On Sun, Jun 27, 2021, 7:04 PM Tomas Pales <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 10:56:33 PM UTC+2 Jason wrote: > >> >> By chance I was just reading this: >> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286624424_My_8_Big_Ideas by >> Zuboff, and in it he shows how to justify induction through a priori >> reasoning: >> >> "By the same reasoning >> as above, if all the first beads randomly drawn are blue, it is becoming >> more and more >> probable that the beads in the urn are generally blue. (Otherwise >> something improbable >> would be happening in another colour not appearing; and what’s improbable >> is improbable.) >> It is therefore probable also that the next bead drawn will be blue. This >> is induction. As Hume >> would have said, we could not know a priori, given this evidence, that >> the next bead will be >> blue. But, as he overlooked, we can know a priori, given this evidence, >> that it is probable that >> the next bead will be blue. >> > > That makes sense. I am wondering, if this idea was worked out in more > detail maybe it would end up being the same as Solomonoff's theory of > induction? > That's a good question. I think it might, if you presume observer states are computationally generated, and assume all program descriptions have a uniform likelihood. Markus Mueller has a derivation in his paper where he shows "consistent laws" are the rule rather than the exception for observers. Then the repeated tests of stable laws acts like drawing 🔵 over and over. No test is guaranteed to be affirm consistency, but the likelihood increases as the compressed (lawful) description becomes more likely. As an aside, I also wonder whether less significant, unmeasured decimal places if fundamental constants are in a sense "undefined." Jason > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d2d0669f-0b17-45d8-a568-1aaa0d2e13f1n%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d2d0669f-0b17-45d8-a568-1aaa0d2e13f1n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUi6beF1sDQhkZdY%3D-g%3DvMmYi6hUz%2B4K9NUdicgQrY72VA%40mail.gmail.com.
