On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 9:20:15 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > On 17 Jan 2021, at 03:03, Pierz Newton-John <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:49 am, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > >> *What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with >> each other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in >> the room that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero >> grounding in empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. >> AG* > > > I’m not an “enthusiast”. It’s a physical theory not a football team. If > anything I dislike the idea of all those alternative variants of me and my > life. If MWI is disproved I’ll be perfectly happy. It’s just that it > unfortunately makes more sense in my assessment than any other alternative, > so I entertain it as the most likely explanation for the observed data. To > say it has zero grounding in empirical data is simply false - it’s the > theory that simply takes the empirical data to its logical conclusion > without adding a collapse postulate. The wave function is the whole thing. > Asking what the mechanism is for worlds to interfere with one another is > the same as asking what the mechanism is for the Schrödinger wave function > to interfere with itself. In the dual slit experiment it’s an observed > fact. It makes no sense for it to behave that way if we stick to the old > view of matter as little hard balls, but there you go. When we talk of > “worlds”, it just refers to a ramifying quantum state, and it is in the > nature of quantum states to interfere with themselves per the dual slit > experiment, even if they become large and complex. Interference ceases when > two branches of the universal quantum state diverge far enough that they > completely decohere. When you say “what is the mechanism?” that really > means “what is the mathematical description?” in physics. Anything else is > just imprecise circumlocution like the word “world” in this context. So the > mechanism for interference is the Schrödinger equation, which predicts such > interference. MWI adds precisely nothing to that mathematical description. > > > > Yes. To avoid the MWI, the early founders of QM *added* an axiom: the wave > collapse postulate. But it introduce a non intelligible dualism with an > unknown theory of mind. It makes everything more complicated, for reason of > philosophical taste, which is alway dubious. Occam Razor favour the theory > with as much axioms as possible. > > Especially if one believe in Mechanism. This asks us to believe that 2+2=4 > & Co., which entails the existence of all computations, with a > extraordinary complex redundancy of those computations, implying the > existence of a (Lebgues) Measure on their first person limit (the > “observer” cannot be aware of the number of steps of the universal > dovetailing (which occur in all models of any theory of arithmetic). So ... > > Bruno > *Are irrational numbers, other than say PI or e, and possibly a few others, computable? AG * > > > >> >> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:32:49 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote: >> >>> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 1:23:52 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>> >>>> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 2:18 pm, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 6:16:25 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 5:56 am, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:36:39 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring in the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> those OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same as what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seen the electron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> go left, in another world Alan Grayson remembers having >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seen the electron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> go right, other than that the two worlds are absolutely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identical, so which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one was the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> MWI guarantee [...] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deals with probability. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the other not so much. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other worlds in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> third trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds are the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in each of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since no ensemble >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. The worlds that arise at each trial are different in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> precisely one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way and one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiment. The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiations" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the consequences of that singular difference ramifies, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> causing the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different worlds generated by the original experimental >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiply. "World" really means a unique configuration of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universal wave >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function, so two worlds at different trials can't possibly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be the "same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world", and yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "same other >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world. It's that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> context and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and 1 twice >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the "SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then how can we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is "WTF?" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quantum experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equally likely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> per the Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> effectively - two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each version >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing nothing about the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> record an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prediction of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between 1 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears that way. