On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 2:34 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 6/27/2021 2:49 AM, Tomas Pales wrote: > > > On Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 3:53:18 AM UTC+2 Brent wrote: > >> >> Notice that they don't exist in the sense you mean. Newton's laws aren't >> around anymore. >> > > By laws I mean regularities in nature. The apple still falls down and not > up or in random directions, so the regularity exists like it did in the > days of Newton although Einstein's theory can describe this regularity more > accurately than Newton's theory. > > >> So there's no guarantee they will continue without change, but they will >> apply to the past. How do we know? We don't, but it's supported by >> induction. Induction is a self-supporting form of inference. If there is >> any effective form of empirical inference, then induction will do as well. >> > > The problem is, why does induction work? Solomonoff tried to explain it > with his theory of induction and that's what Russell's book refers to. > > > Yes, I've read Russell's book. Solomonoff's idea is interesting but > whether his assumptions are more fundamental or believable than just saying > induction works and we know that by induction, is questionable. > By chance I was just reading this: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286624424_My_8_Big_Ideas by Zuboff, and in it he shows how to justify induction through a priori reasoning: "By the same reasoning as above, if all the first beads randomly drawn are blue, it is becoming more and more probable that the beads in the urn are generally blue. (Otherwise something improbable would be happening in another colour not appearing; and what’s improbable is improbable.) It is therefore probable also that the next bead drawn will be blue. This is induction. As Hume would have said, we could not know a priori, given this evidence, that the next bead will be blue. But, as he overlooked, we can know a priori, given this evidence, that it is probable that the next bead will be blue. In neither urn example has the belief regarding the beads been formed as a Humean habit of expectation after many observations of beads. (In the first case there is only one observation. The second could be modified to have all the beads drawn out at once.) Rather the belief is a product of a priori reasoning about probability." Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhs2xDLk4sqg6K%3Djf9JwS-8SJ8MXMzL_gJHU-mgoH05QQ%40mail.gmail.com.
