Thanks for recommending these readings. I’ll see how much I can get through. 
Can’t promise too much at this point. Nowadays we all get too many items on our 
to-do list, just as you indicated below about your website situation.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 19, 2020, at 10:51, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
>>> On 19 Aug 2020, at 05:39, Beixiao Liu <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> That’s a very thoughtful reply. I’m interested in learning about some of 
>>> these fields you mentioned. Right now, I don’t know enough about these 
>>> fields to give an informed reply. 
>> 
>> 
>> That is fair enough, and rathe normal, as I summed up many years of work, 
>> mainly based on the (many) incompleteness and undefinability theorems of the 
>> 1930s, and which were axiomatised in a modal logic of provability by Solovay 
>> in 1979, by the split logic G and G* (sometimes called GL and GLS, for 
>> Gödel, Löb and Solovay).
>> 
>> We might have opportunity to discuss this more. Meanwhile I give you some 
>> references on my main papers where I have developed this. It is also in my 
>> Phd Thesis (short and long version, but they were written in French, and are 
>> easily available on my webpage (which I should update since 2007!).
>> 
>> Your mentioning of Buddhism was quite appropriate, and I might make this 
>> clearer in some of the papers below.
>> 
>> Here are some:
>> 
>> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. Prog 
>> Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23567157
>> 
>> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in 
>> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993
>> 
>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International 
>> System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, 
>> Amsterdam, 2004.
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
>> (sane04)
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>> 
>> Plotinus PDF paper with the link:
>> Marchal B. A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation 
>> of Plotinus’ Theory of Matter. In Barry Cooper S. Löwe B., Kent T. F. and 
>> Sorbi A., editors, Computation and Logic in the Real World, Third Conference 
>> on Computability in Europe June 18-23, pages 263–273. Universita degli studi 
>> di Sienna, Dipartimento di Roberto Magari, 2007.
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
>> 
>> Marchal B. The East, the West and the Universal Machine, Progress in 
>> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2017, Vol. 131, pp. 251-260.
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28919132
>> 
>> Marchal B.  Religion, science and theology, similarity and differences, 
>> Dialogo Journal, 2018, Vol. 5, pp. 205-218.
>> (available at http://www.dialogo-conf.com/archive/)
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>> On Aug 18, 2020, at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 16 Aug 2020, at 15:24, Beixiao Robert Liu <[email protected]> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> In Buddhism teachings, a human has eight cognitions. 
>>> 
>>> Oh! Like the universal machine. You get the cognitions mode by taking into 
>>> account Gödel’s incompleteness. 
>>> 
>>> I abbreviate Gödel’s bewiesibar(‘p’) by []p, p is an arithmetical 
>>> restricted to the partial computable/decidable one, the so called sigma_1 
>>> sentences: that’s the arithmetical version of the Digital Mechanist 
>>> Hypothesis). 
>>> <>p is an abbreviation of ~[]~p. “T” is for “0 = 0", f for “0 = 1”.
>>> 
>>> In that case, it can be shown that p, []p, []p & p (theaetetus true 
>>> opinion), []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p, are equivalent, but very few of 
>>> those equivalence can be proved by the machine itself, making those five 
>>> modes obeying different logics and mathematics.
>>> 
>>> p
>>> []p
>>> []p & p
>>> 
>>> Correspond nicely to Plotinus three primary hypostases
>>> 
>>> ONE
>>> INTELLECT
>>> SOUL
>>> 
>>> Or, with less platonic vocabulary
>>> 
>>> TRUE
>>> BELIEVABLE
>>> KNOWABLE
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The modes
>>> 
>>> []p & <>t
>>> []p & <>t & p
>>> 
>>> Can be motivated through through experiments and defines what is observable 
>>> by the universal machine. They can also be related to Plotinus platonic 
>>> reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory of matter, pointing on the presence of 
>>> non provability and non controllability. 
>>> 
>>> Those two modes gives the two “matters”: the intelligible matter (quanta, 
>>> first person plural), and the sensible matter (qualia). The “quantum 
>>> quanta” appears as special qualia (apparently).
