> On 13 May 2020, at 00:26, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > But we know though, there is no real physical theory.
In which metaphysics? In arithmetic all universal machine already knows that there is no REAL physical universe, and that physics is a calculus of prediction on computational histories as seen from their first person points of view. *we* might still observe a difference, in which case either Mechanism is wrong or we are in a second order normal simulation. But up to now, there is no evidence that physics is different from the physics “in the head” of the Universal Turing machine. This is a progress, as this assumes only very elementary arithmetic for the ontology, and the standard definition for the phenomenology, (with direct motivation with the mechanist assumption at the meta level) and it explains both the quanta and the qualia, and why it looks so different (and is different, actually). It is very simple. One reality (the sigma_1 arithmetical reality), and 8 points of view: p (truth) []p (provable, rationally believable) []p & p (knowable, first person) []p & <>t (observable, “bettable”, first person plural) []p & <>t & p (sensible, feelable, first person singular) Those five nuances provides 8 mathematical theory, because three of them split along the key incompleteness difference between G1 and G1*. (Those are the logic of []p, which emulates all the others,including G1*, and the “1” comes from the limitation of the arithmetical interpretation on the sigma_1 sentences).That is handy to distinguish quanta from qualia. G1 = G + p-> []p for p atomic letter. (Already discover and axiomatised by Visser). G1 can emulate G1*. For example, G* proves A iff G prove the conjunction of the refection of the boxed sub-formula of A. (The reflection of p is the formula []p -> p). It is a form of “YD”: G* believes (about the machine, not about itself) that the machine survives if all its subpart “survives”, somehow. (The arithmetical interpretation of p is always limited G1* proves the equivalence of all the modalities above, but G1 does not prove most of them. It is a complete (at the propositional level) theology valid for all self-rerefntially correct machine believing in “enough induction” axiom, and it is testable, by comparing the physical theories related to the “observable” with Nature. I recall that a machine is universal if it p -> []p (for all p sigma_1) is true for that machine. That is the case for RA. A machine is by definition Löbian (or Gödel-Löbian) if it proves p -> []p (for all p sigma_1). That theology is complete for all their effective consistent extensions. But this becomes as undecidable as it could logically be at the first oder modal logical level. qG is PI_2 complete, and qG* is PI_1 complete in the oracle of truth (!). In this theology, The One is overwhelmed by the Noùs! It is quite Poitinian, as Matter is brought by the Soul at the place where God loses control, to talk poetically (perhaps). Wolfram is not bad in some part of c computer science, but I am not sure he is serious about “new science” or in metaphysics. With mechanism, Gödel-Löb-Solovay (G*) solves the mind-body problem in a testable way, as the physics is given by some modalities above, and that can be tested. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > On Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > My primary difficulty with this is not that this is a possibly useful > math-method, but that I have little physical sense of what this means. As > some combinatorics or paths or states this may have some utility, but this to > me is not terribly much a real physical theory. > > LC > > On Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 3:13:05 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: > > Wolfram Models as Set Substitution Systems > https://github.com/maxitg/SetReplace <https://github.com/maxitg/SetReplace> > > cf. https://www.wolframphysics.org/ <https://www.wolframphysics.org/> > > Stephen Wolfram (Ph.D. in theoretical physics at the California Institute of > Technology in 1979—at the age of 20): > > “I’m disappointed by the naivete of the questions that you’re communicating.” > > https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-criticize-stephen-wolframs-theory-of-everything/ > > <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-criticize-stephen-wolframs-theory-of-everything/> > > “I don’t know of any others in this field that have the wide range of > understanding of Dr. Wolfram,” Feynman wrote ( in 1981). > > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5162709e-0cf0-414f-99b4-7fc715bcca2e%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5162709e-0cf0-414f-99b4-7fc715bcca2e%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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