> On 16 Jan 2021, at 17:49, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with each > other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in the room > that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero grounding in > empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. AG
0 world, 1 world, 2 worlds, … aleph_0 worlds, aleph_1 worlds, etc.. ALL of them are as much speculation than any other. Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at all. A term in a superposition cannot interact with any other terms, but we can make them interfering, like with the two slits. Mechanism makes this simpler: there are 0 world, and there is an apperaance of 1 world above the substitution level, and of infinity of worlds below the substitution level. ((Digital)Mechanism is the assumption that there is a level of substitution of you such that you survive a body part substitution made at that (digital) level). Bruno > > On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:32:49 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote: > On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 1:23:52 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 2:18 pm, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 6:16:25 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 5:56 am, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:36:39 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: > > > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> > wrote: > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> > wrote: > On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> > wrote: > On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> > wrote: > On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > > > On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 [email protected] <> wrote: > On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 [email protected] <> wrote: > On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for > > subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as > > trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. > > I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In one > world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in another > world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, other than > that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was the "SAME > OTHER world"? > > > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...] > > Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with > probability. > > > I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. > > Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2 > meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much. > > In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. Same > other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc? Where > does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? Unless it > does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No probability > exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements exist in these > other world. AG > > You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The worlds > that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one way only: > the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different eigenvalues will > then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the consequences of that > singular difference ramifies, causing the different worlds generated by the > original experimental difference to multiply. "World" really means a unique > configuration of the universal wave function, so two worlds at different > trials can't possibly be the "same world", and yes, there is only one > measurement in each. > > This is what I have been saying all along! AG > No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one measurement > outcome in each world. However this business about "same other worlds" > betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't guarantee" > that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's that the whole > notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and has no > bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice whether we > are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME ones" at each > addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how can we be sure the > answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is "WTF?" > > That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum experiment > with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the Born rule, > then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds are created. > You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing nothing about the > other. > > Again, what I have been saying all along! AG > If you get that, then the next bit follows. > > So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave function > as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat this experiment > many times, each version of you will record an apparently random sequence of > 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the next experiment is > that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively there's no randomness, > subjectively it appears that way. > > Here's where you go astray. AG > > So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You seem to be saying > that probability can't describe QM experiments because in each world there is > only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of outcomes from which a > probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. There are two > "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse branches at each > experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior measurements, and > those are enough to derive the appearance of randomness and to justify a > probabilistic description despite the objective lack of randomness. If you > agree with "what you have been saying all along", then you must agree that > every experimenter in every world in an MWI multiverse will see a record of > an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. > Right? And if not why not? > > IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are disjoint from > each other and each records only one measurement. So the only observer who > sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an ensemble of > outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, you need to appeal > to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye observer. AG > > Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not that every > experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a series of > experiments as described in my scenario will record a seemingly random string > of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all that's required. Abstract debates > about "ensembles required to get a probability" are moot. If the world is as > described by MWI, the appearance of probability is an outcome, and > probability is the best possible description of how quantum experiments turn > out from any real observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If > you disagree that experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and > 0s, then you'll need to explain why you think that. > > I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW OTHER > WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other observers > see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need another > postulate for this to work. AG > > You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world who > repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and 0s or not? > Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... > > The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this world > measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. > > That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about if MWI were true here. > This is a thought experiment in which we are imagining how things would go if > the MWI picture were correct. So if you're admitting that, in such a world, > "AG in this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's", > then you have all the preconditions for making probabilistic predictions from > it. > On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG