitment when we do science, >>>> especially in theology or metaphysics, unless some evidences are given >>>> for it. But there are no evidence at all. People confuse the real >>>> strong evidences for physical laws with evidence for laws who would be >>>> primary. >>>> >>>> You seem to have understood this better sometimes ago. I Hope you are >>>> not having any doubt that the arithmetical reality (not the theories!) >>>> emulate all computations, and that a universal machine (with oracles) >>>> cannot feel the difference between being emulated by this or that >>>> universal machinery. >>> >>> Yes, I have no problem with any of what you say above. >> >> OK. >> >> >>> >>> What I have been wondering about is something else: what exactly is meant >>> by "primitive"? >> >> >> It depends on what you are interested in. To solve the mind-body >> problem, the first difficulty is to formulate it, and for this the >> notion of “primitiveness” is required, for what we will take for >> granted to proceed. >> >> Basically X is considered as primitive if we have some reason to >> consider X as non explainable from something else, and judged as being >> more simple (technically/conceptually, … there is some matter of debate >> here of course). > > Ok, but let me make the analogy with Copernicus' heliocentric model. It > provides a simpler model for planetary dynamics in the solar system than > assuming the earth at the center, but a more modern view on this debate is > that there is really no center anywhere in the universe. You just choose > whatever referential makes calculations easier.
It this not more “perspectival” or even “first person” centred. At the beginning, some thought that Earth was at the center of the universe. This meant that everything else was truly moving around us. Then we understood, that a simpler explanation (and also less anthropocentric) was that the Sun is a the center, and Earth go around it, and then we understood that even the Sun is revolving in a galaxy. We could have decided that our blackhole at the center of the Milky Way, is the “center” of the universe, but, as Kant suggested, there are other galaxies, etc… Today, we know that the “Big Bang” occurred everywhere, somehow, and that the notion of center of the (physical) universe might not make sense at all, but it is hard to say, as we can see only a tiny fraction of the physical universe, and have not yet a coherent theory of the whole, even restricted to the physical. We have not much choice than to use Occam. The theory with the less hypotheses and the bigger range of prediction is the best one, until we find a simpler and more powerful one. > > I wonder if primitiveness is not like that. I believe that consciousness > becomes irreducible if one takes matter as primitive, and I agree that taking > the integers as primitive and proceeding as you do provides a perspective to > tackle the mind-body problem that simply is not available to materialism. At > the same time, it makes it very hard to explain why this particular dream > that I am experiencing has such and such specific features and patterns. > > I guess I am in an extremely agnostic mood. Maybe it's the corona. Agnostic is the position of the scientist. Even theologian are agnostic when rational, like the greeks. So, if the corona makes you agnostic, double the dose! Well, it contains alcohol, so better to use some moderation! There are much less toxic product for the same, if not better effect …. > >> Most materialist agrees that biology is explained, or explainable in >> principle by chemistry, itself explainable by particles/force physics. >> (And I agree with them on this). > > Btw, have you seen this? > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=makaJpLvbow I did not, but I saw this one, which looks to belong to the same family, you might like it, but there is no sound/music until 4:07 (the there is good music!): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qr28DwXeyu0 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qr28DwXeyu0> > > I love that simulation for several reasons. Firstly because I was involved in > ALife / Complex Systems, and it is of course exciting to see such > "biological" behavior emerging from such simple rules. But also because it > exposes a certain emptiness in the idea of "explanation". It is not hard to > imagine that one day Wolfram will be successful, and will be able to produce > a simple rule that allows for complexity of the level we observe in the "real > world". At the same time, I do not really feel that things were explained at > that point. I agree. The (quantum or classical) cellular automata, despite quite interesting and useful, is still physicalism, when used in metaphysics, even if conceived in an immaterialist frame. To get the explanation, you need a theory of consciousness, and an explanation of how the “computations” (made by the cellular automata) makes this consciousness relatively stable. I do think that G* provides a as complete as possible explanation of consciousness (including why it cannot be completed) and as long as nature obeys to the logic of the machine’s observable (like currently) I think it would be premature to search for another explanation (which adds only difficulties, up to now at least). > >> Then if they are metaphysical materialist, they will have to explain >> psychology from biology, say, and usually they do believe that such an >> explanation is possible (and of course, we know or should know that >> this is impossible: but before judging this, it means that for a >> materialist (who believes that matter cannot be explained entirely from >> a