> On 18 May 2020, at 16:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, May 18, 2020 at 6:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 15 May 2020, at 21:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, May 15, 2020 at 11:08:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 14 May 2020, at 12:09, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> This is true! >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files> >>> >>> "Magic <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_(paranormal)>" is described as >>> being a branch of applied computation (mathematics), therefore computers >>> and equations are just as useful, and perhaps more potent, than classic >>> spellbooks, pentagrams, and sigils for the purpose of influencing ancient >>> powers and opening gates to other dimensions. >> >> >> >> I don’t believe in “real magic”. If time travel was possible and a >> time-traveller comes back with a documentary showing Jesus making water into >> wine, I would still consider that the most plausible explanation would be >> that Jesus is a good prestidigitator. >> >> Why? Just by considering the degree of credulity of the humans, and their >> craft in prestidigitation. >> >> Similarly, I find far more reasonable, even “Occam-reasonable” that the >> appearance of a physical universe is due to number’s prestidigitation, >> because incompleteness shows the numbers being both terribly naïve, but also >> incredibly gifted in the art of making their fellow number believing almost >> everything. Gödel’s theorem warned us; if we are consistent, it is even >> consistent that we are inconsistent (<>t -> <>[]f). >> >> Computationalism is Prestidigitalism. Lol. >> >> Wolfram is correct about “[]p”, but forget completely []p & p (and thus >> missed physics, theology, etc.) >> >> At least Penrose is aware of the abyssal difference between “[]p” and “[]p & >> p”, but literally confusse them in its use of Gödel’s incompleteness against >> Mechanism. >> >> So, with respect to metaphysics and to the Mind-Body problem in the frame of >> Descartes-Darwin Mechanism, we can say that Penrose is less wrong than >> Wolfram, and more interestingly-wrong. >> >> I am not claiming that Penrose or Wolfram are wrong. I am just comparing >> them with the canonical theology of the universal machine, that is, with the >> 8 modes of self-truth/belief/knowledge/observation/sensation of the >> universal machine having enough induction beliefs/axioms, in any hard or >> soft relative implementation. >> >> Those modes can be motivated through Mechanist thought experiments and/or >> through the Theaetetus of Plato. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Wolfram thinks that his Hypergraphic Universe Modeling (HUM) language can >> lead to a unified QM+GR theory. >> >> Do you think consciousness is needed for this unification? > > Not necessarily, in the sense that it is still possible to conceive a theory > of "everything physical” which would be logically independent of a theory of > consciousness, as far as we are interested in predicting first person plural > observation. > > But such a theory would be cut from reality, as it would not be able to > explain why our consciousness satisfies those prediction, so it would not be > a theory of everything. > > To get that theory of everything including mind and consciousness, there are > two options: a mechanist theory of mind, or a non mechanist theory of mind. > With a mechanist theory, you will need to derive the “theory of > everything-physical” from arithmetic. I don’t see any other way to get a > theory of consciousness adequate with the physical observation. > With a non-mechanist theory of mind, everything remains open, if only because > such a theory of mind does not exist (except in faith tales). > > Bruno > > > The get a theory of consciousness (or experience), one starts with a "sixth" > force/field, allowing for the other five - > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_force > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_force>- around now.
The notion of (physical force) is, by default, a 3p notion (even if later we discover that it is a 1p-plural) notion, yet with clear 3p describable theories. I don’t see how adding a 3p notion can help. What is it, where does it come from, and, how is is related to consciousness, first person, qualia, etc. And why? When you understand that the elementary truth related to any Turing complete theory is enough to explain the qualia, including the quanta, and that Nature seems to obey to the theory of quanta extracted from arithmetic. It looks like adding difficulties without needing them, just to make the problem more complex? > > It's nature would be "localized" in a way different from the other five (or > four). > > And no one knows what gravity - for example - really is either, aside from > some mathematical formulas - we invented - matching its "behavior". > Yes, why not use gravity, like Penrose, but again, what would be explained about qualia by gravitation, which is not already explained by the universal machineries. When we do metaphysics with the scientific method: the staring point is that we don’t know the (metaphyical) truth, and we start from hypothesis that we understand, and build from it, without adding anything not needed in the search of the explanation. Since Plato, we know that adding a primitive matter leads to the apparently unsolvable mind-body problem. The problem of mind is hard, but not so when you learn the abyssal difference that all machine is obliged to make between []p (2p self-reference) and ([]p & p) the unnameable, and never 3p descriptible, first person. That entails a reversal, as this forces us to derive physics from those intensional (modal) variant of provability. Maybe you are right, but up to now, the evidences favours strongly mechanism and its non materialism. Bruno > @philipthrift > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3b9fa6a6-0e35-4581-8390-52fcd2cefc7d%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3b9fa6a6-0e35-4581-8390-52fcd2cefc7d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F12E0DCF-47D2-4E99-AA39-EB8B1E4A6372%40ulb.ac.be.