>>> 
>>> This gives five modes, but incompleteness splits again three of those 
>>> logics ([]p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p) in two, ((corresponding to 
>>> “provable” versus “true”, making eight "modes of cognition”, or eight ways 
>>> arithmetic can see itself through universal numbers).
>>> 
>>> The logic of the modes with the occurence of “& p”, gives first person 
>>> modes, and describes entities which cannot be defined in any third person 
>>> description, something inherited by the qualia, consciousness, etc. 
>>> technically, they entail that the subject obeys some intuitionistic logic.
>>> 
>>> The logic of the modes with “& <>t” gives the physical modes, and implies a 
>>> quantum logic and some measure, corresponding to the machine’s ignorance on 
>>> which computations support her (among an infinity). Recently,  I realised 
>>> that the existence of this measure exists and can be proved in ZF + some 
>>> sufficiently large cardinal.
>>> 
>>> The “& p” makes things non definable.
>>> 
>>> The “<>t” makes things non provable, which allows the study of the negation 
>>> of those modes, and things get subtle and counter-intuitive.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> The first five are related to our physical world: sight, hearing, smell, 
>>>> taste, touch. 
>>> 
>>> Of course, those should be obtained by the particularisation of some of the 
>>> modes above, if we want to make this coherent with some school go Buddhism. 
>>> The Hinayana, the Mahayana, the tantric, zen have many school, and 
>>> variants. Some Buddhists have develop school on logics. It is rather 
>>> complex. The Plato/Aristotle divide divides also Buddhism. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Then there are three related to our spiritual world. 
>>>> 
>>>> The sixth cognition is our thinking and emotions. This is where our 
>>>> repository of knowledge is located. All the human knowledge of philosophy, 
>>>> science, technology, arts belongs to the sixth cognition. This includes  
>>>> mental consciousness, sub-consciousness and these related concepts. 
>>> 
>>> Looks like []p, intellect, mind, ...
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Then the seventh and eighth senses are uniquely oriental and are near the 
>>>> core theory of Buddhism. The eighth sense is easier to explain than the 
>>>> seventh. 
>>>> 
>>>> The eighth sense is the “real-self”, or an inaccurate equivalent of 
>>>> “soul”, that’s the constant between incarnations, regardless one’s life 
>>>> takes the form of this human or that life being on earth.
>>> 
>>> That becomes close to the simplest mode (conceptually), but that the 
>>> machine can not defined the “p” mode. That’s Plotinus One :)
>>> 
>>> But it might be []p & p (it depends of before or after illumination (“p <-> 
>>> []p”).
>>> 
>>> You need to take this with some grain of salt (but not the whole salt 
>>> shaker!).
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> The seven sense can be roughly said as something between the sixth 
>>>> cognition - our day-to-day thinking - and the eighth cognition. The 
>>>> seventh cognition enables us to perform all the deep and thorough thinking 
>>>> at the sixth cognition level. 
>>> 
>>> Maybe []p & <>t? It is unclear.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Therefore, according to Buddhism teachings, AI may venture into the realm 
>>>> of the mental consciousness, but will never be able to reach the seventh 
>>>> and eighth cognition. 
>>> 
>>> Really?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> And that seventh and eight cognition is what distinguishes a life being 
>>>> from a non life being. 
>>> 
>>> The universal machine is born illuminated, in the eight cognition mode, p. 
>>> But then attached itself to some universal body/representation/number []p, 
>>> and the laws of arithmetic are such that this one put an infinite mess in 
>>> Arithmetic, and that is nothing compared to the mess when they met and 
>>> multiply. 
>>> 
>>> I explain elsewhere why, if we assume the minimal amount of mechanism 
>>> (Descartes) to make sense of Darwin, and a notion of finite information, + 
>>> the Church Turing thesis, the mind body problem becomes a problem of 
>>> reducing the “hallucination of matter” from the logic of self-reference. It 
>>> works. It is not well known, and it is normal, given that behind the modes, 
>>> you have the mood, and the mood today is almost everywhere Aristotelian, 
>>> with few exception, since about 1500 years in Occident, 800 years in the 
>>> Middle-East, and it is more complex to figure out in India and China. 
