One of the most special properties of science -- indeed its core that differentiates it from natural philosophy -- is the practice of testing hypotheses. Leaving aside the 'human' weaknesses involved here, there is, however, the 'Duhem-Quine thesis' to be faced. In order to test an hypothesis, one must rig up some more or less elaborate set-up. This involves various ancillary assumptions, and even other hypotheses, that enable the test, but that are not being tested themselves. A failure to corroborate an hypothesis does not automatically lead to rejection, because some of these ancillary assumptions may have been inappropriate. And so on. No single failure to corroborate can impugn an hypothesis, but the question even is -- 'can anything at all be tested adequately?'.
This need not slow down a science. For example take evolutionary biology and its key hypothesis that natural selection is the mode by which macroevolution (e.g., ape -> human) occurs. Natural selection has been tested adequately, and shown to operate to preserve the adaptedness of a population, from one generation to the next. But its application to macroevolution has been testable (?) only in laboratory populations of microorganisms. Nevertheless natural selection remains the key ASSUMPTION of all evolutionary thinking. Its role in macroevolution is NOT testable, but is used to organize a major research program on the basis of its plausibility. STAN On Thu, Jan 6, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net>wrote: > Dear John and colleagues, > > > > The idea that the rationality of science is in the specifics of its nature > as an institution goes back at least to C.S. Peirce, and does not lie in the > activities or reasoning of specific scientists. The the sociological > approach misses the target completely, and is rather mundane and relatively > uninteresting (to use Jim Brown's words). Science is, indeed, just another > institution, but it has rather special properties that are missed when we > focus on the activities and rationales of individuals within the > institution. > > I would maintain that both the institutions and the individuals reflect > developments in the communication of science at the global level. Thus they > participate insofar as the communication can be understood and brought > forward (reproduced and changed). The codes of communication are specific; > the institutions follow historically; for example, in moving from academies > to universities during the 19th century. Of course, institutions can last > longer than individuals. > > > > I am not pleading against ethnography and other forms of sociology of > science. However, the core subject is our subject: how is scientific > information communicated? And how is this communication system (including > scholarly discourses) evolving? The study of institutions provides us with > windows of instantiations which can be interesting in themselves (for > example, national differences). > > > > Best wishes for a happy New Year, > > Loet >
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