Am Fr, 12. Aug 2022, um 14:55, schrieb John Clark:
> On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:04 AM Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>> *> Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)*
> 
> Well, I like Stephen Wolfram

I like him too. Mathematica is a beautiful piece of software and I bought his 
book "A New Kind of Science" when it came out, which is also beautiful and 
inspiring.

> and I agree 100% with the ASCII sequence that Stephen Wolfram's *physical* 
> brain produced:
> 
> "*As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will 
> immediately ask “On what computer?" But a key intellectual point is that 
> computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, 
> without reference to anything like a physical computer*. "
> 
> All completely true, however you can't make a computation with a definition, 
> not even if the definition is what a computation is. For a definition to make 
> any sense you need a mind, and to have a mind you need a brain, and a brain 
> needs to process information, and if a Turing Machine cannot process a given 
> amount of information then nothing can. And nobody, I repeat absolutely 
> nobody, has been able to make a Turing machine without using the laws of 
> physics

We are physical beings existing within the laws of physics. It could be that 
there is a larger computational reality, and that our universe and the laws of 
physics are "local" to the "sector" of the computation that we inhabit. We are 
experiencing this computational reality from the inside.

> or has even propose a theory about how such a thing could be possible 
> because, as I said in the above, you can't make a computation with nothing 
> but a definition, in fact *you can't do anything at all* if all you have is a 
> definition.

The tricky thing, that Jason expanded on better than me, is that the outcomes 
of computations preexist, in the sense that the outcome will be the same 
independently of how, when or where the computation is performed. We might need 
a physical computer to find out that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050, but it was 
already and it always has been and will be the case that 12345 * 67890 = 
838102050 (by definition of the natural numbers and multiplication). 

> 
>> * > My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory 
>> power? *
> 
> Although quite interesting so far Stephen Wolfram cellular automation ideas 
> have been no help whatsoever to physicists, but perhaps someday they may be,

They are however already quite interesting from computer science, I would say. 
I am still to this day fascinated by the fact that some elementary cellular 
automata rules such as rule 110 are Turing complete and display chaotic 
behavior, while most others are stable. The connections with phenotypical 
expression in nature are also quite fascinating. It is hard to not suspect that 
there is something fundamental going on here.

Telmo

> maybe someday we'll find that quarks behave the way they do because of some 
> simple cellular automation at work inside them, but even if that day comes to 
> pass you're still not going to be able to make a Turing machine, or anything 
> else, with just a definition. 
> 
> John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
> ewg
> 
>    
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> __
>> Hi Jason,
>> 
>> This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going 
>> in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are 
>> perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be 
>> conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of 
>> hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised 
>> if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being 
>> gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a 
>> powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit 
>> that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something 
>> really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.
>> 
>> "As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will 
>> immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that 
>> computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, 
>> without reference to anything like a physical computer. "
>> 
>> Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)
>> 
>> Telmo.
>> 
>> Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:
>>> https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the 
>>> type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with 
>>> new ways of explaining it and some new insights.
>>> 
>>> Jason
>>> 
>>> 
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