"Or do we assert, as the Free Will contingent do, that Will is above the fray?"
Ok, so I continue to struggle with what it is that concerns me about the assumption of determinism. Marcus's point about the loci of *will* requires serious consideration. From where I stand, arguments opposing free will to determinism are instances of dialectical argument, where the former is posed as the pure negative to the latter[!]. The particular choice here then is seen to be part of a class of such opposites: chaos and order, irrationality and rationality, randomness and computability, non-representation and representation, absence and substance,... Each negative object then is presented as either failing to have scrutable qualities or have qualities explicitly defined relative to their positive counterpart. What follows is an asymmetry that is baked into the form of the argument, regardless of its content. Now, as far as I can tell, an argumentative *mode* arises when we relate positive objects to positive objects via metaphor, for instance, when we say that determinism is computation or determinism is pure order, etc... An effect of such metaphor making is the attribution of an object as a quality of another (comprehension), i.e., ascribing determination to a computation or tracing out a determination by a computation. Meanwhile, in the opposite category, free will comes to be identified with randomness. My concern, then, is that positive theories are objectifying whereas negative theories are reflective[!], and since *will* here is presented in its negative form, we are denied access to speak directly about its qualities. Instead, we come to know *will* in terms of randomness via coming to know determination in terms of computation. Ultimately, it leaves me feeling like I am looking for my keys (will) under some nearby streetlight (determination). [!] Evoking Raymond Guess in his analytic exposition "The Idea of a Critical Theory". -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
