Well... as I said...
There are many positive things people get out of wrestling with
impossible-to-solve problems. Zen kōan have a long history for a reason.
They are intended to be engaged with and answered, though never really
"solved", and many masters are said to have become enlightened by
contemplating them deeply. I hope you similarly benefit from this endeavor,
and I wish you the best.

Best,
Eric

<[email protected]>


On Tue, Nov 3, 2026 at 1:35 PM <[email protected]> wrote:

> We clearly have a different point of view here. I tried to find a
> solution for the really hard problems, esp. the problem of free will and
> the hard problem of subjective experience, because they are hard. As JFK
> said "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other
> things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard". Your
> point of view seems to be that this is nonsense, because there are
> problems that cannot not solved, where you simply cannot find a
> solution, and if you still try to solve them you have not understood the
> problem. A legitimate position. If this is the case then these problems
> should be renamed as "impossible problems", which might be accurate,
> because they are often impossible to solve completely.
>
> The name for the hard problem still fits though. It is not only hard to
> find a solution, it is also hard to find a consensus about what a
> solution looks like, and if there is a solution at atll. I believe you
> can find a solution and bridge the explanatory gap, not exactly, but
> approximately, and to find a good approximate solution is indeed hard.
> For me the hard problems are where it gets interesting, not where you
> give up. For example there are many differential equations that cannot
> be solved analytically as a finite combination of elementary functions.
> But mathematicians have not given up, they can use numerical methods
> (like Runge-Kutta) to approximate the behavior.
>
> In the same way we are able to understand the hard problem by using
> using all the tools we have invented over time to reach a approximate
> understanding. This approximate understanding is not 100% the same
> experience, but close enough to narrow the explanatory gap from Joseph
> Levine. Humans can't fly. But we can build machines that help us to
> reach the sky and go to the moon. Similarly Humans can't see what it is
> like to be another human. But we can build machines (movie cameras,
> go-pro cameras, cinemas) that help us to do it. Humans also don't know
> what its like to be an owl or cat that can see 10 times better than we
> do in the night. But if we use night-vision goggles, we can imagine what
> it is like to view things in the night. Humans don't know what its like
> to be a sperm whale or bat that can navigate in complete darkness. But
> if we consider the sonars that are common for submarines, we can imagine
> what it is like to view things by hearing: by sending out clicks and
> listening for echoes.
>
> Solving the hard problem is an achievement which is possible if we try
> to bridge the explanatory gap by using the tools we have invented over
> time. The interesting part is how the gap can be closed, although we
> normally cannot do it. Different sensory organs can be partially bridged
> by "goggles" like night night-vision goggles that extend our senses.
> Different life paths can be partially bridged by cinemas and movies
> which allow us to peek into the lives of others. Or simply by spending
> time with the person you try understand, by sharing the same path for a
> while.
>
> Every hard philosophical problem that can be solved approximately is an
> achievement. Free will is an achievement too, as Daniel Dennett wrote.
> It remains an illusion unless you try to have it. Even then it is hard.
> The interesting part to me is how we can achieve it, and how good this
> solution is, although we normally cannot find a solution. It is also
> interesting why the explanatory gap exists - which often has
> evolutionary reasons.
>
> Best
> Jochen
>
>
> On 2026-11-02 23:01, Eric Charles wrote:
> > Yeah.... Jochen...
> > I'm a bit confused by your reply as well... I am neither expressing
> > professional jealousy nor trying to angle for co-authorship on your
> > project... I'm trying to help you out here...
> >
> > I'm pointing out that "The Hard Problem" is more like a Zen Koan than
> > a clearly-specified problem. Those who buy into "The Hard Problem"
> > will insist that any success you might have in "solving it" is
> > indicative of your not understanding it. That isn't to denigrate your
> > work, it is specifically to address any expectation you might have
> > that when you are done someone, anyone, might agree that you have
> > "solved The Hard Problem." That's just not how the weird
> > socio-cultural game surrounding that "problem" works.
