Interesting. I don't think I'd say that a unique experience is not an 
experience. But I would say than a unique experience is not knowledge of any 
kind. The trick to this position would be that, when one has a unique 
experience, one then fiddles with it in order to think about it further or tell 
it to some other person.

So, I'm along about mile 4 in my 6 mile run, looking up at the moon, plodding 
along, my body drifts away, and [unsayable somatic, mental, and emotional state 
obtains] ... then that state fades away when I have to dodge a car or stop at 
an intersection. Now, when I go to tell Renee' *about* that state within 
brackets above [...], I have to couch it in my private lexicon and then 
translate it from my lexicon to hers. So even though [...] may have been 
unique, the post-processing (couching in my lexicon, translating into hers) has 
been done before. The post-processing is a repeated/repeating process. This 
means we can become confused about which part of the _experience_ is unique and 
which part is repeated. 

Regardless, if you cannot *tell* someone about an experience. And you can't 
even recall it well enough to internally tell yourself about it, then it's 
meaningless. The only experience that has any meaning at all is an experience 
that is repeatable enough so you can at least remember it. Remembering is 
repeating to some extent. And when you guys have this discussion *without* 
addressing repetition or accumulation (as you've written off regarding 
experience composition), then I can't see AT ALL how it's in any way related to 
epistemology.

On 3/10/20 9:31 AM, [email protected] wrote:
> You often and rightly accuse me of overstating stuff, and I apologize if I am 
> about to do it again.  But I think you are perhaps saying that there are no 
> idiosyncratic experiences?  That an experience, to be an experience, has to 
> be repeated or shared or both.  If so, I think I agree with you.  And a very 
> strident position it would be if that were the position.  I think many 
> humanists would assert that ONLY idiosyncratic experiences are real and that 
> it is upon the uniqueness of individual experience that we must focus.  Hmmm! 
> 
> I feel that this thought is a genuine crowbar.
> 
> . It's that protocol that carries the knowledge, not the internal experiences 
> or the particular toolchain used to execute the protocol.
> 
> Can you pry some more things with it?

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ

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