Hm. I appreciate an attempt to cleanly separate the predicative parts from the impredicative parts. But you don't seem to be allowing *any* impredicative parts. Your push to the universal foundation *smells* like predicativism to me, especially when you go off into monism la-la land.
My claim would be that Doug is correct that the words (or concepts even) are never *defined* because they cannot be defined in the way the predicativists want. This perspective is anti-foundationalism. It's not turtles all the way down. It IS that there is no such thing as *down*. On 7/28/20 11:33 AM, [email protected] wrote: > I saw you coming! My bottom line is not predication but the explicitness of > whatever predications one makes. What could, of course define consciousness > as "whatever humans do that seems to me conscious" or "Whatever is produced > by a human brain". But, after trying to do science with such definitions, I > think most would realize that these definitions are incapacitating. At that > point, a scientist relinquishes those definitions and begins to seek others, > definitions that actually direct one toward the possibility of finding > answers. Thus, I stipulate that definitions are part of the dialectic of > discovery. Neither I, nor Frank, is allowed to say M is the meaning of P for > all time; we are only allowed to say that for some set of purposes, in some > context, M is the meaning of P. Are we constantly pressing a head toward the > most universally applicable definitions? You bet! Do we ever get there? > Not yet! -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
