This morning's headlines indicate Bush-Cheney are indeed backtracking on
this issue, and tacking to another:
U.S. Not Claiming Iraqi Link To Terror
By Dana Priest Washington Post Staff Writer Tuesday, September 10, 2002;
Page A01
As it makes its case against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the Bush
administration has for now dropped what had been one of the central
arguments presented by supporters of a military campaign against Baghdad:
Iraq's links to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.
Although administration officials say they are still trying to develop a
strong case tying Hussein to global terrorism, the CIA has yet to find
convincing evidence despite having combed its files and redoubled its
efforts to collect and analyze information related to Iraq, according to
senior intelligence officials and outside experts with knowledge of
discussions within the U.S. government.
Most specifically, analysts who have scrutinized photographs, communications
intercepts and information from foreign informants have concluded they
cannot validate two prominent allegations made by high-ranking
administration officials: links between Hussein and al Qaeda members who
have taken refuge in northern Iraq and an April 2001 meeting in Prague
between Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence agent.
"It's a thin reed," said a senior intelligence official describing the
information on both cases.
As a result of the CIA's conclusions, the Bush administration has accepted
the notion that its stronger case against Iraq is Baghdad's apparent ongoing
attempt to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. President Bush
is expected to focus on this aspect during his speech Thursday to the United
Nations in which he will present the administration's Iraq policy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59403-2002Sep9.html
For what it's worth, I read a free Stratford intelligence briefing comparing
US and Iraq war plans as bedtime reading last night. It wasn't that
provocative, just logical, and didn't keep me awake. Essentially, the US
must either take Iraq in a stunning massive force, taking out the command
elite, or do it in segments that quickly cut off communications and order in
the highly centralized command structure SH enforces. The problem is that
the US has too many strategic goals, and Iraq only has one: to survive the
first assault is a victory for SH.
"War Plans I: Aims, Perceptions and Issues." @
http://www.stratfor.com/house/special/iraq_special_report.php
