Don't you ever get bored of this materialistic mumbo-jumbo ? When will you finally understand that brain doesn't exist ?
On Tuesday 9 July 2024 at 18:18:35 UTC+3 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > On Wed, 10 Jul 2024 at 00:34, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 10:16 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> >>> On Tue, 9 Jul 2024 at 22:15, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 4:33 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, 9 Jul 2024 at 04:23, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 3:14 PM John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 1:58 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *>>> ** I think such foresight is a necessary component of >>>>>>>>>> intelligence, not a "byproduct".* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>I agree, I can detect the existence of foresight in others and >>>>>>>>> so can natural selection, and that's why we have it. It aids in >>>>>>>>> getting >>>>>>>>> our genes transferred into the next generation. But I was talking >>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> consciousness not foresight, and regardless of how important we >>>>>>>>> personally >>>>>>>>> think consciousness is, from evolution's point of view it's >>>>>>>>> utterly useless, and yet we have it, or at least I have it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *> you don't seem to think zombies are logically possible,* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Zombies are possible, it's philosophical zombies, a.k.a. smart >>>>>>> zombies, that are impossible because it's a brute fact that >>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>> is the way data behaves when it is being processed intelligently, >>>>>>> or at least that's what I think. Unless you believe that all >>>>>>> iterated sequences of "why" or "how" questions go on forever then >>>>>>> you must believe that brute facts exist; and I can't think of a better >>>>>>> candidate for one than consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *> so then epiphenomenalism is false* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy "*Epiphenomenalism >>>>>>> is a position in the philosophy of mind according to which mental >>>>>>> states or >>>>>>> events are caused by physical states or events in the brain but do not >>>>>>> themselves cause anything*". If that is the definition then I >>>>>>> believe in Epiphenomenalism. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If you believe mental states do not cause anything, then you believe >>>>>> philosophical zombies are logically possible (since we could remove >>>>>> consciousness without altering behavior). >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Mental states could be necessarily tied to physical states without >>>>> having any separate causal efficacy, and zombies would not be logically >>>>> possible. Software is necessarily tied to hardware activity: if a >>>>> computer >>>>> runs a particular program, it is not optional that the program is >>>>> implemented. However, the software does not itself have causal efficacy, >>>>> causing current to flow in wires and semiconductors and so on: there is >>>>> always a sufficient explanation for such activity in purely physical >>>>> terms. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't disagree that there is sufficient explanation in all the >>>> particle movements all following physical laws. >>>> >>>> But then consider the question, how do we decide what level is in >>>> control? You make the case that we should consider the quantum field level >>>> in control because everything is ultimately reducible to it. >>>> >>>> But I don't think that's the best metric for deciding whether it's in >>>> control or not. Do the molecules in the brain tell neurons what do, or do >>>> neurons tell molecules what to do (e.g. when they fire)? Or is it some >>>> mutually conditioned relationship? >>>> >>>> Do neurons fire on their own and tell brains what to do, or do neurons >>>> only fire when other neurons of the whole brain stimulate them >>>> appropriately so they have to fire? Or is it again, another case of >>>> mutualism? >>>> >>>> When two people are discussing ideas, are the ideas determining how >>>> each brain thinks and responds, or are the brains determining the ideas by >>>> virtue of generating the words through which they are expressed? >>>> >>>> Through in each of these cases, we can always drop a layer and explain >>>> all the events at that layer, that is not (in my view) enough of a reason >>>> to argue that the events at that layer are "in charge." Control >>>> structures, >>>> such as whole brain regions, or complex computer programs, can involve and >>>> be influenced by the actions of billions of separate events and separate >>>> parts, and as such, they transcend the behaviors of any single physical >>>> particle or physical law. >>>> >>>> Consider: whether or not a program halts might only be determinable by >>>> some rules and proof in a mathematical system, and in this case no >>>> physical >>>> law will reveal the answer to that physical system's (the computer's) >>>> behavior. So if higher level laws are required in the explanation, does it >>>> still make sense to appeal to the lower level (physical) laws as providing >>>> the explanation? >>>> >>>> Given the generality of computers, they can also simulate any >>>> imaginable set of physical laws. In such simulations, again I think >>>> appealing to our physical laws as explaining what happens in these >>>> simulations is a mistake, as the simulation is organized in a manner to >>>> make our physical laws irrelevant to the