Actually, I got access for free by logging in with my Google account as an independent researcher.
--- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Wed, Apr 7, 2021, 5:19 PM Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> wrote: > If you have access via a library this article by Glymour might be of > interest: > > https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/521968?seq=1 > > --- > Frank C. Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > 505 670-9918 > Santa Fe, NM > > On Wed, Apr 7, 2021, 4:47 PM Marcus Daniels <[email protected]> wrote: > >> No, it isn't ideal to pin free will on determinism. There's some >> consensus reasonable people can come to about the physical world, and we >> can either agree that humans are a part of the physical world or that we >> are decoupled or partially decoupled from it. If such a decoupling is >> suggested, then I think it is reasonable to want to know how that >> decoupling would work, and what experiments could shed light on that >> decoupling. Why can't we just go beyond the Standard Model to understand >> that decoupling? What is this pantheism and why can't we take it apart or >> study it? >> >> So, sure, it is possible to pull the rug out from under the whole debate >> with other metaphysics where anything can happen. If one is arguing with >> someone who insists that analysis of their metaphysics is not possible, >> then that's the end of the conversation. To continue, there has to be >> some ability to reason about what happens in that metaphysics and what >> cannot, and why that is, and there has to be some rationale for how things >> we observe in our (physical) world could map to that metaphysics. >> Otherwise why waste their time, they can go back to their important >> business with Q-Anon. >> >> Maybe the physical world really is random. On the other hand, >> superdeterminism does seem to address the measurement problem. [1] >> Either way, how does one get to free will, as in It Could Have Been >> Otherwise? The real or illusory randomness collapses to definite >> measurements either way. There has to be a magical homunculus that is >> shifting that random distribution around somehow if there is free will. >> Or if the physical world is actually deterministic all the way down, then >> there is a big problem because Mind just defies causality. >> >> I'm an atheist, not an agnostic, because I have no patience for >> implausible models. If you want to understand the world, you follow the >> evidence, not what you want to be true. >> >> [1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2020.00139/full#h5 >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of jon zingale >> Sent: Wednesday, April 7, 2021 2:33 PM >> To: [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Free Will in the Atlantic >> >> "Or do we assert, as the Free Will contingent do, that Will is above the >> fray?" >> >> Ok, so I continue to struggle with what it is that concerns me about the >> assumption of determinism. Marcus's point about the loci of *will* requires >> serious consideration. From where I stand, arguments opposing free will to >> determinism are instances of dialectical argument, where the former is >> posed as the pure negative to the latter[!]. The particular choice here >> then is seen to be part of a class of such opposites: chaos and order, >> irrationality and rationality, randomness and computability, >> non-representation and representation, absence and substance,... >> Each negative object then is presented as either failing to have >> scrutable qualities or have qualities explicitly defined relative to their >> positive counterpart. What follows is an asymmetry that is baked into the >> form of the argument, regardless of its content. >> >> Now, as far as I can tell, an argumentative *mode* arises when we relate >> positive objects to positive objects via metaphor, for instance, when we >> say that determinism is computation or determinism is pure order, etc... >> An effect of such metaphor making is the attribution of an object as a >> quality of another (comprehension), i.e., ascribing determination to a >> computation or tracing out a determination by a computation. Meanwhile, in >> the opposite category, free will comes to be identified with randomness. >> >> My concern, then, is that positive theories are objectifying whereas >> negative theories are reflective[!], and since *will* here is presented in >> its negative form, we are denied access to speak directly about its >> qualities. Instead, we come to know *will* in terms of randomness via >> coming to know determination in terms of computation. Ultimately, it leaves >> me feeling like I am looking for my keys (will) under some nearby >> streetlight (determination). >> >> [!] Evoking Raymond Guess in his analytic exposition "The Idea of a >> Critical Theory". >> >> >> >> -- >> Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >> - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >> - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >
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