>>> 
>>> Thanks to Gödel and the logicians, the theology of machine is taught to 
>>> logicians, but, not many realise, or appreciate, that as a platonic 
>>> Pythagorean theory, it is testable (as it contains physics, or its 
>>> invariant (for all universal machine) core).
>>> 
>>> If interested I give you references, including good books on the 
>>> mathematics of self-reference. The mode “[]p & p” is a standard variant of 
>>> []p in the literature.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Sent from my iPad
>>>> 
>>>>>> On Aug 16, 2020, at 5:02 AM, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Saturday, August 15, 2020 at 10:36:40 PM UTC-6, Beixiao Robert Liu 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> Well, if the inquiry here concerns consciousness, then the question of 
>>>>>> whether a human should trust the AI, or whether the AI has the capacity 
>>>>>> to be trusted by a human, ought to be part of the inquiry, right? The 
>>>>>> movie listed others elements: compassion, sympathy, etc. I guess I was 
>>>>>> just using my wife’s off-the-cuff comment as a convenient way to suggest 
>>>>>> that Caleb might set the wrong threshold in his Turing test; and as a 
>>>>>> result, he gave a pass to the AI too easily, which later proved fatally 
>>>>>> wrong. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Sorry. Maybe my comment was too flippant. I just don't think Caleb's 
>>>>> mistake in trusting the AI relates to whether the AI is conscious. AG 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Aug 15, 2020, at 23:29, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Saturday, August 15, 2020 at 7:54:35 PM UTC-6, Beixiao Robert Liu 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> It’s available on YouTube. You could rent it for as little as $4, as 
>>>>>>>> long as you finish viewing it within 2 days once your start playing. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks for recommending it. I just viewed it. My wife said that it’s 
>>>>>>>> stupid for the boy to trust the AI girl, Ava, so he got what he 
>>>>>>>> deserved. 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Too funny! That's hardly the point. AG 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> > On Aug 15, 2020, at 21:26, Russell Standish <[email protected]> 
>>>>>>>> > wrote: 
>>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>>> > Alas not available on Netflix Australia. It'll have to wait until 
>>>>>>>> > if/when I subscribe to Amazon Prime briefly. 
>>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>>> > I'm also not really prepared to purchase a VPN just to watch other 
>>>>>>>> > countries' Netflix connections, for much the same reason as I only 
>>>>>>>> > subscribe to one streamer - so it might have to wait until if/when I 
>>>>>>>> > do live in a country that has it in the Netflix catalogue. 
>>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>>> > The tangled web of movie copyright arrangements... Bah! 
>>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>>> >> On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>>>>>>> >> If you haven't viewed it, please do so. It's about the Turing Test, 
>>>>>>>> >> science 
>>>>>>>> >> fiction, but the "special effects" aren't primarily photographic 
>>>>>>>> >> bells and 
>>>>>>>> >> whistles, but the dialogue. the text, the logic of the script. 
>>>>>>>> >> Recently, we 
>>>>>>>> >> have argued about consciousness, what it is, and how we can test 
>>>>>>>> >> for it in the 
>>>>>>>> >> context of AI. I claimed that we could do some superficial surgery 
>>>>>>>> >> to determine 
>>>>>>>> >> whether the subject of the test was a robot or a conscious entity. 
>>>>>>>> >> But this is 
>>>>>>>> >> completely mistaken. All that that would reveal is whether the 
>>>>>>>> >> subject was 
>>>>>>>> >> artificial, not whether it was "conscious". The subject could have 
>>>>>>>> >> been a black 
>>>>>>>> >> box, and still showing signs of what we can't really define; 
>>>>>>>> >> consciousness. I 
>>>>>>>> >> think Ex Machina provides an answer of what we need to look for. 
>>>>>>>> >> Please view it 
>>>>>>>> >> and report back. But do NOT read the plot, say in Wiki. It's a 
>>>>>>>> >> spoiler. AG 
>>>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>>>> >> -- 
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>>>>>>>> >>  
>>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>>> > -- 
>>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> >  
>>>>>>>> > Dr Russell Standish                    Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
>>>>>>>> > Principal, High Performance Coders     [email protected] 
>>>>>>>> >                      http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>>>>>>>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> >  
>>>>>>>> > 
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>>>>>>> 
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