> On 10 Mar 2021, at 18:19, 'scerir' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >>> [scerir] But - since then - I'm in trouble. Maybe 'Quantum' is a language, >>> nothing more than a language. Efficient? >>> >> [Bruno] If it is a language, the question is what does that language refers >> too, and what or who does the conversation (in that language). > I would mean: A general, natural "syntax" (or "operating system" maybe?). > What does that "syntax" refers to? Good question. > > Well, I think that "something" for sure exists. Something knowable. I'm a > realist. Everett III was a realist. At least, his interpretation was realist. > Schroedinger thought his waves were real. > > So, I think that the supposed "syntax" could refer to real things, let us say > "states" or Ur-objects or physical informations or knowable relations, or > something else. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00676265 > <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00676265> > But are those "states" real? David Finkelstein wrote: "In quantum theory we > represent actual operations and the relations among them, not a hypothetical > reality on which they act." Right. But isn't that - precisely - a "syntax"? > And can Finkelstein exclude the very existence of that "hypothetical reality" > on which operators act? > I am quite a physical realist myself, but I am quite skeptical of physical fundamentalism, aka physicalism.
I do believe the wave is real, but that belief stems from the fact that all universal machine eventually believe that the wave is real, for logical reason, and not from inference and extrapolation from observation. Once you have a syntax, you have words and some operations on the words. To get the natural numbers, that syntax will already be as rich as being essentially undecidable, and with Mechanism, such a “language” is enough, and is no more a language, but a full Turing universal realm, and with Mechanism, you cannot add an axiom to it: either it is redundant or it is contradictory. If you postulate a physical universe which would not be an internal mental construct by numbers, you will have to explain how that physical universe manage to influence the statistics on all computations in arithmetic, to make some computations more “real” than others, but this will require some non Turing emulabity of the mind, different from the non Turing emulable truth already present in arithmetic (which I recall is mainly NOT Turing emulable, as only the tiny sigma_1 part of arithmetic is Turing-emulable). You seem to assume some physical reality “out there”. I agree that there is a physical reality “out of the human mind” with far away galaxies and big-bangs, and other fermions and bosons. But I am skeptical that there is a physical reality “out of the Turing machine mind”, and it is a fact that *all* Turing machines “live” (are emulated by) a tiny part of arithmetic (a fact known by logicians since the 1930s). Few people seem to realise the impact of this, though. Computer science transforms the (already rather convincing) Dream Argument into a constructive proof that physics is not describing the fundamental Reality. The proof is constructive, so we can test Mechanism. We cannot know-for-sure that Mechanism is true, but we might be able to get evidences that mechanism is not plausible, but until now, there are no evidences at all. (Weak) Materialism is still a Fairy Tales, which complicates the matter. I invite you to try to present me one evidence for the ontological existence of matter, and then I can illustrate you why it will not work, and why no argument will ever work for this. In the theology of the Turing machine, there is no creator, and no creation, but there is a universal dreamer which can awake from "time to time” (where time is measured here in the simplest way: the number of step of a program relatively to the universal machinery that we assume at the start). An ontological matter needs a non computationalist theory of mind, and there are none, except the fairy tale-like pseudo-religious one, which are also pseudo-science. When doing theology (aka metaphysics) with the scientific method, it is better to not commit oneself in any ontological assumption at the start, and progress very carefully on the hypotheses on which we can agree. We cannot start from an ontological assumption to discuss what is fundamentally real, and what his derivable from it. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1132548789.189923.1615396769469%40mail1.libero.it > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1132548789.189923.1615396769469%40mail1.libero.it?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/52366108-9A6A-427C-BC37-A6DB5AC31FB4%40ulb.ac.be.