simpler ontological assumption), if interested in the Mind-Body >> problem, he has to develop a phenomenology of mind coherent with its >> taking matter as primitive. > > I agree with you, but I think you use "psychology" in a different sense than > they do. I think modern mainstream psychology is zombie psychology, in the > sense that it discards the first person. That was the case when I was young. A term like “consciousness” was taboo, and most theoretical psychologist were behaviourists. Today, they are no more behaviourist and they accept the existence of consciousness, but they often limit themselves to the “easy” part of the problem, and some (but not all) dismiss the “hard problem” (which is the antic mind-body problem) as either non sensical or non answerable. With Mechanism, the easy problem becomes not so easy, as it relies on some implementation of a program, which relies on some statistically stable computations, with a relative measure close to one, and well, G* solves that problem, but is not trivial, and rather not well known, despite Gödel 1931 and Löb 1955. Thanks to G*, the hard problem of consciousness and matter is solved. I think. A Mistry remains which is why we believe in numbers, but that problem is entirely explained as being indeed necessarily not answerable, because we cannot derive a Turing universal machinery from something which is not already a universal Turing machinery. We can explain the (natural) numbers from the finite set theory, or from the combinators, or from any Turing universal machinery. In all case, we have to assume a universal Turing machinery. Natural numbers + plus and times is just the simpler one. > >> Similarly, a monist immaterialist (who assumes only immaterial >> relations, of the type mind or of the type number, or whatever) has to >> develop (extract, isolate, justify in a way or in another) a >> phenomenology of matter, or of matter conscious appearances in its >> theory of mind. >> A dualist has a even harder task, as he will take both mind and matter >> as primitive, and will have to derive a phenomenology of interactions >> between both. Today, few (serious) people believe that this could be >> meaningful. > > Agreed. > >> “materialism” is just naive physicalism: the idea that physics is the >> fundamental science. This makes matter into a primitive thing, and the >> theories will have to assume some primary physical elements, like >> atomes, or now, particles, or strings, etc. >> >> Mechanism leads to a neutral monism, where neither matter, nor mind, is >> taken as primitive, as they are explained (wrongly or correctly, we >> might not it is wrong through new expriements) from simpler >> (elementary arithmetic without induction). > > Ok, so elementary arithmetic is taken as primitive. Yes. But any universal machinery would do the same job. > I have no doubt that this is fruitful, but I wonder if it doesn't offer its > own dead-ends. It is complete for the ontology, and then all the phenomeloqies, from real numbers to physics, is explained by the universal machine escaping the infinitely many dead-ends which occurs “everywhere” in arithmetic, seen from inside. This is somehow literal true, as the modal logic of G entails that dead-ends occur in all possible state. Now, the fits person (the soul) and even matter, is based on []p & p, and/or the waker and stronger []p & <>t, and []p & <>t & p, are obtained from abstractions one self from the dead-ends (cul-sac world). If you mean “conceptual dead ends”, you will need to elaborate. I don’t see any, although it "strikes the eyes" in the materialist framework. By “primitive” I mean what we feel that we have to assume. Something is primitive if we cannot explained it by something simpler. Matter is not primitive in Mechanism, because we have no choice: we have to explain it by a statistic on dreams in arithmetic (where we are “truly living” somehow). > >> The beauty here (grin) is that fr the natural numbers, or more >> generally, for the universal machinery/machines, we can prove in all >> inductive extension of those machineries that they cannot be explained >> by anything which is not a universal machineries itself, so the >> numbers, with addition and multiplication and a bit of induction can >> explained that they have to be primitive. >> >> A physicalist might say that the superstrings are Turing universal, so >> we can take the super-strings as primitive, but then to explain >> consciousness, if he assumed Mechanism, he will have to justify the >> appearances of sperstrings from its primitive, and this will be very >> confusing if he start from the strings for the starting (primitive) >> universal machinery. >> Physics is "machine independent” (in the language of computer >> scientist): it means that it does not depend on the choice of the phi_i >> (the universal machinery). >> >> With mechanism, no universal machine can know which computations >> support it, among an infinity of computations. It is even a priori a >> non countable infinity, as the first person are determined by all >> oracles. And any first person prediction, and thus any reading of any >> experimental device, must be explained by a statistics on the first >> person indeterminacy where the domain of “reconstitutions” is basically >> the set of all true sigma_1 sentences, structured by the >> self-referential relevant modes. >> >> An explanation is always a reduction of what we don’t understand (like >> mind and matter) to something that we do understand or at least can >> accept as granted (like 0 + 0 = 0, 1 + 0 = 1, 2 + 0 = 2, … and others, >> like 2 + 0 = 2 -> Ex(2+x = 2), etc ). >> >> Consciousness is explained by being an invariant indubitable truth >> which is also non provable and non definable (without invoking some >> notion of truth) that all machine discover when looking inward (which >> is what G* proves, so that is proven by all (arithmetically sound) >> universal machines, although in the conditional way, like “assuming I >> am not wrong up to now then …, or assuming Mechanism, then …). > > Yes, but we could also be crazy. Sure. With Mechanism, this is a theorem. If we are not crazy (~[]f) we could be crazy (<>[]f). But you cannot use this in metaphysics, and even less in physics, which is based on []p & <>t by construction. To use “we are crazy” as an explanation would be like a self-conspiracy theory. > We ourselves cannot escape Gödel. Probably so with Mechanism, and indeed G* (which axiomatise incompleteness) is the canonical theology of all universal platonism machine (platonism means here simply that they accept the validity of the excluded middle principle for the closed proposition on the natural numbers or digital machines). > Which I think is a beautiful thing, but I am in an agnostic mood. In other > words, I think that you place some "faith" in the natural numbers. No? Not really. I would if I claimed that mechanism is true, but that is not my job. I would if I meet a doctor that I can trust so much as telling him “yes”. We are far from this … I say that mechanism requires faith, but that does not mean that I have that faith, and even if I would, I would not make it public. Now, I can say that I am pretty sure that 2+2=4, or even that 4 = the cubic root of 20 minus the square root of 392, added to the cubic root of 20 plus the square root of 392, which is far more difficult to prove (yet I believe in it). > >> Mechanism is the assumption that this invariant is also invariant for >> any relative digital functional substitution made at *some* level (it >> is a self-finitist local and relative assumption). >> >> >>> Does there have to be any X such that "primitive X" is true? This is a real >>> question, not a rhetorical one. >> >> You will fall in Brent’s virtuous circle (still a bit vicious to me). > > I think that Brent is more optimistic than me. I don't think that creating > real AI will explain consciousness, Indeed. AsMinski once said, the conscious machine will be as much confused on this complex topic than we are. > even though I am interested in the problem of creating real AI. My circle is > totally vicious. The creation of AI is a natural phenomenon. It will explains a lot of things in psychology, but can hardly tackle the ontological questions. It isa bit like the recursion theorem of Kleene. It explains self-reproduction, self-regeneration, embryology, but cannot explain consciousness. For this a reference to some notion of Truth is needed (even if just the arithmetical truth, or even just the sigma_1 arithmetical truth. There are some subtleties here that is belong the scope of this post :) To sum up: For the corona beer: moderation. For the corona G* \ G: no moderation! For the corona virus: be careful (of the virus and of the humans …). Best, Bruno > >> Or in ZF + the non foundation axiom, like Stephen Paul King pressed me >> to do, although here you still have a notion of set taken as primitive, >> at least. >> >> With Mechanism, we get free such sort of circles, and spirales (!), in >> the phenomenology,. They are capable of being explained with the >> “simple" natural numbers. Taking such circle as primitive, is like >> deciding to avoid the search of an explanation to them, and like to >> avoid the experimental testing. Eventually you might been led to >> philosophical relativism and dilute truth (and causality, >> responsibility) etc. >> >> I can imagine a materialist psychologist claiming that the natural >> numbers are not primitive but explainable by a cultural >> anthropo-evolutionary genetic, say. But 1) he is confusing the human >> natural number theories with arithmetic, and 2) he is cheating, as his >> explanation will make only sense by an implicit acceptance of some >> universal machinery equivalent to the belief in RA, so, he is just >> confusing level of explanation. Yes, the human number theory is a >> fascinating subject, and it sustains the idea that 2+2=4 is “really >> absolutely” true, as all humans agree on this, and even many other >> mammals, actually. But that is a different subject matter than the one >> number theory is build for. This one avoid the philosophy of numbers >> by using the axiomatic method. It should be obvious that with >> mechanism, the discovery of the numbers by the numbers is part of the >> meta-arithmetic that Gödel’s showed embeddable in arithmetic. The real >> bomb is still Gödel’s 1931, even if it is the two theorems of Solovay >> which sums it all in G, and G*. >> >> >> >>> >>> Hope that you (and everyone else) are doing well! >> >> I wish you (and everyone) the best Take care. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> Telmo >>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/dc764642-dd49-70b2-e84f-363efe66582c%40verizon.net. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/965BBF35-DF8E-4F03-AF43-F9B0D843A1A3%40ulb.ac.be. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/96161ef4-ce79-43e0-98a0-288cff950049%40www.fastmail.com. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/700B3302-51A9-4647-A70C-2E6EEDAC7627%40ulb.ac.be. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/07a264aa-a10b-43e3-a68a-8b0e020ae599%40www.fastmail.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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