> >
> > IF you want to try to formalize our discussions of psychological
> > phenomenon, there are two reasonable ways approaches to The Hard
> > Problem: 1) Decide the "The Hard Problem" is legitimately pointing out
> > aspects of our experience about which we cannot speak sensibly... and
> > then really and truly let that stand... not trying to speak beyond
> > perhaps trying to demarcate the border, on the other side of which you
> > let silence reign. 2) Decide that there are only things about which we
> > can speak... and thereby fundamentally reject "The Hard Problem."
> >
> > As such: If you are trying to formalize psychology, and you think you
> > can provide words and formulae to talk meaningfully about everything
> > in that domain, i.e., if _you _think the domain contains only things
> > that words and formulae are capable of getting at, then _you _are
> > rejecting The Hard Problem.
> >
> > Of course, as Dave and Glen and others point out, there is no need to
> > care about any of this at all if formalizing (to whatever extent)
> > isn't your goal. Zen Koans aren't useless. Questions that ultimately
> > don't make sense can still transform our lives in meaningful ways, and
> > the world is often made better by virtue of containing people who
> > contemplate such questions. It may also be possible to get at things
> > artistically (poetically, musically, etc.) that cannot be gotten at
> > with formal systems of words and equations; that is a different
> > discussion.
> >
> > Formal systems have limits created by the fact of their formality, and
> > some people believe there are things that exist fundamentally beyond
> > the limitations of any such systems. The Hard Problem is a postulation
> > of exactly the latter sort of things. As a result: You may find
> > benefit in working on The Hard Problem, but what you can't find is "a
> > solution", because it is crucial to the premise that no solution can
> > work.
> >
> > Best,
> > Eric
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 2, 2026 at 1:35 PM glen <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> >> FWIW, I agree, though I like my phrasing better than yours: "if your
> >> language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless
> >> for talking about that target."
> >>
> >> The problem with natural languages like English is that you *can*
> >> express anything (or non-thing) in them. [⛧] And I'd argue without
> >> nonsense, paradox, or "non-truth". This is because it's not the
> >> *language* that forces those outcomes but the inferential system to
> >> which the language is bound. Most people in my network are very
> >> metaphorical thinkers, which allows them to slip and slide all over
> >> the place when they hear/read an expression whose bindings are
> >> ambiguous or unregistered. More literal thinkers like me aren't
> >> incapable of metaphorical flex-and-slop. But we tend to resist it,
> >> complain when we spot unregistered slippage.
> >>
> >> More cognitively powered people than me, have at their "fingertips"
> >> a suite of possible bindings they can don and doff as the tokens
> >> come in, setting the context. Those in this class who are
> >> charitable, either ask you helpful questions to choose which
> >> inferential system to bind to. Uncharitable ones (e.g.
> >> Wittgenstein?) balk and shunt, usually because they feel like their
> >> time would be better spent elsewhere (as Eric & Nick say in the
> >> blurb below). I'm OK with either type. I grew up with all sorts
> >> yelling RTFM at me. 8^D
> >>
> >> But it's important to place the blame where it belongs, at the
> >> inferential system, not the slippery language atop it. So I applaud
> >> Jochen's attempt(s) to whatever extent I can. "ὅτε oi μὲν
> >> ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς
> >> δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα
> >> σώσω."
> >>
> >> [⛧] A friend of mine is fond of asking "Why is there something
> >> rather than nothing?" It's a bit of a litmus test for a crowd's
> >> charitability. E.g. Sean Carroll is very charitable
> >> <https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02231>. I'm not. To me, it's a nonsense
> >> question and demonstrates the extent to which the asker is confused.
> >> But you can *still* express it. And if you're amongst a crowd of
> >> charitable people, especially if they're cognitively endowed, tokens
> >> like "nothing" can be well-defined if you bind to the right
> >> inferential system. I wonder if Wittgenstein ever met Dr. Seuss?