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *seem* to be saying that probability can't describe QM >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experiments because in each world there is only one outcome >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and therefore >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no "ensemble" of outcomes from which a probability can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derived. That is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally wrong-headed. There are two "ensembles": the ensemble >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of different >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiverse branches at each experiment, and the ensemble of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experimenter's prior measurements, and those are enough to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derive the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appearance of randomness and to justify a probabilistic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> description despite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the objective lack of randomness. If you agree with "what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have been >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> saying all along", then you must agree that every experimenter >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in every >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world in an MWI multiverse will see a record of an apparently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> random >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. Right? And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if not why >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are disjoint from each other and each records only one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement. So the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world. To get an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probability, you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bird's Eye >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> observer. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not that every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse >>>>>>>>>>>>>> who records a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> series of experiments as described in my scenario will record a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *seemingly* random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> really all that's required. Abstract debates about "ensembles >>>>>>>>>>>>>> required to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get a probability" are moot. If the world is as described by >>>>>>>>>>>>>> MWI, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> appearance of probability is an outcome, and probability is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> best >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possible description of how quantum experiments turn out from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> any real >>>>>>>>>>>>>> observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> disagree >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 0s, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you'll need to explain why you think that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, >>>>>>>>>>>>> a NEW OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. >>>>>>>>>>>>> So the >>>>>>>>>>>>> other observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume >>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise. You >>>>>>>>>>>>> need another postulate for this to work. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each >>>>>>>>>>>> world who repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series >>>>>>>>>>>> of 1s >>>>>>>>>>>> and 0s or not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in >>>>>>>>>>> this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were >>>>>>>>>> true* here. This is a thought experiment in which we are >>>>>>>>>> imagining how things would go if the MWI picture were correct. So if >>>>>>>>>> you're >>>>>>>>>> admitting that, in such a world, "AG in this world measures an >>>>>>>>>> apparently >>>>>>>>>> random sequence of 0's and 1's", then you have all the preconditions >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> making probabilistic predictions from it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of >>>>>>>>>>> what AG in this world measured. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once >>>>>>>>>> you remove the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm >>>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>> asking you to believe in them here, only to advance an argument >>>>>>>>>> based of >>>>>>>>>> "if" MWI were true. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs >>>>>>>>>>> always measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they >>>>>>>>>> don't measure more than one outcome at the same trial. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when >>>>>>>>> created for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes >>>>>>>>> because, >>>>>>>>> unless you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related >>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>> connected any other "other AG". AG * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Of course? I’m starting to think your picture of MWI is even more >>>>>>>> misconceived than I imagined. Look, the MWI multiverse has the >>>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>>> a tree, where each branch event is a different possible eigenvalue of >>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>> observable. But - again ex hypothesi - all branches of the tree are >>>>>>>> ontologically equal. They are all as real as one another. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *I'm really dumb. Ask Bruce for confirmation. I agree; in a horse >>>>>>> race there's no difference between AG observing the winner, and a MWI >>>>>>> enthusiast imagining another winner in another world. AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Bruce thinks that MWI violates Born’s rule and generally hates MWI. I >>>>>> don’t think his argument about the Born rule holds water, though it’s a >>>>>> well-known one. David Deutsch’s chapter on MWI in The Beginning of >>>>>> Infinity >>>>>> presents a refutation of that argument that I personally find >>>>>> convincing. >>>>>> But Bruce does at least understand MWI. I’m sure that while he shares >>>>>> your >>>>>> disdain for it, he would not accept that your specific argument against >>>>>> is >>>>>> valid. All you are doing is asserting that the other observers are >>>>>> imaginary, which is not a valid form of argument. >>>>>> >>>>>> Each AG’s past at a particular trial is the same as all the other AGs >>>>>>>> at that trial, though each AG’s future diverges into further trees of >>>>>>>> different observed realities. The equal status of all branches means >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> your idea that AG observers on other branches are in some way >>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>> from the AG branch you happen to be on in that they only ever have one >>>>>>>> observation is just totally misconceived. To be blunt, you don’t get >>>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *What I get is that "ex hypothesi" covers a multiple of sins, >>>>>>> including a complete disregard of experimental verification in physics. >>>>>>> AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> A hypothesis by definition has no experimental verification - yet! >>>>>> The same objection could have been made against General Relativity in >>>>>> 1915. >>>>>> But I’m not trying to convince you of MWI. Only that your argument about >>>>>> it >>>>>> not giving rise to probabilities is not valid. You can’t assume the >>>>>> hypothesis isn’t valid in your argument against it. You have to show how >>>>>> it’s logically inconsistent. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Your comparison with GR is plainly deficient if not silly. GR was >>>>> published in Nov 1915, and with it was a postulated empirical test which >>>>> the theory passed in 1920 (the bending of starlight as it passes the >>>>> Sun). >>>>> By comparison, the MWI was published around 1957, and now, after about 63 >>>>> years, there's no proposal for a test of its validity. As for the >>>>> observers being imaginary, I contend they remain in that status until >>>>> they >>>>> are experimentally detected. Have you seen one? As for Bruce's position, >>>>> I >>>>> don't know his perspective on my argument, nor do I particularly care. >>>>> But >>>>> I am pretty sure he would not agree on the absolute thematical reliance >>>>> on >>>>> mathematics as support for the Interpretation. After all, he put forth >>>>> the >>>>> horse racing model to cast grave doubt on the MWI. AG* >>>>> >>>> >>>> If your argument is that MWI is wrong because it hasn’t been “proved” >>>> yet (or supported by empirical test) you’re welcome to hold that position >>>> and I won’t argue with you. My point relates to the internal logic of your >>>> argument. You’re saying the other observers are imaginary and then using >>>> that to build a case against MWI giving rise to probabilities. That’s >>>> illogical. If you want to argue against the internal logic of MWI, you >>>> have >>>> to start by accepting what it proposes then proceeding to demonstrate how >>>> that leads to internal inconsistency. However I can see the futility of >>>> trying to hold you to the finer points of logic so I will bow out at this >>>> point - as I note many here have before me. >>>> >>> >>> *If you don't like my characterization of those other worlds as >>> "imaginary", then you should certainly accept their status as >>> "speculative", as well as the idea that these other worlds interact with >>> each other. It's not that I oppose speculation, but given the lack of any >>> empirical evidence of such other worlds, seems to be a strong point against >>> their existence! But for you and others who apply Trumper-type logic to >>> physics, the lack of empirical evidence, after 63 years, has no >>> argumentative weight and the postulates remain "consistent". AG * >>> >>>> > If you consider them imaginary I don’t have a problem with that. It’s not > the point! I’m happy to call them speculative if you like. They exist or > they don’t, right? I’m not 100% sure they do. Of course not. Neither my > opinion nor yours has any bearing on their existence or otherwise. But when > we debate whether MWI is theoretically consistent with observation, we can > disregard the question of whether other observers/worlds are speculative or > imaginary. Otherwise your argument assumes it’s premises. Effectively > you’re saying “MWI can’t be right because the other worlds are purely > imaginary”. > > “There’s no ensemble from which to derive probabilities because all the > other observers are purely imaginary” is thus a circular argument. That is > my point. Please try to get over your abhorrence for MWI long enough to get > it. > >> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each >>>>>>>>>>> other. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" >>>>>>>>>> means "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have >>>>>>>>>> measured >>>>>>>>>> different results, initially their worlds have only this difference >>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>> them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they >>>>>>>>>> cannot >>>>>>>>>> interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then >>>>>>>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>> only the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because >>>>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>>>> interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word >>>>>>>>>> disjoint >>>>>>>>>> seems to be central to your objection, but you need to define >>>>>>>>>> precisely >>>>>>>>>> what is meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate >>>>>>>>>>> to your MWI. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, >>>>>>>>>> adjusting it slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of >>>>>>>>>> 1s and >>>>>>>>>> 0s in this experiment if MWI describes reality? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the >>>>>>>>> MWI interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> never observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no >>>>>>>>> observations of interacting other worlds have ever been made, within >>>>>>>>> QM or >>>>>>>>> without QM. So the MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Im not assuming it. It’s part of QM that wave functions interfere >>>>>>>> with themselves. In MWI that translates to different “worlds” >>>>>>>> interfering. >>>>>>>> That interference is extremely limited since it only occurs to the >>>>>>>> extent >>>>>>>> that two branches can become identical again after having diverged. >>>>>>>> Nonetheless it is the basis for proposed experimental proofs of MWI. >>>>>>>> One >>>>>>>> argument goes that if we can make a quantum computer with a >>>>>>>> sufficiently >>>>>>>> large number of qubits, we can prove the existence of other worlds >>>>>>>> because >>>>>>>> the other worlds are the only place we can get all that information >>>>>>>> from. >>>>>>>> So, no, this is not my assumption, it’s intrinsic to MWI. Again, if >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> don’t get that, you don’t get MWI. You can’t expect your arguments to >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> taken seriously if you don’t understand basics like this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in >>>>>>>>> the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email >>>>>>>>> to [email protected]. >>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in >>>>>>> the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>> >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a4966dac-4001-47ff-9d33-1ccb39c047fen%40googlegroups.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a4966dac-4001-47ff-9d33-1ccb39c047fen%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >>>>> . >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>> [email protected]. >>>>> >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97460a4a-2141-4db6-88df-56158edffe89n%40googlegroups.com >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97460a4a-2141-4db6-88df-56158edffe89n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b2dddd36-e9ba-4777-abe0-e9f7ac01e0a2n%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b2dddd36-e9ba-4777-abe0-e9f7ac01e0a2n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAArMS03MsDJ2tEOOvU-vFXDJbWUqgATnV4Bf55EAtU6ftGyopw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAArMS03MsDJ2tEOOvU-vFXDJbWUqgATnV4Bf55EAtU6ftGyopw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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