On Tue, 12 Jan 1999, Andy Condliffe wrote:

> THE ONE YOU UNDERSTAND BEST!

There is a counter-point to this, of course.

_If_ you don't have a great deal of confidence in either the coding 
ability of the OS vendor, especially the network stack of the OS, then 
you may be better served with a product that is running a different OS, 
or a different stack implementation.  This is also true if you simply 
don't want to put all of your security eggs in one basket.  Host security 
is your final barrier, and if your firewall is vulnerable to the same 
sorts of things as the hosts it's protecting, it's worth considering.  

Also, if you're not happy with the upgrade necessities of an OS, it may be 
advantageous to chose one with a higher stability cycle.  Folks applying 
lots of NT hotfixes or moving to a new Solaris version will know what I 
mean.  People who have high-risk environments need to be protected from 
DoS attacks, they'll feel that painfully in any environment, but 
less-painfully in some.

Finally, it depends on your operations staff, and your mindset on 
firewalls.  We've found it advantageous to put in cryptic "don't mess 
with it" firewalls in places where we wanted a specific policy 
implemented without the site administrators opening the site up to 
significantly greater risk through good-faith intentions while upgrading 
or adding additional protocols.  

It's all about risk management.  Using something you know decreases some 
risks, but may increase others.  In some instances it may significantly 
increase your vulnerability to some attacks.

If you haven't done a risk/feature analysis on your gateway (not necessarily 
even a formal one), including software, hardware, administrative 
procedures, historical performance, and how it fits in with the rest of the 
network (or not - depending on your mindset) then I think you haven't made 
an informed choice.  If you have, then unless someone can point out a serious 
flaw in your logic you don't have to worry about what anyone thinks of your 
choice.  

I don't think I'd use Solaris to protect a site running Solaris servers 
anymore than I'd use NT to protect a site running NT servers.  

FWIW, I wouldn't use NT to protect the Solaris site either, but that has to do
with my own risk analysis of NT, that doesn't make it a bad choice for 
anyone who doesn't either share my weighting of risks/benifits or my value 
assignments for the OS.   

Rather than going with what you know, you should go with what will give 
you the greatest ammount of protection and if it's important, 
scalability.  After all, firewalls are meant to be protection, and all 
the warm fuzzies in the world of "knowing" something don't help one bit 
if you're compromised or DoS'ed at a business-critical moment.  Comments 
on "knowing" saved for another rant entirely.


Paul
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Paul D. Robertson      "My statements in this message are personal opinions
[EMAIL PROTECTED]      which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
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