in > this world measured. > > They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once you remove > the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm not asking you to > believe in them here, only to advance an argument based of "if" MWI were true. > Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always measure > complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. > > Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they don't measure > more than one outcome at the same trial. > > I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when created for > some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes because, unless you > can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related or connected any > other "other AG". AG > > Of course? I’m starting to think your picture of MWI is even more > misconceived than I imagined. Look, the MWI multiverse has the structure of a > tree, where each branch event is a different possible eigenvalue of some > observable. But - again ex hypothesi - all branches of the tree are > ontologically equal. They are all as real as one another. > > I'm really dumb. Ask Bruce for confirmation. I agree; in a horse race there's > no difference between AG observing the winner, and a MWI enthusiast imagining > another winner in another world. AG > > Bruce thinks that MWI violates Born’s rule and generally hates MWI. I don’t > think his argument about the Born rule holds water, though it’s a well-known > one. David Deutsch’s chapter on MWI in The Beginning of Infinity presents a > refutation of that argument that I personally find convincing. But Bruce does > at least understand MWI. I’m sure that while he shares your disdain for it, > he would not accept that your specific argument against is valid. All you are > doing is asserting that the other observers are imaginary, which is not a > valid form of argument. > > Each AG’s past at a particular trial is the same as all the other AGs at that > trial, though each AG’s future diverges into further trees of different > observed realities. The equal status of all branches means that your idea > that AG observers on other branches are in some way different from the AG > branch you happen to be on in that they only ever have one observation is > just totally misconceived. To be blunt, you don’t get it. > > What I get is that "ex hypothesi" covers a multiple of sins, including a > complete disregard of experimental verification in physics. AG > > A hypothesis by definition has no experimental verification - yet! The same > objection could have been made against General Relativity in 1915. But I’m > not trying to convince you of MWI. Only that your argument about it not > giving rise to probabilities is not valid. You can’t assume the hypothesis > isn’t valid in your argument against it. You have to show how it’s logically > inconsistent. > > Your comparison with GR is plainly deficient if not silly. GR was published > in Nov 1915, and with it was a postulated empirical test which the theory > passed in 1920 (the bending of starlight as it passes the Sun). By > comparison, the MWI was published around 1957, and now, after about 63 years, > there's no proposal for a test of its validity. As for the observers being > imaginary, I contend they remain in that status until they are experimentally > detected. Have you seen one? As for Bruce's position, I don't know his > perspective on my argument, nor do I particularly care. But I am pretty sure > he would not agree on the absolute thematical reliance on mathematics as > support for the Interpretation. After all, he put forth the horse racing > model to cast grave doubt on the MWI. AG > > If your argument is that MWI is wrong because it hasn’t been “proved” yet (or > supported by empirical test) you’re welcome to hold that position and I won’t > argue with you. My point relates to the internal logic of your argument. > You’re saying the other observers are imaginary and then using that to build > a case against MWI giving rise to probabilities. That’s illogical. If you > want to argue against the internal logic of MWI, you have to start by > accepting what it proposes then proceeding to demonstrate how that leads to > internal inconsistency. However I can see the futility of trying to hold you > to the finer points of logic so I will bow out at this point - as I note many > here have before me. > > If you don't like my characterization of those other worlds as "imaginary", > then you should certainly accept their status as "speculative", as well as > the idea that these other worlds interact with each other. It's not that I > oppose speculation, but given the lack of any empirical evidence of such > other worlds, seems to be a strong point against their existence! But for you > and others who apply Trumper-type logic to physics, the lack of empirical > evidence, after 63 years, has no argumentative weight and the postulates > remain "consistent". AG > > > > As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other. > > What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" means > "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have measured > different results, initially their worlds have only this difference between > them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they cannot > interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then that is only > the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because without > interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word disjoint seems > to be central to your objection, but you need to define precisely what is > meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims. > > The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to your > MWI. AG > > No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, adjusting it > slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of 1s and 0s in this > experiment if MWI describes reality? > > You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the MWI > interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds are never > observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no observations of > interacting other worlds have ever been made, within QM or without QM. So the > MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG > > Im not assuming it. It’s part of QM that wave functions interfere with > themselves. In MWI that translates to different “worlds” interfering. That > interference is extremely limited since it only occurs to the extent that two > branches can become identical again after having diverged. Nonetheless it is > the basis for proposed experimental proofs of MWI. One argument goes that if > we can make a quantum computer with a sufficiently large number of qubits, we > can prove the existence of other worlds because the other worlds are the only > place we can get all that information from. So, no, this is not my > assumption, it’s intrinsic to MWI. Again, if you don’t get that, you don’t > get MWI. You can’t expect your arguments to be taken seriously if you don’t > understand basics like this. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe > <https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe>. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected] <>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe > <https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe>. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected] <>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a4966dac-4001-47ff-9d33-1ccb39c047fen%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a4966dac-4001-47ff-9d33-1ccb39c047fen%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe > <https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe>. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected] <>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97460a4a-2141-4db6-88df-56158edffe89n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97460a4a-2141-4db6-88df-56158edffe89n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b2dddd36-e9ba-4777-abe0-e9f7ac01e0a2n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b2dddd36-e9ba-4777-abe0-e9f7ac01e0a2n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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