> On 24 Nov 2020, at 20:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > The Conscious Turing Machine > > video: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=152yq0SPIqk > > arXiv: > https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.09850 > > A Theoretical Computer Science Perspective on Consciousness > Manuel Blum [ http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mblum/ ], > Lenore Blum [ https://twitter.com/BlumLenore ] > > The quest to understand consciousness, once the purview of philosophers and > theologians, is now actively pursued by scientists of many stripes. This > paper studies consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer > science. It formalizes the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) originated by > cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, > Stanislas Dehaene, and others. Our major contribution lies in the precise > formal definition of a Conscious Turing Machine (CTM), also called a > Conscious AI. We define the CTM in the spirit of Alan Turing's simple yet > powerful definition of a computer, the Turing Machine (TM). We are not > looking for a complex model of the brain nor of cognition but for a simple > model of (the admittedly complex concept of) consciousness. After formally > defining CTM, we give a formal definition of consciousness in CTM. We then > suggest why the CTM has the feeling of consciousness. The reasonableness of > the definitions and explanations can be judged by how well they agree with > commonly accepted intuitive concepts of human consciousness, the breadth of > related concepts that the model explains easily and naturally, and the extent > of its agreement with scientific evidence. > > cf. > https://thenextweb.com/neural/2020/11/23/eureka-a-family-of-computer-scientists-developed-a-blueprint-for-machine-consciousness/ >
Manuel Blum and his wife Lenore Blum wrote many quite interesting paper in theoretical computer, based on the work of Gold on "limiting recursion” and which inspired also the very interesting work of Case & Smith. But here, they are naïve on consciousness and they are still reasoning in an Aristotelian Metaphysics, with the usual identity thesis which I have shown to be incompatible with Mechanism. Once you work in the digital mechanist frame, a theory of consciousness is offered by the necessary first person mode (given by the consistency of truth nuance added to provability (rational belief). Incompleteness simply does not leave any choice: the logic of p (sigma_1), []p (sigma_1-complete), []p & p (the subject, as we know by thought experience, or by using Theaetus’definition), []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p, obeys different mathematics, explaining why the arithmetical reality when seen from inside takes the psycho-theological shapes, including the physical reality. This predicted quickly the “many-histories’ aspect of nature, and has been confirmed by attributing quantum logics to the platonic material modes. Incompleteness explains both 1) the vertical nuances between, truth, belief, knowledge, observation, and sensation: P []p []p & p []p & <>t []p & <>t & p, and 2) the horizontal nuance between provable and true which splits 3 modes in two, leading to the 8 arithmetical “hypostases”. That difference explains (mathematically) where the qualia and quanta comes from, and how they are related, and why it looks like, locally, the identity thesis is true, and why it works (locally). Aristotle confused the “apparent physical universe” with an ontological universe. There are no evidences at all for the first one, albeit a lot of evidence for the second one, including an explanation of how the illusion is unavoidable for most universal machine (in arithmetic). Mechanism changes the burden of the proof. A Materialist has to abandon Digital Mechanism (and thus Darwin!), and has to provide some evidence for an ontological universe, and some evidences that it differs from the “canonical physics of the universal (reflexive, Löbian) machine/number. Up to now, no one has found a discrepancy… Consciousness is simply knowledge, and incompleteness assures it exists on its own, and has all the platonic characteristic intuited in Parmenides, Moderatus, Plotinus, Proclus, etc… (unfortunately not well known). And physics is explained, both in its qualia sensible and non sharable aspects, as well as its quanta, at least up to now. In a sense, Mechanism enforces a sort of strong Aristotelian Atheism, as there is no creator, nor a creation, just a universal dreamer, which can awake from time to time. But, from a Platonic perspective, it needs at the least a Pythagorean ontology (numbers), as it necessitates to postulate at least one universal machinery (like very elementary arithmetic (Robinson), or combinators, etc.). It can be proved that we cannot prove/explain/define the existence of a universal machinery from anything less. Blum and Blum are probably interesting, but incomplete and unaware of the canonical “theory of everything” provided already by the universal machine or number. They are still avoiding the “hard” part of the problem: the mind-body problem, and they use in the background the “wrong” ontology (wrong with Mechanism). The reflexive universal machine knows that is true and provable for simpler (than itself) reflexive universal machine, and they know that they have a soul, and that such a theory is true if classical mechanism is true, which they know they cannot prove, unless inconsistent. Bruno > > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/662dd413-ee5a-4250-a12c-a8e138deb519n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/662dd413-ee5a-4250-a12c-a8e138deb519n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/700CE2FD-5054-4531-849E-3CC7E83F8681%40ulb.ac.be.