> >>> 8^D
> >>
> >> On 11/2/26 7:08 AM, Prof David West wrote:
> >>> I seem to have missed some entries in this thread (mockery??
> >> successor??), but I want to make a very specific comment about
> >> Wittgenstein.
> >>>
> >>> Reducing a theory to an aphorism almost always leads to
> >> misunderstanding. Wittgenstein did not mean, IMHO, don't speak; he
> >> merely said it is pointless to try to force fit something into a
> >> language that has been formally defined to exclude expressions of
> >> that thing.
> >>>
> >>> Or another way of thinking about it: if you define a language game
> >> with strict, formal, rules, and want to make a play in that game
> >> that is contravenes those rules you either have to cheat or not make
> >> the play.
> >>>
> >>> If our language game is English, with the verb 'to be' at its
> >> core, there are all kinds of things—keeping the context of
> >> psychology—"experiences" that are not, keeping with the rules,
> >> expressible in that language without creating nonsense, paradox, or
> >> "non-truth."
> >>>
> >>> A simple example" 'Nothing" is at least a concept, that, in
> >> English is necessarily a paradox because simply expressing the word
> >> makes it "Something."
> >>>
> >>> Wittgenstein never said, "shut up."
> >>>
> >>> davew
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, at 7:25 AM, [email protected] wrote:
> >>>> Eric,
> >>>>
> >>>> I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is
> >> that
> >>>> behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that
> >> someone
> >>>> else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been
> >> waiting
> >>>> patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor
> >> at an
> >>>> university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was
> >> and is
> >>>> not my intention.
> >>>>
> >>>> My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than
> >>>> yours.
> >>>> For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the
> >>>> cinemas
> >>>> I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological
> >> residue.
> >>>> This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our
> >> new AI
> >>>> friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node
> >>>> bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together
> >> if it
> >>>> looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas
> >> and
> >>>> write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
> >> Group
> >>>> solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you
> >> to
> >>>> get
> >>>> that academic position too.
> >>>>
> >>
> >
> https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActionReadiness.pdf
> >>>>
> >>>> Best wishes,
> >>>> Jochen
> >>>>
> >>>> On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote:
> >>>>> As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book
> >> (the one
> >>>>> I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation
> >> in
> >>>>> Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated
> >> drafts to
> >>>>> some readers... so if any of you are interested....
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question
> >> here:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers,
> >>>>> “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man
> >> schweigen,”
> >>>>> which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak,
> >> one
> >>>>> must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate
> >> that we
> >>>>> should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding
> >> the
> >>>>> mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime
> >> example of
> >>>>> that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is
> >> true,
> >>>>> either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then
> >> your
> >>>>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something
> >> that
> >>>>> exists only in your mental space, that only you could access,
> >> and my
> >>>>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something
> >> that
> >>>>> exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And
> >> _if_
> >>>>> that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such
> >> things all
> >>>>> we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about
> >> them
> >>>>> sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments
> >> demonstrated
> >>>>> this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in
> >>>>> combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many
> >> people
> >>>>> have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering
> >> proof
> >>>>> that a science of psychology is impossible.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we
> >> do
> >>>>> not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we
> >> understand
> >>>>> his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of
> >> psychology:
> >>>>> Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the
> >> phenomena
> >>>>> they are discussing are, inherently, an example of
> >>>>> that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are
> >>>>> discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak
> >> about
> >>>>> sensibly.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person
> >> deeply
> >>>>> interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the
> >> scrutinizing
> >>>>> you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that
> >>>>> cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to
> >> deal
> >>>>> with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that
> >> situation, and
> >>>>> then you should try to find other things to be interested in.
