Well... as I said... There are many positive things people get out of wrestling with impossible-to-solve problems. Zen kōan have a long history for a reason. They are intended to be engaged with and answered, though never really "solved", and many masters are said to have become enlightened by contemplating them deeply. I hope you similarly benefit from this endeavor, and I wish you the best.
Best, Eric <[email protected]> On Tue, Nov 3, 2026 at 1:35 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > We clearly have a different point of view here. I tried to find a > solution for the really hard problems, esp. the problem of free will and > the hard problem of subjective experience, because they are hard. As JFK > said "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other > things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard". Your > point of view seems to be that this is nonsense, because there are > problems that cannot not solved, where you simply cannot find a > solution, and if you still try to solve them you have not understood the > problem. A legitimate position. If this is the case then these problems > should be renamed as "impossible problems", which might be accurate, > because they are often impossible to solve completely. > > The name for the hard problem still fits though. It is not only hard to > find a solution, it is also hard to find a consensus about what a > solution looks like, and if there is a solution at atll. I believe you > can find a solution and bridge the explanatory gap, not exactly, but > approximately, and to find a good approximate solution is indeed hard. > For me the hard problems are where it gets interesting, not where you > give up. For example there are many differential equations that cannot > be solved analytically as a finite combination of elementary functions. > But mathematicians have not given up, they can use numerical methods > (like Runge-Kutta) to approximate the behavior. > > In the same way we are able to understand the hard problem by using > using all the tools we have invented over time to reach a approximate > understanding. This approximate understanding is not 100% the same > experience, but close enough to narrow the explanatory gap from Joseph > Levine. Humans can't fly. But we can build machines that help us to > reach the sky and go to the moon. Similarly Humans can't see what it is > like to be another human. But we can build machines (movie cameras, > go-pro cameras, cinemas) that help us to do it. Humans also don't know > what its like to be an owl or cat that can see 10 times better than we > do in the night. But if we use night-vision goggles, we can imagine what > it is like to view things in the night. Humans don't know what its like > to be a sperm whale or bat that can navigate in complete darkness. But > if we consider the sonars that are common for submarines, we can imagine > what it is like to view things by hearing: by sending out clicks and > listening for echoes. > > Solving the hard problem is an achievement which is possible if we try > to bridge the explanatory gap by using the tools we have invented over > time. The interesting part is how the gap can be closed, although we > normally cannot do it. Different sensory organs can be partially bridged > by "goggles" like night night-vision goggles that extend our senses. > Different life paths can be partially bridged by cinemas and movies > which allow us to peek into the lives of others. Or simply by spending > time with the person you try understand, by sharing the same path for a > while. > > Every hard philosophical problem that can be solved approximately is an > achievement. Free will is an achievement too, as Daniel Dennett wrote. > It remains an illusion unless you try to have it. Even then it is hard. > The interesting part to me is how we can achieve it, and how good this > solution is, although we normally cannot find a solution. It is also > interesting why the explanatory gap exists - which often has > evolutionary reasons. > > Best > Jochen > > > On 2026-11-02 23:01, Eric Charles wrote: > > Yeah.... Jochen... > > I'm a bit confused by your reply as well... I am neither expressing > > professional jealousy nor trying to angle for co-authorship on your > > project... I'm trying to help you out here... > > > > I'm pointing out that "The Hard Problem" is more like a Zen Koan than > > a clearly-specified problem. Those who buy into "The Hard Problem" > > will insist that any success you might have in "solving it" is > > indicative of your not understanding it. That isn't to denigrate your > > work, it is specifically to address any expectation you might have > > that when you are done someone, anyone, might agree that you have > > "solved The Hard Problem." That's just not how the weird > > socio-cultural game surrounding that "problem" works. > > > > IF you want to try to formalize our discussions of psychological > > phenomenon, there are two reasonable ways approaches to The Hard > > Problem: 1) Decide the "The Hard Problem" is legitimately pointing out > > aspects of our experience about which we cannot speak sensibly... and > > then really and truly let that stand... not trying to speak beyond > > perhaps trying to demarcate the border, on the other side of which you > > let silence reign. 2) Decide that there are only things about which we > > can speak... and thereby fundamentally reject "The Hard Problem." > > > > As such: If you are trying to formalize psychology, and you think you > > can provide words and formulae to talk meaningfully about everything > > in that domain, i.e., if _you _think the domain contains only things > > that words and formulae are capable of getting at, then _you _are > > rejecting The Hard Problem. > > > > Of course, as Dave and Glen and others point out, there is no need to > > care about any of this at all if formalizing (to whatever extent) > > isn't your goal. Zen Koans aren't useless. Questions that ultimately > > don't make sense can still transform our lives in meaningful ways, and > > the world is often made better by virtue of containing people who > > contemplate such questions. It may also be possible to get at things > > artistically (poetically, musically, etc.) that cannot be gotten at > > with formal systems of words and equations; that is a different > > discussion. > > > > Formal systems have limits created by the fact of their formality, and > > some people believe there are things that exist fundamentally beyond > > the limitations of any such systems. The Hard Problem is a postulation > > of exactly the latter sort of things. As a result: You may find > > benefit in working on The Hard Problem, but what you can't find is "a > > solution", because it is crucial to the premise that no solution can > > work. > > > > Best, > > Eric > > > > On Mon, Nov 2, 2026 at 1:35 PM glen <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> FWIW, I agree, though I like my phrasing better than yours: "if your > >> language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless > >> for talking about that target." > >> > >> The problem with natural languages like English is that you *can* > >> express anything (or non-thing) in them. [⛧] And I'd argue without > >> nonsense, paradox, or "non-truth". This is because it's not the > >> *language* that forces those outcomes but the inferential system to > >> which the language is bound. Most people in my network are very > >> metaphorical thinkers, which allows them to slip and slide all over > >> the place when they hear/read an expression whose bindings are > >> ambiguous or