Excellent post "new morning",,,,very thought provoking. Bill
--- In [email protected], new.morning <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > --- In [email protected], "sparaig" <sparaig@> wrote: > > > > --- In [email protected], "Bill (William)Simmons" > <unclewas@> wrote: > > > > > > Fairfield itself offers an amazing case study. Because of the length > > > of time factor of the study group. > > > > > > 1. There would have been a crime rate prior to TM's introduction into > > > the community and should be verifable through past > > > public/police/court records. > > > > > > 2. Then the introduction of TM and its organization to the community. > > > > > > 3. And a 30 year study period in which the crime rate could be > > > tracted along with the steady growth of practising meditators. > > > > > > To my way of thinking. Thirty years of meditations by a steadily > > > increasing population of meditators (far exceeding the 1% cl;aimed > > > necessary to reverse rising crime rates) must result in a reduction > > > in Fairfield's crime rates or the whole ME therory is disproved. > > > > > > Has Fairfield itself ever been the subject of such a study. If > > > not,,,why not!!! How many crimminal offenses were reported in > > > Fairfield in the year TM meditators began in Fairfield and how many > > > reported offenses occured say last year? The trends should point to > > > a declining crime rate given the significant number of meditators in > > > the community. > > > > > > > > > For whatever it is worth: > > > > > http://www.truthabouttm.org/truth/SocietalEffects/FairfieldCrime/inde x.cfm > > > > I read DOJ's analysis. Its distrurbing that it is so shallow and has > so many unaddressed (or only partially addressed) questionable > metheodological issues. > > Following is a quick list of five major obvious flaws -- there are > probably more: > > > 1) Base Year. > DOJ notes 74 as the year of the great migration (my term) to FF. And > uses 1973, and prior, as the base year(s) to compare the efffect of TM > etc on crime. > > The move occurred in middish Sept 1974. I was there. There was a lot > of chaos the first several weeks as things were unpacked, people moved > in, the place was cleaned, etc.,what I term "chaos effects" At a > minimum, starting in October -- probably later to give chaos effects > a chance to settle down, gives 1/4 of a year for TM effects. The other > 3/4s of the year were Pre-TM, same old unmitigated crime rate. > > So in 1975, we would expect to see 4x the effect of 1974 due to any ME > effect. The effect in 1975(and 76-77): no noticable change in violent > crimes, and only a small decrease in property crimes. But property > crimes was in a strong downward trend since 1970 through 1976. In > 77-79, in the period when YF began, and the number of meditators and > sidhas increased dramatically (as i recall -- anyone have data?), > DOJ's property crime index > actually increases, about 30% (visually). > > Is it reasonable to attribute this to 1/4 year of 600 or so 20 min 2x > TMers (no YF, no long rounding in that period)? And during a period > that was quite more relaxed than today with regards to many, what I > will term "satva factors" -- factors which the TMO apparently links to > purity/satva/being on the program: staying up late, unmarried > cohabitation on campus, lots of guys leaving womens dorms very late at > night or early in the morning, inorganic food, non SV buildings, old > Parsons vibes yet to be purified, some meat eating, etc. > > > Parsons Effects > Could other factors explain the very sharp decrease (around 80%+ > decrease) in violent crime in 1974? Lets look at Parsons College which > used the facilities until it formally closed in June 1973. See end of > post for details on Parsons. > > Given that there were probably 3-5000+ Parsons students at its peak, > plus faculty, administration and staff, probabably didn't all leave > town immediately. Its reasonable to assume that some lingered on > through the end of 1973, figuring out what to do next, since no other > colleges would apparently take them. However that essentially most > were gone by early 1974 is also a resonable assumption. And lets > assume the "flocking" -- "students from other communities would flock > to Fairfield to sample the atmosphere" stopped completely in 1973. > > These two factors could well explain the huge drop off in Violent > crime from 1973 to 1974. Its far more compelling IMO, than a 1/4 year > of a ME effect from 600 TMers 20 min 2x. Particularly given that the > hypothesized ME did not change for violent crimes in the next several > years when there was 4x+ the "cohenrence" effect of ME. > > Violent crimes are: murder, robbery, aggravated assault(usually > involving a weapon), unagravated assault (usually no weapon) and rape. > Given that up to 5000, 80% male, heavily partying, prone to drunkeness > students, plus some factor above that from like minded flockers, its > not hard to imagine that unagravated assaults (including fist fights, > I presume) and rapes declined dramatically. > > > 2) TM vs YF > > From 1976 to 1984, the trend of property crimes increased. Yet, the > number of meditators, the time spent in meditation, and advanced ME > techologies, such as YF, increased