On Wednesday, March 10, 2021, spudboy100 via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> Only if we could break into other worldliness does MWI seem interesting. > Especially for trade between earth's! Maybe the Neanderthal earth never > discovered yams as a food source, so we could trade some of ours for their > wonderful gray crystals that do photonic computing so well? Your axioms are > indisputable, but I would still hug the real world closely, as it doesn't > do to ignore the punches that nature delivers. > You might like the TV series: Counterpart. It explorers these ideas. Jason > ------------------------------ > On Wednesday, March 10, 2021 Bruno Marchal <everything-list@googlegroups. > com> wrote: > > On 10 Mar 2021, at 00:45, spudboy100 via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > > I kind of side with Canadian philosopher John Leslie, as well as British > astronomer, James Jeans on this question. Both Leslie and Jeans see the > cosmos as a Great Thought. I formalize their conjectures as a Great > Program. One may ask, running on what? > > > > *IF* you are willing to bet, like Darwin did implicitly, that life is > Turing emulable, so that for example, you can survive with an artificial > digital brain (and there are evidences for this, if only the success of > Darwin’s type of explanation in biology), > *Then*, the “Great program” are given any Universal Turing Machinery. > More precisely, any Model (in the sense of Logician) of any Turing-complete > theory would do the work. As the elementary arithmetic that we all learn in > primary school is a universal machinery, we need only to believe in the > truth of 2+2=4 & Co. > > Now, you might ask where does that arithmetical reality come from? > > *Answer:* any other universal machinery can explain this. You can derive > the Robinson Axioms of Arithmetic from the simple theory of combinators, > which has only two axioms Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz) together with three > simple identity axioms(*). I did it explicitly on this forum (search > “combinators”). > So, all we need is to assume one Universal machinery, whichever you want. > > Now, you might ask where does that “first” universal machinery comes from? > > *Answer:* It is impossible to derive a universal machinery from something > which is not already a universal machinery. So, a universal machinery is a > needed to even just define the notion of machine and machinery. > > (In case people have forgotten: a universal machinery is given by all > programs in some Turing universal system, or the partial computable > functions associates with those programs, the phi_i. A universal > machine/number is a number u such that > phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). u is called the computer, x is called the program, > and y is called the data. (x, y) is supposed to be a number (coding the two > numbers x and y). > > Note that when you have a universal number, you can define a universal > machinery associated with it, and all universal machinery contains > (infinitely many) universal numbers. > > Once we assume/believe/bet-on Indexical Digital Mechanism (yes doctor + > the Church Turing thesis), physics is reduced to a statistics on all > (relative) computations going through our computational mental states, and > that statistics is given by the modal logic of the “observable” variant of > Gödel’s beweisbar predicate. > > A believer in an ontological physical universe must abandon Mechanism, or > abandon rationality. > > I got the "many-world” aspect of physics from this in the 1970, and it > took 30 years to get quantum logic for the observable, and quantum > intuitionist logic for the sensible. > > I recall you the 8 modes of self-reference imposed by incompleteness. P > represents sigma_1 arithmetical proposition. > > p (truth) > []p (justifiable) (splits in two along G*/G) > []p & p (knowable) > []p & <>t (observable) (splits in two along G*/G) > []p & <>t & p (sensible) (splits in two along G*/G) > > G* proves them all equivalent, but G cannot prove any of those > equivalences. It means that the machine sees the same truth, but from 8 > very different perspective obeying 8 very different mathematics. > > Bruno > > (*) the full basic theory of combinators is: > > RULES: > > 1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z > 2) If x = y then xz = yz > 3) If x = y then zx = zy > > AXIOMS: > > 4) Kxy = x > 5) Sxyz = xz(yz) > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > On Tuesday, March 9, 2021 Jason Resch <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 12:37 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 3/9/2021 12:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 12:57 AM Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > > What was there before there was nothing? > > > I don't believe reality was ever a state of absolute nothingness. Rather, > there are things that exist necessarily: logical laws, truth, properties of > numbers, etc. Some of these truths and number relations concern and define > all computational histories, and the appearance of a physical reality is a > result of these computations creating consciousness observers. See: > https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#A_Story_of_Creation > > > But you're casually confounding different sense of "exist". Logical laws, > number, etc are derivative on language. They don't "exist" physically. > The logicians meaning of exist is just to satisfy a predicate. Any > sensible discussion of "exist"needs to start with recognizing it has > several different meanings. > > > Hi Brent, > > You are right there are various senses of the word "exists". > > I dedicate a section specifically to this issue, and define three types, > or modes of existence: https://alwaysasking.com/why-does- > anything-exist/#Three_Modes_of_Existence > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA% > 2BBCJUhz5QF90QwoJfbF-u76tuYr%2B61fY5%3D%2BbkhjLZMxxqrqEA%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhz5QF90QwoJfbF-u76tuYr%2B61fY5%3D%2BbkhjLZMxxqrqEA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > msgid/everything-list/1268362286.989763.1615333541353%40mail.yahoo.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1268362286.989763.1615333541353%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA749CB4-1A7D-417A-99F2- > FEC0E278449E%40ulb.ac.be > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA749CB4-1A7D-417A-99F2-FEC0E278449E%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > msgid/everything-list/78897196.50015.1615428555721%40mail.yahoo.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/78897196.50015.1615428555721%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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