> On 18 May 2020, at 21:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/18/2020 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 18 May 2020, at 00:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/17/2020 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> the appearance of matter as they are explained by the mechanist >>>> consciousness flux in arithmetic (itself explained by G and G* and their >>>> difference). >>> >>> You frequently say this, >> >> Yes, it is the PhD content. >> 1) UDA = the constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to the >> necessity of deriving he physical laws from arithmetic. >> 2) AUDA = the derivation itself. >> >>> but I have not seen this explanation except in vague hand waving. >> >> Hand waving? >> >> Your remark does look like hand waving, I would say. >> >> Come on Brent, I am the guy who gives 8 precise mathematical theories, three >> of them being concerned with the appearance of matter in arithmetic, and so >> are testable, and indeed confirmed by all experiences until now. > > They do not show the appearance of matter, the persistence of objects, the > shared reality. You merely assume that they must...since otherwise your > theory doesn't work.
UDA explains that there is no other choice. It exposes the problem. Then AUDA solves it at the propositional level, which is enough to see that measure exists and obey a quantum logics, and yes, this leads to an infinite sequence of open problems, which is normal for any "open science”. Invoking an ontological commitment is not better than “God made it”. Even if false, it is interesting to discover that machine have a physics in arithmetic, and can test it. Up top now, Nature obeys the consequences of mechanism, so to invoke an ontological commitment (which is like a special propose oracle) is premature. Such an oracle explains everything, and it is like the alien in cosmology: we can appeal to them only on the last ressort. > > > >> >> I refer you to my two last papers(*), which contains also some difficult >> open problems. >> You might try to ask specific questions. >> >> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. Prog >> Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23567157 >> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23567157> > > A good example. It's behind a paywall, but even the abstract shows that it > all aspirational. Nothing is proven about matter except that "If I'm right > it must be provable.” ? It is not "If I'm right it must be provable.” It is If Mechanism is right, then physics becomes Z1* or S4Grz1, or X1*. Those are complete theories (well with the addition of the quantifier) sp let us just compare with Nature. If the physical laws does not appear in any of Z1*, X1* or S4Grz1, then Mechanism is refuted (up to some boring technical nuances). The degree of discrepancy provides a measurable degree of non-mechanism. If physics appears in S4Grz1, then the reality is more idealist than we thought, and if it appears in Z1*, the physical reality is almost not idealist at all, despite remaining immaterial. The charge is reversed when we postulate mechanism. If you believe that a physical universe is needed to be assumed, then you have to explain how that works. I claim no truth, just that we can test this, and that quantum mechanics is by itself a very strong evidence for mechanism and its neopythagorean metaphysical consequences. > > " We will explain that once we adopt the computationalist hypothesis, which > is a form of mechanist assumption, we have to derive from it how our belief > in the physical laws can emerge from *only* arithmetic and classical computer > science. In that sense we reduce the mind-body problem to a body problem > appearance in computer science, or in arithmetic....The main point is that > the derivation is constructive, and it provides the technical means to derive > physics from arithmetic, and this will make the computationalist hypothesis > empirically testable, and thus scientific in the Popperian analysis of > science." > > >> >> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 >> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993> >> >> Now, if you read carefully the second part of my Sane04(*) or my “Plotinus >> paper" (larger public) talk, then, if you have read some >> introduction to G and G*, like Smullyan “Forever Undecided” of better” >> Boolos 1979” or even better “Boolos 1993”, you have all the >> ingredient to proceed, and certainly to ask precise and specific question. > > OK. What's your definition of matter? The usual definition (that is something made of elementary insurable entities which have to be assumed) is shown to not exist. But a notion of matter remains, it is the sharable part of the observable, which is defined by []p & <>t (& p) with “[]” being Gödel’s bewiesbar, and p is interred by any sigma_1 sentences. We ca easily redefined even a notion of “apparent primary matter”: it is the statistical results of of our observation, and below our substitution level, it is given by a measure on all sigma_-sentences, and that measure is given by the semantics of Z1*, or X1*, or S4Grz1. Matter is what we see, smell, touch, … in or sharable dreams, so to speak. The math shows that it obeys already variate form of possible quantum logic. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International >> System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, >> Amsterdam, 2004. >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> >> (sane04) >> >> Marchal B. A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation >> of Plotinus’ Theory of Matter. In Barry Cooper S. Löwe B., Kent T. F. and >> Sorbi A., editors, Computation and Logic in the Real World, Third Conference >> on Computability in Europe June 18-23, pages 263–273. Universita degli studi >> di Sienna, Dipartimento di Roberto Magari, 2007. >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf >> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39f9ebf7-7038-d236-7ddd-9436c04c3bc9%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39f9ebf7-7038-d236-7ddd-9436c04c3bc9%40verizon.net>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AE6D1F0C-E294-4541-B1DA-03C3147F44BB%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AE6D1F0C-E294-4541-B1DA-03C3147F44BB%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/513e1539-2817-f09d-3256-ca858fa2d16a%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/513e1539-2817-f09d-3256-ca858fa2d16a%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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