substantially during that period. > An FF ME would have to explain this -- beyond empirically unsupported > analogies and hypotheses such as washing machine effects. > > Given the base year issue, and the large rising trend in ME coherennce > "units", DOJ's assertion that "property crime in Fairfield compared to > other small U.S. cities was 64% lower in the years after MIU came to > Fairfield than in the years before MIU arrived." is a laughably > biased, slective, and most probably, incccurate interpretation of the > data. > > > 3) Small Population Effects > As spraig notes (my interpretation of his point), that since crime > occurs in relatively small numbers in small towns, abrupt peaks and > troughs may occur from year to year. Fluctuations which would be less > apparent in larger cities. And the anomolous "pickpockets" which may > occur in one year would spike the figures. However, it would not spike > the trend -- which is afterall what the sustained ME in FF is > concerned with -- the long-term effects on crime. > > This can work for troughs also. DOJ notes that in three years there > was zero violent crime! he neglected to note that the three cited > zero crime years were preceeded by almost double the level of crime in > the preceeding year (relative to its prior year). A two (or more) year > moving average, or regresson line, would filter out the spikes due to > small population effects. > > > 4) Population Denominator (PD) > DOJ and Spraig allude to what I term the "Population Denominator" > problem. DOJ states "This effect can not be explained by the increased > population of the meditators in the town at that time." Well there a > number of problems with DOJ's analysis -- and the population > denominator issue is one of them -- but, yes, it may not SOLEY be able > to discount his conclusions. > > The PD issues are several-fold. First, when if you are introducing a > lower crime rate population segment into another one, average crime > rates (per capita) will decrease. Like pouring white paint into purple > paint will lighten it. So to measure the a trueer effect of crime on > the existing pre ME crime rate in FF, the denominator should be > adjusted downwards by the number of MEers in FF. As well, crimes by > MEers should be subtracted out, but i will let the TMO provide those > figures. For now, lets assume TMO dogma and assume no -- or far fewer > -- crimes are committed by MEers. Or at least assume that the crime > rate for TMers/ MEers is supbstantially less than the native FF crime > rate and adjust the crime numerator with this "noiminal" adjustment. > > 1974, correctly does not apparently reflect the MEers in FF for the > last three months of 74. The 600 or so jump in 1975 presumably are the > MIU MEers and should be subtracted out of the denominator. As should > the rising numbers over time. 3000-4000 TMOers at FFs peak? If those > figures were subracted out, the per capita crime rate would be > substantially higher. > > And the population figures that DOJ cites strting in 1970 do not > decrease by 3-5000+ refelcting the out-migration of Parsons stududnts. > 1970-1974 they decrease by 200. So it appears the FF population > figures do not include Parsons students. They should be included, > particularly since its reasonably assumed they committed a large > number of the crimes 1970-1973. Doing this would dramatically shrink > the pre-MIU crime per capita figures. > > Or if the crimes committed by Parsons students were isolated, then > this could be subtracted from the numerator crime figures -- requiring > no adjustment of the population. This would be a better method to > isolate the native FF, non parsons, crime rate which the ME is > hypothesized to effect. > > > 5) Matching Towns > DOJ "matched" small towns like FF for comparision. Later it appears he > matched them for violent crimes, but FF had 4:1 higher property crimes > as the matched cities. > > Given that he apparently could not find small towns that matched FF in > violent and property crimes (otherwise he would have used them), it > raises a red flag as to unique factors causal to FF crime and not to > other "matched small towns". > > At a minimum two sets of matching towns, for violent and property > crimes would seem appropriate. Better would be multiple sets of each, > each set randomly compiled, to test for special, unknown and > uncontrolled for causal crime factors in the matched towns. (One > anomolous, growing crime town in the matched could skew the results > and make FF look better crime wise. > > No mention of other matching criteria was made -- which would have > most probably done if such were used. Matching of demographic cohorts, > temperature, seasonal effects, education levels, % with active > religious affiliations, income levels and regional economic trends > would be useful if not necessary control / matching factors for a > credible analysis. > > > ----- > > If the original data were available, or one could infer most of the > salient parts from DOJ's tables, a redo of the analysis, accounting > for the above factors would show much less dramatic results for the > ME. Perhaps none. Perhaps an increase. While such an analysis, still > crude -- but much less so than DOJ's, would not be conclusive. But it > would provide an alternative interpretation of the data. > > Frankly, such a re-do of the analysis is probably not worth the time > given the huge steepness of problems and issues DOJ's "analysis' raises. > > A larger question is raised by sparaig, is FF too small to measure the > ME? I repeat his imperitive "Think a out it." If not in FF, where the > effect should be most intense, where then? He does raise, two, and > IMO, these are the only two potentially valid problems he raises in > measuring a sustained ME effect on FF crime trends from long-term > TMers, sidhads, domes, rounders, etc (not isolated short courses). > These are the Small Population Effects and Population Denominator > (PD) issues. These points have been addressed above and shown not to > be obstacles to an obstacle to measuring a sustained ME effect on FF > crime trends. > > > > > ------ About Parons ---- > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsons_College > > "In 1955, the trustees adapted a "fifteen-year plan" to develop the > college. They appointed Millard G. Roberts, a Presbyterian minister > from New York City, as president of the college... Roberts promoted a > nationwide campaign for students. Enrollment grew from 350 to 5000 > students, its income rocketed, and the professors entered a circle of > the highest paid teachers in the nation all due to a program Roberts > called "The Parsons College Plan." > > The "Parsons Plan" included academic help in all areas of instruction. > A ranked professor taught a 3 credit course with 3 hours per week of > formal lecture. An academic specialist (usually a masters degree > holder or instructor) would have a small classroom seminar 2 days per > week to review the lecture notes and add weekly quizzes. A tutorial > center in the Wright Library was available to all students where they > could review all course work. > > The "Publish or Perish" rule for faculty was not as widely enforced at > Parsons as it was at other schools. A "Scholar in Residence" program > was established exposing students to top academic instructors. This > resulted in published authors teaching freshman level humanities and > history courses. > > .. > Students were permitted to learn at a rate that was unique to them, > often manifesting in the student repeating the course a following > trimester with no loss of standing as an enrolled student. This was > called "double starring" by students. > > ... > At one time, the Board of Trustees had placed a limit of 3,000 > students on campus at any given time. By 1968, the enrollment topped > 5,000 students with a dramatic building plan creating low cost housing > units, "quads", co-ed housing and standard dormitories > > ... > Parsons offered many opportunities for the financially stressed > students with work-study grants employing students as kitchen staff, > serving staff and dishwashers. To attract women to the overwhelmingly > male populated campus "milk maids" (attractive co-eds serving milk in > pitchers roaming the dining halls) received full board grants. > ... > At one time, transfers made up 43% of the student body and never > dropped lower than 22%. This was the main reason that Parsons was > often referred to as "Flunk-Out U" or as a college "for rich dumb > kids." An unfortunate article in Life Magazine (June 3, 1966) > highlighted many wisecracking students and prominently featured the > highspirited recreational adventures of many of the students. Life > Magazine also hinted in the article (perhaps unfairly) that many > students enrolled at Parsons to avoid being drafted into the military > during the Vietnam War. > > Parsons became known mainly as a college for students who couldn't get > into any other colleges or had been refused readmission from another > college due to poor grades. However, not all students went there > because of that. ... > > ... > Female students at Parsons were outnumbered 4 to 1. Despite the > shortage, most students gave Parsons a four-star rating as a party > college. Townspeople complained bitterly about the drinking parties > and the wild driving that followed these parties. One example is of a > classic party held in a cemetery crypt. The proliferation of Greek > letter Fraternities and Sororites as well as "independent" social > groups provided party houses and socialization opportunities off > campus. The campus was "dry" and the women had "hours", curfews and > monitoring. Town wide celebrations such as homecoming parades, Greek > Week (with chariot races) and "Town and Gown" events (with Parsons > College fine Drama Department) enhanced cultural life in Fairfield. > > The townspeople of Fairfield wondered if the hard drinking hot- rodding > invasion of Parsons boys was a mixed blessing. Students from other > communities would flock to Fairfield to sample the atmosphere. > ... > > Parsons' accreditation was restored, but it was too late. The school > closed in June 1973. > " > > ======================== > To subscribe, send a message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Or go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FairfieldLife/ and click 'Join This Group!' Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FairfieldLife/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