simulation. So while you could >>>> explain what happens in the simulation in terms of the physics of the >>>> computer running it, it adds no explanatory power: it all cancels out >>>> leaving you with a model of the simulated physics. >>>> >>> >>> I would say that something has separate causal efficacy of its own if >>> physical events cannot be predicted without taking that thing into account. >>> >> >> I agree. >> >> >> For example, the trajectory of a bullet cannot be predicted without >>> taking the wind into account. In the brain, the trajectory of an atom can >>> be predicted without taking consciousness into account. >>> >> >> >> Here I disagree. You are hiding consciousness away in the overwhelming >> complexity and obscurity of atomic motion. But we can't discard it. >> Consider the following behavior (example from Yudowsky): >> >> "Consciousness, whatever it may be—a substance, a process, a name for a >> confusion—is not epiphenomenal; your mind can catch the inner listener in >> the act of listening, and say so out loud. The fact that I have typed this >> paragraph would at least seem to refute the idea that consciousness has no >> experimentally detectable consequences." >> >> "If you can close your eyes, and sense yourself sensing—if you can be >> aware of yourself being aware, and think "I am aware that I am aware"—and >> say out loud, "I am aware that I am aware"—then your consciousness is not >> without effect on your internal narrative, or your moving lips. You can see >> yourself seeing, and your internal narrative reflects this, and so do your >> lips if you choose to say it out loud." >> >> In the act of reporting one's experience of their own consciousness, in >> the act of catching the inner listener in the act of listening, is this >> something that can be explained *without taking consciousness into account*? >> > > That is the classic objection to epiphenomenalism, but if consciousness is > supervenient, then the physical activity on which the consciousness > supervenes also causes the physical activity describing the consciousness. > > A different objection is to double down on the idea that physical reality > is causally closed. Advanced alien scientists who have no knowledge of > human consciousness would not say about the motion of Eliezer Yudkovsky’s > vocal cords, “we can’t explain that sequence of vibrations at the 2 minute > mark, there must be some force acting on the vocal cords that we are > unaware of”. > > The wind therefore can be said to have separate causal efficacy of its >>> own, but consciousness cannot. This is perhaps a narrow, reductionist >>> account and it misses out on all that is important about the mind and >>> intelligence, but I think it is a valid difference. >>> >>> I view mental states as high-level states operating in their own regime >>>>>> of causality (much like a Java computer program). The java computer >>>>>> program >>>>>> can run on any platform, regardless of the particular physical nature of >>>>>> it. It has in a sense isolated itself from the causality of the >>>>>> electrons >>>>>> and semiconductors, and operates in its own realm of the causality of if >>>>>> statements, and for loops. Consider this program, for example: >>>>>> >>>>>> [image: twin-prime-program2.png] >>>>>> >>>>>> What causes the program to terminate? Is it the inputs, and the >>>>>> logical relation of primality, or is it the electrons flowing through >>>>>> the >>>>>> CPU? I would argue that the higher-level causality, regarding the >>>>>> logical >>>>>> relations of the inputs to the program logic is just as important. It >>>>>> determines the physics of things like when the program terminates. At >>>>>> this >>>>>> level, the microcircuitry is relevant only to its support of the higher >>>>>> level causal structures, but the program doesn't need to be aware of nor >>>>>> consider those low-level things. It operates the same regardless. >>>>>> >>>>>> I view consciousness as like that high-level control structure. It >>>>>> operates within a causal realm where ideas and thoughts have causal >>>>>> influence and power, and can reach down to the lower level to do things >>>>>> like trigger nerve impulses. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is a quote from Roger Sperry, who eloquently describes what I am >>>>>> speaking of: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> "I am going to align myself in a counterstand, along with that >>>>>> approximately 0.1 per cent mentalist minority, in support of a >>>>>> hypothetical >>>>>> brain model in which consciousness and mental forces generally are given >>>>>> their due representation as important features in the chain of control. >>>>>> These appear as active operational forces and dynamic properties that >>>>>> interact with and upon the physiological machinery. Any model or >>>>>> description that leaves out conscious forces, according to this view, is >>>>>> bound to be pretty sadly incomplete and unsatisfactory. The conscious >>>>>> mind >>>>>> in this scheme, far from being put aside and dispensed with as an >>>>>> "inconsequential byproduct," "epiphenomenon," or "inner aspect," as is >>>>>> the >>>>>> customary treatment these days, gets located, instead, front and center, >>>>>> directly in the midst of the causal interplay of cerebral mechanisms. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mental forces in this particular scheme are put in the driver's seat, >>>>>> as it were. They give the orders and they push and haul around the >>>>>> physiology and physicochemical processes as much as or more than the >>>>>> latter >>>>>> control them. This is a scheme that puts mind back in its old post, over >>>>>> matter, in a sense-not under, outside, or beside it. It's a scheme that >>>>>> idealizes ideas and ideals over physico-chemical interactions, nerve >>>>>> impulse traffic-or DNA. It's a brain model in which conscious, mental, >>>>>> psychic forces are recognized to be the crowning achievement of some >>>>>> five >>>>>> hundred million years or more of evolution. >>>>>> >>>>>> [...] The basic reasoning is simple: First, we contend that conscious >>>>>> or mental phenomena are dynamic, emergent, pattern (or configurational) >>>>>> properties of the living brain in action -- a point accepted by many, >>>>>> including some of the more tough-minded brain researchers. Second, the >>>>>> argument goes a critical step further, and insists that these emergent >>>>>> pattern properties in the brain have causal control potency -- just as >>>>>> they >>>>>> do elsewhere in the universe. And there we have the answer to the >>>>>> age-old >>>>>> enigma of consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> To put it very simply, it becomes a question largely of who pushes >>>>>> whom around in the population of causal forces that occupy the cranium. >>>>>> There exists within the human cranium a whole world of diverse causal >>>>>> forces; what is more, there are forces within forces within forces, as >>>>>> in >>>>>> no other cubic half-foot of universe that we know. >>>>>> >>>>>> [...] Along with their internal atomic and subnuclear parts, the >>>>>> brain molecules are obliged to submit to a course of activity in time >>>>>> and >>>>>> space that is determined very largely by the overall dynamic and spatial >>>>>> properties of the whole brain cell as an entity. Even the brain cells, >>>>>> however, with their long fibers and impulse conducting elements, do not >>>>>> have very much to say either about when or in what time pattern, for >>>>>> example, they are going to fire their messages. The firing orders come >>>>>> from >>>>>> a higher command. [...] >>>>>> >>>>>> In short, if one climbs upward through the chain of command within >>>>>> the brain, one finds at the very top those overall organizational forces >>>>>> and dynamic properties of the large patterns of cerebral excitation that >>>>>> constitute the mental or psychic phenomena. [...] >>>>>> >>>>>> Near the apex of this compound command system in the brain we find >>>>>> ideas. In the brain model proposed here, the causal potency of an idea, >>>>>> or >>>>>> an ideal, becomes just as real as that of a molecule, a cell, or a nerve >>>>>> impulse. Ideas cause ideas and help evolve new ideas. They interact with >>>>>> each other and with other mental forces in the same brain, in >>>>>> neighboring >>>>>> brains, and in distant, foreign brains. And they also interact with real >>>>>> consequence upon the external surroundings to produce in toto an >>>>>> explosive >>>>>> advance in evolution on this globe far beyond anything known before, >>>>>> including the emergence of the living cell." >>>>>> >>>>>> -- Roger Sperry <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Wolcott_Sperry> >>>>>> in "Mind, Brain, and Humanist Values >>>>>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/sperry/Mind_Brain_and_Humanist_Values.html>" >>>>>> >>>>>> (1966) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Jason >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *> As you said previously, if consciousness had no effects, there >>>>>>>> would be no reason for it to evolve in the first place.* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What I said in my last post was "It must be because consciousness >>>>>>> is the byproduct of something else that is not useless, there are no >>>>>>> other >>>>>>> possibilities". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *> There is another possibility: consciousness is not useless.* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If consciousness is not useless from Evolution's point of view then >>>>>>> it must produce "something" that natural selection can see, and if >>>>>>> natural >>>>>>> selection can see that certain "something" then so can you or me. So >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> Turing Test is not just a good test for intelligence it's also a good >>>>>>> test >>>>>>> for consciousness. The only trouble is, what is that "something"? >>>>>>> Presumably whatever it is that "something" must be related to mind in >>>>>>> some >>>>>>> way, but If it is not intelligent activity then what the hell is it"? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis >>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXofreWBf0Ei9k6JxD4_Cbbprq%3DKduBYTZGAnHh8Ufpw%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhXofreWBf0Ei9k6JxD4_Cbbprq%3DKduBYTZGAnHh8Ufpw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypU3rJgLLdoZ3S2s5gQxMNp30AQGh%3Dyq_gTtmQLtUP8DsQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypU3rJgLLdoZ3S2s5gQxMNp30AQGh%3Dyq_gTtmQLtUP8DsQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh2kx%3Dm8UkhTM9zJLN9EgLvMH0TC95-iDGaOiVZVVFuLQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh2kx%3Dm8UkhTM9zJLN9EgLvMH0TC95-iDGaOiVZVVFuLQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> >> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWhOENkkX6FReseS6DzPOpSARWhZp_NwjE2ZuvgpEpHpQ%40mail.gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWhOENkkX6FReseS6DzPOpSARWhZp_NwjE2ZuvgpEpHpQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUibzDkhvbB3Ys90fjC8oZod%2B7scy39HsNJYQVTB0Tw26w%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUibzDkhvbB3Ys90fjC8oZod%2B7scy39HsNJYQVTB0Tw26w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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