Glen did not invent the word predicative. See https://iep.utm.edu/predicat/
--- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, 1:03 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > You are pushing me hard, here, but I think the up/down thang is orthogonal > to the predicativist position. (You invented that word, right?) We > Predicativists need only assert that there is a before and after: i.e., > BEFORE we can say whether a thing is, we have to have said, up front, what > it would be for that thing to be. We can take it back soon as we see where > it leads. > > Nick > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > [email protected] > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of u?l? ??? > Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 12:47 PM > To: FriAM <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dogs, Computers, Joy > > Hm. I appreciate an attempt to cleanly separate the predicative parts from > the impredicative parts. But you don't seem to be allowing *any* > impredicative parts. Your push to the universal foundation *smells* like > predicativism to me, especially when you go off into monism la-la land. > > My claim would be that Doug is correct that the words (or concepts even) > are never *defined* because they cannot be defined in the way the > predicativists want. This perspective is anti-foundationalism. It's not > turtles all the way down. It IS that there is no such thing as *down*. > > On 7/28/20 11:33 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > I saw you coming! My bottom line is not predication but the > explicitness of whatever predications one makes. What could, of course > define consciousness as "whatever humans do that seems to me conscious" or > "Whatever is produced by a human brain". But, after trying to do science > with such definitions, I think most would realize that these definitions > are incapacitating. At that point, a scientist relinquishes those > definitions and begins to seek others, definitions that actually direct one > toward the possibility of finding answers. Thus, I stipulate that > definitions are part of the dialectic of discovery. Neither I, nor Frank, > is allowed to say M is the meaning of P for all time; we are only allowed > to say that for some set of purposes, in some context, M is the meaning of > P. Are we constantly pressing a head toward the most universally > applicable definitions? You bet! Do we ever get there? Not yet! > > -- > ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> > http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> > http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
