> On 15 May 2020, at 21:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, May 15, 2020 at 11:08:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 14 May 2020, at 12:09, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> This is true! >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files> >> >> "Magic <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_(paranormal)>" is described as >> being a branch of applied computation (mathematics), therefore computers and >> equations are just as useful, and perhaps more potent, than classic >> spellbooks, pentagrams, and sigils for the purpose of influencing ancient >> powers and opening gates to other dimensions. > > > > I don’t believe in “real magic”. If time travel was possible and a > time-traveller comes back with a documentary showing Jesus making water into > wine, I would still consider that the most plausible explanation would be > that Jesus is a good prestidigitator. > > Why? Just by considering the degree of credulity of the humans, and their > craft in prestidigitation. > > Similarly, I find far more reasonable, even “Occam-reasonable” that the > appearance of a physical universe is due to number’s prestidigitation, > because incompleteness shows the numbers being both terribly naïve, but also > incredibly gifted in the art of making their fellow number believing almost > everything. Gödel’s theorem warned us; if we are consistent, it is even > consistent that we are inconsistent (<>t -> <>[]f). > > Computationalism is Prestidigitalism. Lol. > > Wolfram is correct about “[]p”, but forget completely []p & p (and thus > missed physics, theology, etc.) > > At least Penrose is aware of the abyssal difference between “[]p” and “[]p & > p”, but literally confusse them in its use of Gödel’s incompleteness against > Mechanism. > > So, with respect to metaphysics and to the Mind-Body problem in the frame of > Descartes-Darwin Mechanism, we can say that Penrose is less wrong than > Wolfram, and more interestingly-wrong. > > I am not claiming that Penrose or Wolfram are wrong. I am just comparing them > with the canonical theology of the universal machine, that is, with the 8 > modes of self-truth/belief/knowledge/observation/sensation of the universal > machine having enough induction beliefs/axioms, in any hard or soft relative > implementation. > > Those modes can be motivated through Mechanist thought experiments and/or > through the Theaetetus of Plato. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Wolfram thinks that his Hypergraphic Universe Modeling (HUM) language can > lead to a unified QM+GR theory. > > Do you think consciousness is needed for this unification?
Not necessarily, in the sense that it is still possible to conceive a theory of "everything physical” which would be logically independent of a theory of consciousness, as far as we are interested in predicting first person plural observation. But such a theory would be cut from reality, as it would not be able to explain why our consciousness satisfies those prediction, so it would not be a theory of everything. To get that theory of everything including mind and consciousness, there are two options: a mechanist theory of mind, or a non mechanist theory of mind. With a mechanist theory, you will need to derive the “theory of everything-physical” from arithmetic. I don’t see any other way to get a theory of consciousness adequate with the physical observation. With a non-mechanist theory of mind, everything remains open, if only because such a theory of mind does not exist (except in faith tales). Bruno > > That would be bizarre. > > @philipthrift > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d1e6375b-4e54-4942-9623-cb9146d88419%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d1e6375b-4e54-4942-9623-cb9146d88419%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F490E5E3-1C65-4F76-A6E7-96C2D9E22BF5%40ulb.ac.be.