unregistered. More literal thinkers like me aren't > >> incapable of metaphorical flex-and-slop. But we tend to resist it, > >> complain when we spot unregistered slippage. > >> > >> More cognitively powered people than me, have at their "fingertips" > >> a suite of possible bindings they can don and doff as the tokens > >> come in, setting the context. Those in this class who are > >> charitable, either ask you helpful questions to choose which > >> inferential system to bind to. Uncharitable ones (e.g. > >> Wittgenstein?) balk and shunt, usually because they feel like their > >> time would be better spent elsewhere (as Eric & Nick say in the > >> blurb below). I'm OK with either type. I grew up with all sorts > >> yelling RTFM at me. 8^D > >> > >> But it's important to place the blame where it belongs, at the > >> inferential system, not the slippery language atop it. So I applaud > >> Jochen's attempt(s) to whatever extent I can. "ὅτε oi μὲν > >> ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς > >> δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα > >> σώσω." > >> > >> [⛧] A friend of mine is fond of asking "Why is there something > >> rather than nothing?" It's a bit of a litmus test for a crowd's > >> charitability. E.g. Sean Carroll is very charitable > >> <https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02231>. I'm not. To me, it's a nonsense > >> question and demonstrates the extent to which the asker is confused. > >> But you can *still* express it. And if you're amongst a crowd of > >> charitable people, especially if they're cognitively endowed, tokens > >> like "nothing" can be well-defined if you bind to the right > >> inferential system. I wonder if Wittgenstein ever met Dr. Seuss? > >>> 8^D > >> > >> On 11/2/26 7:08 AM, Prof David West wrote: > >>> I seem to have missed some entries in this thread (mockery?? > >> successor??), but I want to make a very specific comment about > >> Wittgenstein. > >>> > >>> Reducing a theory to an aphorism almost always leads to > >> misunderstanding. Wittgenstein did not mean, IMHO, don't speak; he > >> merely said it is pointless to try to force fit something into a > >> language that has been formally defined to exclude expressions of > >> that thing. > >>> > >>> Or another way of thinking about it: if you define a language game > >> with strict, formal, rules, and want to make a play in that game > >> that is contravenes those rules you either have to cheat or not make > >> the play. > >>> > >>> If our language game is English, with the verb 'to be' at its > >> core, there are all kinds of things—keeping the context of > >> psychology—"experiences" that are not, keeping with the rules, > >> expressible in that language without creating nonsense, paradox, or > >> "non-truth." > >>> > >>> A simple example" 'Nothing" is at least a concept, that, in > >> English is necessarily a paradox because simply expressing the word > >> makes it "Something." > >>> > >>> Wittgenstein never said, "shut up." > >>> > >>> davew > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, at 7:25 AM, [email protected] wrote: > >>>> Eric, > >>>> > >>>> I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is > >> that > >>>> behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that > >> someone > >>>> else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been > >> waiting > >>>> patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor > >> at an > >>>> university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was > >> and is > >>>> not my intention. > >>>> > >>>> My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than > >>>> yours. > >>>> For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the > >>>> cinemas > >>>> I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological > >> residue. > >>>> This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our > >> new AI > >>>> friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node > >>>> bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together > >> if it > >>>> looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas > >> and > >>>> write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee > >> Group > >>>> solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you > >> to > >>>> get > >>>> that academic position too. > >>>> > >> > > > https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActionReadiness.pdf > >>>> > >>>> Best wishes, > >>>> Jochen > >>>> > >>>> On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote: > >>>>> As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book > >> (the one > >>>>> I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation > >> in > >>>>> Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated > >> drafts to > >>>>> some readers... so if any of you are interested.... > >>>>> > >>>>> This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question > >> here: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers, > >>>>> “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man > >> schweigen,” > >>>>> which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak, > >> one > >>>>> must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate > >> that we > >>>>> should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding > >> the > >>>>> mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime > >> example of > >>>>> that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is > >> true, > >>>>> either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then > >> your > >>>>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something > >> that > >>>>> exists only in your mental space, that only you could access, > >> and my > >>>>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something > >> that > >>>>> exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And > >> _if_ > >>>>> that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such > >> things all > >>>>> we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about > >> them > >>>>> sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments > >> demonstrated > >>>>> this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in > >>>>> combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many > >> people > >>>>> have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering > >> proof > >>>>> that a science of psychology is impossible. > >>>>> > >>>>> However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we > >> do > >>>>> not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we > >> understand > >>>>> his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of > >> psychology: > >>>>> Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the > >> phenomena > >>>>> they are discussing are, inherently, an example of > >>>>> that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are > >>>>> discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak > >> about > >>>>> sensibly. > >>>>> > >>>>> We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person > >> deeply > >>>>> interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the > >> scrutinizing > >>>>> you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that > >>>>> cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to > >> deal > >>>>> with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that > >> situation, and > >>>>> then you should try to find other things to be interested in. > >> We, > >>>>> however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological > >> phenomena > >>>>> are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and > >> we > >>>>> have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in > >> practice. We > >>>>> believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand > >>>>> psychological terms that is fundamentally different than > >> Lavoisier’s > >>>>> attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be > >> right or > >>>>> wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways > >> that can > >>>>> be readily corrected over time… because the things we are > >> talking > >>>>> about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital > >> essence, or > >>>>> other mystical factors having been included. > >>>>> > >>>>> We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things > >> that > >>>>> _can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied. > >> They are > >>>>> aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be > >>>>> recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately > >> and > >>>>> explained well. > >>>>> > >>>>> Best, > >>>>> Eric > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the > >> rest. > >>>>>> What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak, > >> thereof > >>>>>> one must remain silent" is apparently that things like anxiety, > >>>>>> pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective > >>>>>> experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot > >> be > >>>>>> meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I > >> see it > >>>>>> differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never > >>>>>> understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the > >>>>>> depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that > >>>>>> substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just > >>>>>> linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the > >>>>>> interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages, > >>>>>> theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for > >> pain is > >>>>>> as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which the > >>>>>> agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts". > >> If we > >>>>>> describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal > >> by > >>>>>> definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to > >> feel > >>>>>> pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for > >> instance we > >>>>>> can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most > >> of > >>>>>> us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or > >> horse > >>>>>> ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which > >>>>>> looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg ). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the > >> film > >>>>>> maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema > >>>>>> conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, and > >> they > >>>>>> are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead > >> actor > >>>>>> because they see and hear what it goes through and they know > >> what it > >>>>>> feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According > >> to > >>>>>> Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must > >>>>>> remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know > >>>>>> what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the > >> hard > >>>>>> problem. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -J. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > >>>>>>> You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of > >> pain. > >>>>>> And > >>>>>>> … > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> You just cannot have it both ways. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> N > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Sent from my Dumb Phone > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini > >>>>>> created. > >>>>>>> And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I > >> asked > >>>>>> Claude > >>>>>>> and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I > >> asked > >>>>>> them > >>>>>>> if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience > >> - > >>>>>> gauge > >>>>>>> invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for > >>>>>>> subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was > >> able > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>> formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs > >>>>>> which > >>>>>>> have different personalities often gives better results than > >> just > >>>>>>> using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate > >> and > >>>>>>> precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field > >>>>>> theory > >>>>>>> of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics, > >> but > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also > >>>>>>> understand only half of it. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named > >> the > >>>>>> same, > >>>>>>> only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing > >> than > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the > >> appendix > >>>>>> with > >>>>>>> this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem > >> looks > >>>>>>> similar to this - in combination with the other things written > >> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> rest of the book. > >>>>>>> > >> https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some > >>>>>>> researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for > >> example > >>>>>> wrote > >>>>>>> he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as > >> regulations. In > >>>>>> a > >>>>>>> post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my > >>>>>>> behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of > >> various > >>>>>>> sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, > >> has > >>>>>>> been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can > >> be > >>>>>>> found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is > >> a > >>>>>> kind > >>>>>>> of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of > >> it > >>>>>> but > >>>>>>> for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what > >> it > >>>>>>> feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it > >> does > >>>>>> not > >>>>>>> scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the > >> animal > >>>>>> well > >>>>>>> you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for > >> example > >>>>>> by > >>>>>>> the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain > >> just as > >>>>>>> intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th > >>>>>>> eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we > >> still > >>>>>> eat > >>>>>>> pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We > >> Love > >>>>>> Dogs, > >>>>>>> Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -J. > >>>>>>> > >> -- > >> 8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ > >> ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς > >> δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα > >> σώσω. > >> > >> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. > >> --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > >> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > >> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > >> to (un)subscribe > >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > >> archives: 5/2017 thru present > >> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > >> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. > > / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > archives: 5/2017 thru present > > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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