If you have access via a library this article by Glymour might be of interest:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/521968?seq=1 --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Wed, Apr 7, 2021, 4:47 PM Marcus Daniels <[email protected]> wrote: > No, it isn't ideal to pin free will on determinism. There's some > consensus reasonable people can come to about the physical world, and we > can either agree that humans are a part of the physical world or that we > are decoupled or partially decoupled from it. If such a decoupling is > suggested, then I think it is reasonable to want to know how that > decoupling would work, and what experiments could shed light on that > decoupling. Why can't we just go beyond the Standard Model to understand > that decoupling? What is this pantheism and why can't we take it apart or > study it? > > So, sure, it is possible to pull the rug out from under the whole debate > with other metaphysics where anything can happen. If one is arguing with > someone who insists that analysis of their metaphysics is not possible, > then that's the end of the conversation. To continue, there has to be > some ability to reason about what happens in that metaphysics and what > cannot, and why that is, and there has to be some rationale for how things > we observe in our (physical) world could map to that metaphysics. > Otherwise why waste their time, they can go back to their important > business with Q-Anon. > > Maybe the physical world really is random. On the other hand, > superdeterminism does seem to address the measurement problem. [1] > Either way, how does one get to free will, as in It Could Have Been > Otherwise? The real or illusory randomness collapses to definite > measurements either way. There has to be a magical homunculus that is > shifting that random distribution around somehow if there is free will. > Or if the physical world is actually deterministic all the way down, then > there is a big problem because Mind just defies causality. > > I'm an atheist, not an agnostic, because I have no patience for > implausible models. If you want to understand the world, you follow the > evidence, not what you want to be true. > > [1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2020.00139/full#h5 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of jon zingale > Sent: Wednesday, April 7, 2021 2:33 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Free Will in the Atlantic > > "Or do we assert, as the Free Will contingent do, that Will is above the > fray?" > > Ok, so I continue to struggle with what it is that concerns me about the > assumption of determinism. Marcus's point about the loci of *will* requires > serious consideration. From where I stand, arguments opposing free will to > determinism are instances of dialectical argument, where the former is > posed as the pure negative to the latter[!]. The particular choice here > then is seen to be part of a class of such opposites: chaos and order, > irrationality and rationality, randomness and computability, > non-representation and representation, absence and substance,... > Each negative object then is presented as either failing to have scrutable > qualities or have qualities explicitly defined relative to their positive > counterpart. What follows is an asymmetry that is baked into the form of > the argument, regardless of its content. > > Now, as far as I can tell, an argumentative *mode* arises when we relate > positive objects to positive objects via metaphor, for instance, when we > say that determinism is computation or determinism is pure order, etc... > An effect of such metaphor making is the attribution of an object as a > quality of another (comprehension), i.e., ascribing determination to a > computation or tracing out a determination by a computation. Meanwhile, in > the opposite category, free will comes to be identified with randomness. > > My concern, then, is that positive theories are objectifying whereas > negative theories are reflective[!], and since *will* here is presented in > its negative form, we are denied access to speak directly about its > qualities. Instead, we come to know *will* in terms of randomness via > coming to know determination in terms of computation. Ultimately, it leaves > me feeling like I am looking for my keys (will) under some nearby > streetlight (determination). > > [!] Evoking Raymond Guess in his analytic exposition "The Idea of a > Critical Theory". > > > > -- > Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >
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