> On 27 Jun 2021, at 01:41, Tomas Pales <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, June 26, 2021 at 11:36:47 PM UTC+2 Brent wrote: > > But presumably the laws are stable. Why? Because that's the way we want > them. If they weren't stable (or even time invariant) we wouldn't call them > laws of physics. They'd be initial conditions or historical accidents. > > But why do stable laws exist in our universe and what is the guarantee that > they will continue to exist?
Because our universe emerge from the statistic on all computations (arithmetical object) going through our indexical state. With Mechanism, physicalism cannot work, and physics is reduced to the “theology of the machine”, The physical laws are stable because they have an arithmetical origin in the “head” of any universal+ machine (those which have the theology G*) There is a widespread belief that Mechanism and Materialism fit well together, and indeed many materialist use Mechanism and the brain-mind identity thesis to … persist in hiding the mind-body problem under the rug. Now, I have already on this list explain why this is logically impossible, and the proof is constructive: it shows how to extract physics from that statistic on computations (infinitely many computations access any state when taken in the first person view): The theology is the theory G1* (qG1*). You need G to define it. G is the provable part of the theology: Axioms: (classical logic + [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B) []([]A -> A) -> []A (Löb formula) p -> []p for all p sentence letter (this restricts the arithmetical interpretation to the sigma_1 (partially computable) arithmetical sentences) Rules: modus ponens + necessitation (you can infer []A from a proof of A). Incompleteness (that you get here by putting “f” (the constant false) at the place of A in Löb’s formula, justify that although G* prouve the equivalence of all “Theaetetus” mode of knowledge, G, the machine itself proves none of those equivalence, and the physical laws are given by the material modes and the “soul”: p (truth) []p (provable) []p & p (knowable, the soul) []p & <>t (observable, intelligible matter) []p & <>t & p (sensible matter) Here the box “[]” represent Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate (and “<>” represents ~[]~). Physics is derivable entirely from elementary arithmetic, or any Universal Turing system. The shorter one are the equation Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) >From which you can derive the 5 modes above, and their mathematics. G* proves p <-> []p <-> … (all modes above), But G does not prove any of them, they belong to the true but non provable part of the theology (the proper theology, G* \ G).They obey different mathematics. The splitting G* vs G makes possible to distinguish the quanta and the qualia. Both have been shown to obey different quantum logic. An intutionist quantum logic is also appearing with the knowable mode ([]p & p) (I was wrong on this in may original thesis). So, there is no universe, but the appearance of a universe is a logical consequence of incompleteness, and the laws of physics will be stable … as long as 2+2=4. I found in this way a “many-worlds”, or better a “many histories” interpretation of elementary arithmetic (or combinatory algebra, …). Until now, Nature confirms. That is not the case for most physical laws when taken with the identity thesis, which somehow identify []p with []p & p at the G level, which is incorrect. This shows also that the laws of physics are machine or theory independent. The ontology is given by any interpretation of the term of any Turing complete (Turing universal) theory. I will send a summary I have just made (for Facebook!) of the theology of the universal machine. We get an arithmetical interpretation of neoplatonism, making Mechanism testable experimentally, and QM without collapse confirms both the many-histories aspect, and the quantum logical formalism … until now. Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/70e5fca0-63b7-424b-b6ee-8571ee36796en%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/70e5fca0-63b7-424b-b6ee-8571ee36796en%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9C356305-1669-4FC7-BD0A-DE401CC34F5B%40ulb.ac.be.