> >> We,
> >>>>> however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological
> >> phenomena
> >>>>> are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and
> >> we
> >>>>> have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in
> >> practice. We
> >>>>> believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand
> >>>>> psychological terms that is fundamentally different than
> >> Lavoisier’s
> >>>>> attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be
> >> right or
> >>>>> wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways
> >> that can
> >>>>> be readily corrected over time… because the things we are
> >> talking
> >>>>> about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital
> >> essence, or
> >>>>> other mystical factors having been included.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things
> >> that
> >>>>> _can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied.
> >> They are
> >>>>> aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be
> >>>>> recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately
> >> and
> >>>>> explained well.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Best,
> >>>>> Eric
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the
> >> rest.
> >>>>>> What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak,
> >> thereof
> >>>>>> one must remain silent" is apparently that things like anxiety,
> >>>>>> pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective
> >>>>>> experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot
> >> be
> >>>>>> meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I
> >> see it
> >>>>>> differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never
> >>>>>> understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the
> >>>>>> depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that
> >>>>>> substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just
> >>>>>> linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the
> >>>>>> interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages,
> >>>>>> theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for
> >> pain is
> >>>>>> as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which the
> >>>>>> agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts".
> >> If we
> >>>>>> describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal
> >> by
> >>>>>> definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to
> >> feel
> >>>>>> pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for
> >> instance we
> >>>>>> can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most
> >> of
> >>>>>> us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or
> >> horse
> >>>>>> ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which
> >>>>>> looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg ).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the
> >> film
> >>>>>> maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema
> >>>>>> conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, and
> >> they
> >>>>>> are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead
> >> actor
> >>>>>> because they see and hear what it goes through and they know
> >> what it
> >>>>>> feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According
> >> to
> >>>>>> Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must
> >>>>>> remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know
> >>>>>> what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the
> >> hard
> >>>>>> problem.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> -J.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> >>>>>>> You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of
> >> pain.
> >>>>>> And
> >>>>>>> …
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> You just cannot have it both ways.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> N
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Sent from my Dumb Phone
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini
> >>>>>> created.
> >>>>>>> And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I
> >> asked
> >>>>>> Claude
> >>>>>>> and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I
> >> asked
> >>>>>> them
> >>>>>>> if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience
> >> -
> >>>>>> gauge
> >>>>>>> invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for
> >>>>>>> subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was
> >> able
> >>>>>> to
> >>>>>>> formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs
> >>>>>> which
> >>>>>>> have different personalities often gives better results than
> >> just
> >>>>>>> using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate
> >> and
> >>>>>>> precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field
> >>>>>> theory
> >>>>>>> of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics,
> >> but
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also
> >>>>>>> understand only half of it.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named
> >> the
> >>>>>> same,
> >>>>>>> only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing
> >> than
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the
> >> appendix
> >>>>>> with
> >>>>>>> this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem
> >> looks
> >>>>>>> similar to this - in combination with the other things written
> >> in
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> rest of the book.
> >>>>>>>
> >> https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some
> >>>>>>> researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for
> >> example
> >>>>>> wrote
> >>>>>>> he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as
> >> regulations. In
> >>>>>> a
> >>>>>>> post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my
> >>>>>>> behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of
> >> various
> >>>>>>> sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”,
> >> has
> >>>>>>> been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can
> >> be
> >>>>>>> found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is
> >> a
> >>>>>> kind
> >>>>>>> of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of
> >> it
> >>>>>> but
> >>>>>>> for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what
> >> it
> >>>>>>> feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it
> >> does
> >>>>>> not
> >>>>>>> scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the
> >> animal
> >>>>>> well
> >>>>>>> you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for
> >> example
> >>>>>> by
> >>>>>>> the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain
> >> just as
> >>>>>>> intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th
> >>>>>>> eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we
> >> still
> >>>>>> eat
> >>>>>>> pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We
> >> Love
> >>>>>> Dogs,
> >>>>>>> Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -J.
> >>>>>>>
> >> --
> >> 8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ
> >> ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς
> >> δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα
> >> σώσω.
> >>
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